☢ test - Í

Bostic v. State, 252 Ga.App. 242, 555 S.E.2d 894 (November 1, 2001). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions reversed; although the trial court stated on the record that defendant and his co-defendant waived their demand for a jury trial, there was no evidence that the trial court conducted an inquiry of defendant or informed him of the rights he was waiving. Slater v. State, 251 Ga.App. 620, 555 S.E.2d 8 (September 20, 2001). After a bench trial conviction, defense counsel informed the court that defendant had not waived his right to a jury trial. The court informed defendant and his counsel to have a seat in the courtroom and the court would “get a jury before this term is over with and [defendant] can retry it again....” Defendant agreed, but ignored the court’s instructions and he and his attorney left the court. Held, judgment affirmed because although the trial court was prepared to afford defendant his right to a jury trial even after the bench trial was concluded, defendant waived the right when he and his counsel ignored the trial court’s instruction to remain in the courtroom until a jury trial could be arranged. Further held, the Court cannot reward counsel’s behavior by insisting on the technical requirements of a formal waiver when counsel admitted he planned a cynical manipulation of the judicial process by proceeding with the bench trial and later asserting his right to a jury trial if the result of the bench trial did not please him. Gary v. State, 241 Ga.App. 76, 526 S.E.2d 148 (November 23, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for reckless conduct affirmed; record showed that defendant assented to waiver of jury trial: “‘“A criminal defendant must personally and intelligently participate in the waiver of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. When the purported waiver of this right is questioned, the State bears the burden of showing [that] the waiver was made both intelligently and knowingly, either (1) by showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived; or (2) by filling a silent or incomplete record through the use of extrinsic evidence which affirmatively shows that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.”’ [Cit.] Jones v. State, 212 Ga.App. 676, 679(2), 442 S.E.2d 908 (1994).” Defendant here testified at motion for new trial “that he met with defense counsel prior to trial, that counsel explained to him ‘everything about what a bench trial is and what a jury trial is,’ and that he agreed to let counsel decide whether to try the case before a judge or jury. In Gary's own words, ‘I left that in [counsel's] hands....’ … In a not-guilty plea signed by Gary, he attested that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to trial by jury and was requesting a bench trial.” Accord, Whitaker v. State , 256 Ga.App. 436, 568 S.E.2d 594 (July 9, 2002); Cooper v. State , 324 Ga.App. 451, 751 S.E.2d 102 (November 4, 2013). Q. OVERBROAD Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 690 S.E.2d 827 (March 15, 2010). Sex offender registration requirement was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant, convicted of false imprisonment of a 17-year old. No equal protection violation – not “over-inclusive because it requires him to register as a sexual offender even though the offense that he committed against a minor did not involve sexual activity.” Employs rational basis test, as defendant is not a member of a suspect class. “[I]t is rational to conclude that requiring those who falsely imprison minors who are not the child's parent to register pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 advances the State's legitimate goal of informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm them. Indeed, it is not unreasonable or completely arbitrary to believe that a child may be more at risk of harm from someone who would falsely imprison the child who is not the child's parent. Again, the fact that Rainer's offense did not involve sexual activity is of no consequence. The term ‘sexual offender’ is specifically defined in OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(20)(A) as ‘any individual ... [w]ho has been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual offense.’ (Emphasis supplied).” Hunstein, writing for Benham, dissents from this ruling, would find the statute to be over-inclusive. “The majority concludes that it is rational to require non-parental false imprisoners of minors to register as sex offenders in order to ‘protect [ ] children from those who would harm them.’ [Cit.] But the statutory scheme creating the sex offender registry seeks to protect children not from all harm, but from harm by those who have committed certain designated offenses,” noting statistics that most non-parental kidnappings do not involve sexual assault. Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (January 12, 2009). Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq., is not overly broad. “[O]ther jurisdictions have consistently rejected overbreadth challenges to anti-gang legislation by relying on some combination of the following factors: the aforementioned requirements of active participation with knowledge and specific intent, a legislative declaration of a compelling state interest, a legislative exclusion of constitutionally protected activities, and definitions of key terminology. Bjerregaard, [ The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 Campbell L.Rev. 31, 42(III)(B) (1998)]. See also State v. Bennett, 782 N.E.2d 101, 111(V) (Ohio App., 2002); Helton v. State, [[624 N.E.2d 499, 508-511(I)(B)(2) (Ind.App., 1993)]. Each of