☢ test - Í

conviction affirmed; trial court’s colloquy with defendant, regarding waiver of right to jury trial and proceeding with bench trial, was sufficient to demonstrate ‘that Thomas knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial,’ although colloquy did not occur until State’s first witness had testified on direct ). Harris v. State, 269 Ga.App. 234, 603 S.E.2d 749 (August 24, 2004). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. “‘While the defendant must personally and intelligently participate in the waiver of the right to trial by jury, there is no legal precedent which requires that waiver be done in court.’ [Cit.] In fact, the Supreme Court announced two post-trial methods by which the state could successfully carry its burden of proving a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial: (1) by showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived; or (2) by filing a silent or incomplete record through the use of extrinsic evidence which affirmatively shows that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Roberts v. Greenway , 233 Ga. 473, 475(1), 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975) …. In the present case, Harris’ trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he and Harris discussed the advantages and disadvantages of trial by jury and trial by the court, that Harris understood why they were not having a jury trial, and that Harris ‘was in complete agreement’ with proceeding without a jury for tactical reasons.” “In the present case, the extrinsic evidence clearly showed that Harris made a personal, knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. The trial court did not err when it denied Harris’ motion for a new trial based on this ground.” Accord, Alvarado v. State , 271 Ga.App. 714, 610 S.E.2d 675 (February 18, 2005); Fleming v. State , 282 Ga.App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769 (October 17, 2006); Annaswamy v. State , 284 Ga.App. 6, 642 S.E.2d 917 (March 7, 2007). Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 573, 592 S.E.2d 666 (February 2, 2004). Malice murder conviction affirmed. “Brown contends that he did not intelligently waive his right to a jury trial, because the trial court did not advise him … [that] a bench trial creates fewer possible grounds for appellate review. For example, the conduct of voir dire and jury instructions are not a potential basis for reversal. However, the purpose of a trial, with or without a jury, is not to create issues for appeal. In the criminal context, it is a proceeding to determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense he is charged with committing. Thus, there is not any requirement that the trial court expressly inform the accused of those particular appellate issues which waiver of a jury trial will obviate.” (Defendant was specifically advised that the judge would sit as “the judge of both the law as well as the judge of the facts, and he will decide all factual issues.”) Accord, Ray v. State , 292 Ga.App. 575, 665 S.E.2d 345 (June 12, 2008); Mastrogiovanni v. State , 324 Ga.App. 739, 751 S.E.2d 536 (November 15, 2013). Bennett v. State, 262 Ga.App. 800, 586 S.E.2d 704 (August 19, 2003). Conviction for obstruction of officer affirmed. Where the record showed “ample evidence … of Bennett’s repeated efforts to delay his trial” over a two year period (including “twice requesting a continuance for a mental evaluation but then refusing to cooperate with the evaluator, as well as twice requesting replacement of his attorney”), the court properly refused to allow withdrawal of his written waiver of jury trial. “‘While a defendant may waive trial by jury at any time on or before trial, he may revoke the waiver provided he acts timely and in such season as not substantially to delay or impede the cause of justice, and especially where the State makes no point as to delay or prejudice,’” quoting and easily distinguishing Carleton v. State , 176 Ga.App. 399, 336 S.E.2d 333 (1985). Jenkins v. State, 259 Ga.App. 47, 576 S.E.2d 300 (December 23, 2002). Burglary and related convictions remanded for determination whether jury waiver was knowing and voluntary. Prior to defendant’s bench trial, a form titled “Waiver of Trial by Jury” was filed. Signed by defendant and his counsel, it read “Comes now the defendant above-named and herein waives his right to a Trial by Jury and makes his/her request for a trial by the Court.” Held, while this is some indication that defendant “waived his right to a jury trial, there is no evidence that he did so knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. ‘When the purported waiver of this right is questioned, the State bears the burden of showing that the waiver was made both intelligently and knowingly, either (1) by showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived; or (2) by filling a silent or incomplete record through the use of extrinsic evidence which affirmatively shows that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.’” Quoting Jones v. State , 212 Ga.App. 676, 679(2), 442 S.E.2d 908 (1994). Accord, Davis v State , 287 Ga.App. 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (October 10, 2007) (Defendant’s waiver of right to jury trial was adequately proven by extrinsic evidence where defense counsel testified on motion for new trial that he had discussions with defendant and “the two of [us] made the determination to waive the jury trial.”); Chase v. State , 293 Ga.App. 415, 667 S.E.2d 195 (August 25, 2008) (same as Davis ).