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state court, superior court properly denied plea of former jeopardy to related charges of cocaine trafficking and other offenses; record didn’t show that state court solicitor was aware of the related charges at time of plea entry on the traffic charge. Evidence that solicitor was aware that defendant had felony charges pending doesn’t show that solicitor knew that the charges were related to the state court plea, citing Turner (June 4, 1999), below; Powe v. State, 257 Ga. 563, 563–565 (361 S.E.2d 811) (1987) (“defendant's statement in state court that he had another case pending against him in superior court, without further elaboration, was insufficient to show that the state court solicitor actually knew that the superior court charges arose out of the same conduct as the traffic offense to which the defendant pled guilty”). Cotman v. State, 328 Ga.App. 822, 762 S.E.2d 824 (August 13, 2014). In RICO prosecution, trial court properly denied plea in bar and special demurrer based on double jeopardy. Defendant’s first indictment charged defendant with RICO conspiracy and influencing witnesses. The conspiracy charge was based on 44 overt acts, including the influencing witnesses acts. Defendant filed a special demurrer to the count related to influencing witnesses, whereupon State nolle prossed that count and re-indicted defendant on that charge, leaving the RICO count of the first indictment pending. State then moved to join the two indictments for trial, to which defendant objected. Trial court denied joinder, and defendant was tried and acquitted on the second indictment. Defendant then filed plea in bar as to the RICO count of the first indictment. Held, trial court properly denied plea in bar; “pretermitting whether OCGA § 16–1–8(b) might otherwise bar a prosecution under the First Indictment, Cotman faces subsequent prosecution because she chose to have the two indictments tried separately. The State wanted the indictments tried together, as indicated by the filing of its motion to join them. It was Cotman who pursued a speedy trial on the Second Indictment only and objected to joinder, thereby indicating her desire to have the two indictments tried separately.” Citing “ Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152(II)(B) (97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168) (1977), [where] the United States Supreme Court found that even where a defendant is normally entitled to have charges ‘resolved in one proceeding, there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when he elects to have the two offenses tried separately and persuades the trial court to honor his election.’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.” State v. Pruiett, 324 Ga.App. 789, 751 S.E.2d 579 (November 18, 2013). Trial court properly granted plea in bar based on double jeopardy as to one drug charge, but not others. Officer found defendant in possession of alprazolam (Xanax) in her car; she then confessed to possessing more at her home. Another officer obtained a search warrant and found alprazolam, meth, clonazepam and marijuana at her home. Defendant was charged in one accusation with possession of alprazolam on July 30, 2013. She pled guilty to this charge. A second accusation then charged her with possession of meth, alprazolam, clonazepam, and marijuana. Trial court granted defendant’s plea in bar to prosecution of the second accusation. 1. Trial court properly granted plea in bar as to alprazolam in the second accusation. A. The possession of the two amounts of alprazolam didn’t arise out of the same conduct or transaction so as to be barred under OCGA § 16-1-7(a) and 16-1-8(a). “‘The phrase ‘the same conduct’ in [OCGA § 16–1–7] has been used interchangeably with the phrase ‘the same transaction.’ In determining whether two offenses arise from the same conduct or transaction, Georgia courts have considered whether the two crimes involve the same parties, circumstances, locations, and times. The courts also consider whether evidence of the other offenses could be presented without permitting evidence of the first offense or vice versa.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Morgan v. State, 220 Ga.App. 198, 199 (469 S.E.2d 340) (1996). Here, the two accusations against Pruiett arose from the discovery of one-milligram pills of Xanax in her car by the Trion police officer on July 30, 2010, and the discovery of two-milligram pills of the same drug, as well as methamphetamine, clonazepam, and marijuana, by the county investigator at Pruiett's home later on the same day. Although these discoveries were made on the same day, and although Pruiett was the common possessor in both cases, they occurred under different circumstances: Pruiett possessed the one-milligram doses in her car while traveling to an appointed drug deal, but shared possession of the two-milligram doses found later on July 30 at the home she shared with Day before beginning the trip culminating in her arrest. As we held in another case involving the discovery of drugs both at a failed drug deal and at the defendant's residence later on the same day, ‘[t]he incidents forming the basis of the two charges ... occurred on the same date, but at different times and locations,’ such that ‘each offense required proof of different facts and the offenses were not the same in law or fact.’ Poole v. State, 175 Ga.App. 374, 375(2) (333 S.E.2d 207) (1985); see also Kinchen v. State, 265 Ga.App. 474, 475–476 (594 S.E.2d 686) (2004) (following Poole and denying motion for acquittal as to convictions for possession of marijuana that a defendant attempted to sell to an undercover officer and for possession of the same drug later discovered in a warranted search of his home).” B. “Pruiett's prosecution under the second accusation for possession of the Xanax found at her house is barred by the procedural double jeopardy provisions of OCGA § 16– 1–8(b), however. ‘OCGA § 16–1–8(b)(1) bars prosecution if an accused has been ‘formerly prosecuted for a different crime or for the same crime based upon different facts, ’ if the former prosecution ‘[r]esulted in either a conviction or an acquittal and the subsequent prosecution [i] is for a crime of which the accused could have been convicted on the former prosecution, [ii] is for a crime with which the accused should have been charged on the former prosecution (unless the