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court ordered a separate trial of such charge), or [iii] is for a crime which involves the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution or the crime was not consummated when the former trial began.’ (Emphasis supplied.) See McCannon [ v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 519 (315 S.E.2d 413) (1984)] (OCGA § 16–1–8(b)(1) ‘is worded in the disjunctive so that either (i), (ii), or (iii) is sufficient to establish the bar’). Here, the State charged Pruiett with the identical crime of possession of an unspecified amount of Xanax on July 30, 2010, in two accusations, the second of which was brought after Pruiett had pled guilty to the first. We also note that the record before us does not include a transcript of the hearing at which Pruiett pled guilty to the first accusation, with the result that we cannot determine whether the factual bases for that plea included possession of the drug in both her car and her home. … Under these circumstances, which include the State's charging Pruiett in the second accusation with a crime identical to that to which she had already pled guilty, the State has not shown that Pruiett was not convicted of possessing both the Xanax found in her car and that found in her home when she entered her guilty plea to the first accusation.” 2. Prosecution for other substances, not part of same transaction, wasn’t barred by prior guilty plea to possession of alprazolam. Banks v. State, 320 Ga.App. 98, 739 S.E.2d 414 (March 5, 2013). In prosecution for drug-related offenses, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on double jeopardy. Defendant was charged with two sets of drug charges occurring on the same day. Defendant pled to the first set of charges before the file on the second set of charges was delivered to the DA’s office. Held, trial court properly found no double jeopardy because the record didn’t show that the prosecutor was aware of the second set of the charges when the first charge(s) were concluded. Johns v. State, 319 Ga.App. 718, 738 S.E.2d 304 (February 8, 2013). Guilty plea to criminal trespass didn’t prohibit subsequent prosecution for DUI arising out of same incident but not part of the “same transaction.” “[Johns] got into an argument with his live-in girlfriend on March 23, 2010 [,] and damaged some of her clothes. She called the police[,] and [Johns] left driving his vehicle. One of the police officers went to the residence at 109 Godly Road, Brunswick, Georgia[,] and the girlfriend told the police that the Defendant left driving and that he was drinking alcoholic beverages. Another police officer stopped the Defendant at the intersection of Godley Road and Hwy. 99 in Glynn County, Georgia. [Johns] was charged with Driving Under the Influence and taken to jail. [Johns] made bond[,] and on April 15, 2010[,] he was arrested for criminal trespass (FVA) for the incident that occurred on March 23, 2010[,] with his girlfriend. Thereafter, Johns pleaded guilty to criminal trespass.” Held, the two offenses “did not arise from the same transaction.” “[T]he two incidents were separate transactions, one of which had been completed prior to the other, and both of which could be presented to a trier of fact without disclosing evidence of the other offense. See [ State v. Stewart, 317 Ga.App. 82, 85-86, 729 S.E.2d 478 (2012)] (reversing trial court grant of double jeopardy motion because obstruction charges did not arise from the same conduct as underlying traffic charges); Boyette [ v. State, 172 Ga.App. 683, 684(1), 324 S.E.2d 540 (1984)] (affirming the denial of a plea of double jeopardy in defendant's trial for five traffic offenses after pleading guilty to disorderly conduct because the disorderly conduct, which constituted actions the driver committed after leaving the roadway ‘were completed at a different time and at [a] different location[ ]’).” Accord, Jackson (March 10, 2016), above. Hassard v. State, 319 Ga.App. 708, 738 S.E.2d 293 (February 7, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; no double-jeopardy violation where defendant was convicted of DUI in two separate counties, about an hour apart. While double jeopardy prohibits separate convictions for the same offense arising out of a single source of conduct, here “there were two separate courses of conduct. When Hassard collided with the woman's vehicle in Fulton County, he got out of his vehicle, walked to her vehicle, had an extended conversation with her as she spoke with the police dispatcher, got back into his vehicle and began to follow her to a parking lot, but then drove away after driving back by the scene. Hassard collided with another vehicle in Gwinnett County nearly an hour later. This evidence showed that at two different times and in two different locations, Hassard drove under the influence of alcohol to the extent he was less safe albeit on the same day. See Lefler v. State, 210 Ga.App. 609, 609–610(1), 436 S.E.2d 777 (1993) (DUI and vehicular homicide prosecution in Fulton County not barred where defendant hit a pedestrian in Fulton County but was arrested and charged with DUI in Cobb County approximately four hours later).” Distinguishing State v. Willis, 149 Ga.App. 509, 254 S.E.2d 743 (1979) (double jeopardy barred DUI convictions in two counties arising out of a single, continuous high-speed chase). State v. Stewart, 317 Ga.App. 82, 729 S.E.2d 478 (June 22, 2012). In prosecution for making false statement and evidence tampering, trial court erred in granting plea in bar based on double jeopardy. Charged with traffic offenses and driving while license suspended, defendant delivered to prosecutor a letter allegedly from his employer, asserting that he was acting in the scope of his employment (and thus pursuant to a limited driving permit) at the time of the traffic stop. He made a similar statement to an investigator. He later pled to the traffic charges, then was charged with offenses related to