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Birdette affirmed that he had discussed the issue with his trial counsel and was giving up his right to a jury trial.” Barnes concurs specially, urging trial courts conduct a more detailed colloquy with mentally retarded defendants, such as was done in Jones (January 27, 2010), below. Seitman v. State, 320 Ga.App. 646, 740 S.E.2d 368 (March 21, 2013). Convictions for serious injury by vehicle and reckless driving affirmed; record showed valid waiver of jury trial. “We find no merit in Seitman's contention that to knowingly and intelligently waive a jury trial, she must be informed by the trial court of all the complexities of the jury process.” Defense counsel testified that he discussed the waiver with defendant, because he thought a judge would be more receptive to their technical legal defense. Defendant, a college graduate, had previously served on a trial jury herself. “‘Although Georgia appellate courts have often noted that it would be preferable to have defendant's personal participation spread on the record in open court, to forestall subsequent claims of lack of participation or an intelligent or knowing waiver, nonetheless, there is no legal precedent requiring an in court waiver of the right of a jury trial.’ (Citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) Davis v. State, 287 Ga.App. 783, 785(2), 653 S.E.2d 107 (2007). While a colloquy with the trial court may establish a knowing and voluntary waiver, it is not required when the State presents other extrinsic evidence sufficient to establish a waiver. Id. at 786(2), 653 S.E.2d 107.” Accord, Green (March 30, 2015), above. Ealey v. State, 310 Ga.App. 893, 714 S.E.2d 424 (July 14, 2011). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses reversed; trial court erred in finding that defendant’s waiver of jury trial was voluntary. Rather, jury trial waiver was coerced by trial court, which promised defendant a certain sentence and a supersedeas bond if he had a bench trial, but told defendant he could be sentenced to up to 41 years if convicted at jury trial. Analogized to cases on voluntariness of guilty plea, including Pride v. Kemp , 289 Ga. 353, 711 S.E.2d 653 (June 13, 2011) (trial court coerced guilty plea by telling defendant she would impose harsher sentence after trial, commenting on strength of State’s case). Andrews and Dillard dissent, argue trial court here only discussed maximum sentence, without threatening defendant with it. Distinguished, Talton v. State , 324 Ga.App. 9, 749 S.E.2d 18 (September 25, 2013) (court encouraged State to agree to bench trial after defendant had already consented). Jones v. State, 302 Ga.App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (January 27, 2010). At defendant’s armed robbery trial, “[e]vidence supported the trial court's express finding … that Jones knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. When Jones's counsel announced that he had talked to Jones ‘extensively’ about a jury trial versus a bench trial, and that from day one, Jones had expressed his desire for a bench trial, the judge spoke to Jones directly and informed him that he had the right to a jury trial, that twelve persons would sit in judgment in a jury trial, and that the prosecutor would bear the burden of convincing each one of the twelve persons of Jones's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge explained the voir dire process and made clear that by waiving the right to a jury trial, Jones would be forfeiting the voir dire process and his right to have the twelve persons chosen through that process decide his guilt or innocence, and that the judge instead would be making that determination. Jones confirmed his understanding of such and stated he would rather have a bench trial. At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Jones's trial attorney confirmed that in pretrial discussions, he had explained to Jones ‘extensively’ the differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, going over the whole process, and that Jones understood such and wanted a bench trial. Under these circumstances, the record shows that Jones knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. See Ray v. State, 292 Ga.App. 575, 577(2) (665 S.E.2d 345) (2008).” Cited with approval, Birdette (September 9, 2013), above. Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga.App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (January 8, 2008). Aggravated assauly and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s waiver of jury trial was valid, though not in writing. “Here, the record shows that the trial court spoke with Defrancisco regarding his decision to waive a jury trial, and thereby obtained a valid oral waiver of Defrancisco’s right to the same. Specifically, the trial court confirmed that Defrancisco understood that he had an absolute right to a jury trial; that he understood the implications of waiving such a right; and that, upon such understanding in consultation with counsel, he elected to waive a jury trial and to proceed before the trial court sitting alone.” Allison v. State, 288 Ga.App. 482, 654 S.E.2d 628 (November 20, 2007). Defendant’s conviction (for possession of firearm by convicted felon) at bench trial reversed; “ the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial ” where the waiver was made by defense counsel outside defendant’s presence. “In this case, the record does not contain a colloquy between the trial court and Allison about his right to or waiver of a jury trial, nor is there any writing signed by Allison showing that he waived his right to a jury trial. As a result, the State attempts to satisfy its burden of proving that Allison personally, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently chose to waive his right to a jury trial through the use of extrinsic evidence.” No sufficient extrinsic