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these factors is present in this case under our construction of the Act. As a result, we conclude that OCGA § 16-15-4(a) does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally overbroad.” Accord, In re: K.R.S ., 284 Ga. 853, 672 S.E.2d 622 (January 26, 2009). Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 638 S.E.2d 292 (November 29, 2006). “OCGA § 16-8-60(b), which criminalizes the possession and distribution of sounds or images in violation of copyright protection,” is neither “(1) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or (2) preempted by federal copyright law.” As to overbreadth : plurality finds that the statute does not impinge on pure speech. “At most, the statute regulates a combination of commercial conduct and speech.” “‘Under the test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672) (1968), the government may regulate conduct that may have both speech and ‘nonspeech’ elements if the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.’ State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 S.E.2d 547) (1990). OCGA § 16-8-60(b) meets the O'Brien test. It aims to protect the public and entertainment industry from piracy and bootlegging, a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to free speech concerns. To the extent that it can be said that it curtails an artist’s or transferor’s desire to remain anonymous, [fn] its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is minimal. Compare Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 S.E.2d 916) (1991) (statute banning motor vehicle decal containing profane words substantially affects protected speech) with State v. Miller, supra (anti-mask law does not affect a substantial amount of innocent behavior). The statute is not, therefore, overbroad.” Hunstein and Carley concur specially to say that the statute as written is overbroad in that it facially applies to protected speech, but the “palpable” intent of the legislature enables the Court to interpret the statute to apply only to pirated, copyrighted materials. Melton, also writing for Sears, dissents, arguing that the statute is overbroad and cannot be rescued by judicial interpretation. State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 629 S.E.2d 252 (April 25, 2006). By 5-2 majority, Supreme Court affirms trial court’s holding that OCGA § 16-11-34 (prohibiting disrupting a lawful meeting) is unconstitutionally overbroad (although disagreeing that it is unconstitutionally vague). Statute is overbroad because it “does not require proof of a person’s intent to disrupt or prevent a lawful meeting as an element of the offense. Nor does it require that the committed act substantially impair the ordinary conduct of the meeting. Under the literal language of the statute, the only proof required is that the person recklessly or knowingly committed any act that may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering or procession. It does not matter under the statute where or when the accused commits the proscribed act; it does not even matter whether the act, upon its commission, results in any actual prevention or disruption. Any recklessly or knowingly committed act that could reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering or procession is a misdemeanor, regardless where it is committed, how trivial the act, its impact, or the intent of the actor other than the intent to commit the act itself. OCGA § 16-11-34(a) thus applies to the reckless or knowing commission of such acts as heckling a referee at a sports venue, leaving on the audible ringer of a cellphone during a business symposium, changing lanes into a funeral procession on a rainy day, even playing the stereo loudly in an apartment while a neighbor hosts a dinner party. These examples demonstrate that the literal language of OCGA § 16- 11-34(a) reaches conduct that is at once innocent and protected by the guarantees of free speech, thereby affecting and chilling constitutionally protected activity.” Here, defendants were being prosecuted for standing silently in support of another citizen who refused to relinquish the podium during a Valdosta City Council meeting. Majority refuses to construe the legislation to require intent to disrupt and actual disruption, as suggested by Carley and Hines in dissent. Majority: “This Court may construe statutes to avoid absurd results, e.g., State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 (312 S.E.2d 601) (1984), and has the authority to narrow a statute to avoid unconstitutional infirmities. E.g., Howard v. State, 272 Ga. 242(1) (527 S.E.2d 194) (2000). However, under our system of separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes. ” Dissent: “ To withstand constitutional attack, a statute or ordinance which prohibits speech ‘must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.’ [Cit.] (Emphasis supplied.),” quoting Howard v. State , 272 Ga. 242, 243(1), 527 S.E.2d 194 (2000). “Compare State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674(2) (398 S.E.2d 547) (1990) (narrowing construction as to intent was necessary and was accomplished even though statute did not contain any language of intent).” R. PRESENCE 1. DEFENDANT ABSENT New case! Everhart v. State, A16A0652, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3064872 (May 25, 2016). Child cruelty convictions affirmed; defendant’s presence at doctor’s deposition, read at trial, was waived by acquiescence. Defense counsel waived defendant’s presence at the deposition, without first consulting with defendant. “When Dr. Greenbaum’s deposition was later introduced at trial, neither Everhart nor his attorney objected. This silence constituted