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purported waiver of this right is questioned, the state bears the burden of showing the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Jackson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 559, 560 (560 S.E.2d 62) (2002). The record shows that Portilla personally participated in the waiver of his right to a jury trial and provides abundant support for the trial court’s findings as to the validity of the waiver. Neither error nor the need for a remand for resolution of the issue appears.” State v. Henderson, 283 Ga.App. 111, 640 S.E.2d 686 (December 19, 2006). Dismissal of firearms and related charges reversed. Suggests, in dicta, that a bench trial without express waiver of jury trial by State would be void: “As our Supreme Court recently made clear, a defendant has no unilateral right to have his criminal case decided by a bench trial without the acquiescence of the State. [citing Zigan (November 30, 2006), below.] Acquiescence was neither sought nor given in Henderson’s case.” Here, trial court dismissed accusation charging defendant with possession of firearm by convicted felon based on argument of counsel, without evidentiary hearing. Court of Appeals holds that no trial was conducted, dismissal was on motion and not a finding of not guilty following trial, and thus State has right to appeal; but suggests in language quoted here that bench trial without express acquiescence by State would have been ineffective, anyway. Zigan v. State, 281 Ga. 415, 638 S.E.2d 322 (November 30, 2006). Interlocutory appeal in involuntary manslaughter prosecution. Trial court properly ruled that it could not conduct a bench trial instead of a jury trial over the State’s objection, notwithstanding defendant’s waiver of jury trial. “Although [defendants’] waiver of the right to trial by jury appears adequate, the refusal of the prosecution to consent left the trial court with no choice but to deny the demand.” Adopts principles from Glass v. State, 250 Ga. 736(1), 300 S.E.2d 812 (1983), quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930), that waiver requires consent of government counsel. “Although Glass is not directly on point since it involves waiver of a unanimous verdict rather than waiver of jury trial entirely, the principles it imported into Georgia jurisprudence from the decision in Patton apply with equal force to the issue of a defendant’s demand for a bench trial instead of a jury trial. In fact, the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Patton which was quoted in Glass expressly addressed both waiver of a unanimous verdict and waiver of jury trial altogether.” Sears dissents. See also Henderson (December 19, 2006), above (suggesting that State must expressly acquiesce to bench trial.). State can’t appeal trial court’s wrongful denial of jury trial, see Howard v. Lane , 276 Ga. 688, 581 S.E.2d 1 (May 19, 2003). Distinguished, Smith v. State , 291 Ga.App. 725, 662 S.E.2d 817 (May 30, 2008) (where defendant waived right to jury trial, she can’t raise State’s objection to bench trial on appeal). Coursey v. State, 281 Ga.App. 494, 636 S.E.2d 669 (August 17, 2006). Theft by taking conviction affirmed. “Coursey contends that she was denied her right to a jury trial. The record reveals, however, that she waived this right in the term of court before her bench trial began and only at that time did she seek to revoke the waiver. ‘[I]t was [Coursey’s] burden to revoke the waiver in such fashion so as not to delay the trial or impede the cause of justice. [Cit.]’ Mojica v. State, 210 Ga.App. 826, 826-827(1) (437 S.E.2d 806) (1993). In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not err in refusing to revoke her waiver of a jury trial. See id. (attempt to revoke waiver of jury trial on the eve of trial untimely).” Lindo v. State, 278 Ga.App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (March 15, 2006). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s request for bench trial instead of jury trial. “[E]ven though defendants may waive or renounce what the law has established in their favor, they have no right to demand that they be tried by the court without a jury. Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 669(1) (25 S.E.2d 295) (1943). [footnote: There is no federal constitutional right to a trial by judge alone and no such right existed at common law. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26-27 (85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630) (1965).] Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Lindo’s request for a bench trial.” Young v. State, 273 Ga.App. 151, 614 S.E.2d 257 (May 3, 2005). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Unlike the defendant in McCormick v. State, 222 Ga.App. 753 (476 S.E.2d 271) (1996), who was never made aware of his right to a jury trial, Young was made aware of this right by the trial court. The court asked Young ‘on the record whether he wished to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial.’ Watson v. State, 274 Ga. 689, 691(2) 558 S.E.2d 704) (2002). Only after receiving Young’s ‘oral assurance’ that he wished to waive his right to a trial by jury and proceed with a bench trial did the court accept Young’s waiver. Id. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Young ‘personally, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury.’ Id. Young himself elected to have a bench trial, he was aware of his right to a jury trial, and he ‘personally made a knowing and intelligent waiver of’ this right. Pahnke v. State, 203 Ga.App. 88, 90 (416 S.E.2d 324) (1992). We find no basis for reversal.” Accord, Brumbelow v. State , 289 Ga.App. 520, 657 S.E.2d 603 (February 7, 2008) (defendant personally waived right on the record); Thomas v. State , 297 Ga.App. 416, 677 S.E.2d 433 (April 9, 2009) (Criminal trespass