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evidence was shown , however. 1. Counsel’s waiver in defendant’s presence not sufficient: Defense counsel couldn’t remember whether he discussed it with defendant or not. “Defense counsel’s announcement that he was waiving Allison’s right to a jury trial, in Allison’s presence, does not suffice to prove a knowing and intelligent waiver. Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 575(1) (571 S.E.2d 368) (2002). Instead, ‘the most that can be said is that the defendant voluntarily waived a jury.’ Id. Defense counsel’s testimony that the decision to waive a jury trial rested with him, not Allison, renders the remainder of his testimony insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Accord, Jones v. State , 294 Ga.App. 169, 670 S.E.2d 104 (October 21, 2008) (written waiver of defense counsel and participation in bench trial by defendant not sufficient to show knowing waiver); Alexander v. State , 311 Ga.App. 95, 714 S.E.2d 739 (July 18, 2011) (counsel’s waiver of jury trial at calendar call, outside defendant’s presence, not effective); Budeanu v. State , 325 Ga.App. 177, 751 S.E.2d 924 (November 22, 2013). 2. Prior guilty pleas are not evidence of intentional waiver of jury trial right. “Because the trial court erred by relying on Allison’s previous guilty pleas to find a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial in this case, we must reverse. In several fairly recent opinions, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that guilty pleas from other cases ‘cannot substitute’ for the waiver of constitutional rights in the case at issue. Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162(1) (535 S.E.2d 760) (2000). See also State v. Futch, 279 Ga. 300, 301(2) (612 S.E.2d 796) (2005); Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 482(1) (591 S.E.2d 802) (2004). As a result, we disapprove of any statement to the contrary in McCollum v. State, 201 Ga.App. 493, 494(1) (411 S.E.2d 328) (1991). … This erroneous view of the law forecloses any contention that counsel had a routine or standard practice that met constitutional muster regarding a waiver that counsel did not believe to be required.” 3. Trial judge’s affidavit that “[i]n all criminal cases, I make certain that the defendant is proceeding with a bench trial freely, voluntarily, and intelligently,” and that “I would not have conducted a bench trial had I not personally obtained the consent of the defendant Allison” was not sufficient. “The trial court's affidavit also fails to meet the State’s burden. At best, it merely establishes that Allison voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial by consenting to it. See McCormick v. State, 222 Ga.App. 753, 756(1) (476 S.E.2d 271) (1996). It fails, however, to show that Allison’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. The senior judge does not summarize the details of his specific colloquy with Allison, and his affidavit contains no details about the specific steps taken by the senior judge in general to ‘make certain that the defendant is proceeding with a bench trial freely, voluntarily and intelligently.’ As a result, it is conclusory and cannot establish a valid waiver of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. See Green v. State, 279 Ga. 687, 689 (620 S.E.2d 788) (2005); Jones v. State, 260 Ga.App. 251, 252- 253(2) (581 S.E.2d 315) (2003).” Accord, Green (September 11, 2013), above. Edwards v. State, 285 Ga.App. 227, 645 S.E.2d 699 (May 4, 2007). Armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed. Sixteen year-old defendant “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.” “The right to a trial by jury ‘is one of those fundamental constitutional rights that the defendant must personally, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently choose to waive.’ Watson v. State, 274 Ga. 689, 691(2) (558 S.E.2d 704) (2002). Before finding such waiver, the trial court ‘should ask the defendant sufficient questions on the record so that the court can ensure the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.’ Id. The waiver, however, need not follow any particular form. See Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 573, 574(2) (592 S.E.2d 666) (2004). ‘[T]he only real issue is whether [the defendant] intelligently agreed to a trial without jury.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id.” “ The record … shows that the trial court spoke with Edwards and his mother personally about the decision to waive a jury trial. The judge explained that Edwards had the right to have his case decided by twelve jurors, then offered him more time to discuss the waiver of this right with defense counsel. The trial court also confirmed that defense counsel had addressed the benefits and hazards of a jury trial with his client. The record reveals no error in the trial court’s determination that Edwards knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. See Watson, supra, 274 Ga. at 691(2); Wingfield v. State, 226 Ga.App. 448, 449(3) (486 S.E.2d 676) (1997).” Distinguishing State v. Rodriguez, 274 Ga. 728 (559 S.E.2d 435) (2002), which sets out factors to be considered in determining voluntariness of a minor’s custodial statement/ waiver of right to remain silent. “See Whitaker v. State, 256 Ga.App. 436, 439(2) (568 S.E.2d 594) (2002) (‘The question of whether a defendant is capable or incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights is to be answered by the trial judge and will be accepted by this court unless such determination is clearly erroneous.’) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Accord, Simmons v. State , 321 Ga.App. 743, 743 S.E.2d 434 (May 13, 2013) (record supported finding of waiver where “the trial court asked Simmons if he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and asked whether Simmons was ‘voluntarily and knowingly waiving’ his right to a trial by jury, and Simmons responded affirmatively to both questions”); Talton v. State , 324 Ga.App. 9, 749 S.E.2d 18 (September 25, 2013). Portilla v. State, 285 Ga.App. 401, 646 S.E.2d 277 (April 26, 2007). Aggravated assault and firearms convictions remanded on other grounds. “The constitutional right to a jury trial is ‘one of the three inherently personal rights of fundamental importance.’ Wooten v. State, 162 Ga.App. 719, 720 (293 S.E.2d 11) (1982) (citation and punctuation omitted). As such, the defendant must personally participate in the waiver of this constitutional right; and when the