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Everhart’s acquiescence in the waiver of his presence at the deposition. See Holsey [ v. State , 271 Ga. 856, 861 (5) (524 S.E.2d 473) (1999)] (when defendant’s ‘counsel made no objection and [defendant] remained silent as well,’ court concluded that defendant ‘acquiesced in the proceedings that occurred ... in his absence’); Zamora v. State , 291 Ga. 512, 519-20 (7)(c) (731 S.E.2d 658) (2012) (appellant’s failure to object upon discovering the details of a bench conference conducted in his absence amounted to acquiescence).” Pack v. State, 335 Ga.App. 783, 783 S.E.2d 146 (February 23, 2016). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no violation of right to be present where trial court conferred with potential juror and counsel at the bench, then excused the juror on (erroneous) legal grounds. Juror was excused because on first offender probation for a felony. This was error – “[a] person sentenced to a period of probation or confinement under the First Offender Act 7 may serve as a juror” – but not a violation of defendant’s right to be present. “Although the bench conference here related to jury selection, it ultimately involved a purely legal question: whether a first-offender felon is qualified to serve on a jury. The record contains no evidence that Pack had any knowledge about this technical issue or could have advanced the discussion. It also shows that the judge did not exercise any discretion in the matter. Once the juror confirmed that he was on first-offender probation, the trial court excused him for cause because the court believed he could not legally serve on the jury.” Scudder v. State, 298 Ga. 438, 782 S.E.2d 638 (February 8, 2016). Murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived right to be present during conference between trial judge and reluctant witness. Judge asked witness to speak with him in chambers after she expressed reluctance to testify; she agreed. “The judge and the witness then went into his chambers, accompanied by the court reporter.[fn] When the judge and the witness returned to the courtroom, the judge announced that the witness would be testifying, and she did so a short time later. … Although Scudder and his counsel both were present when the judge announced his intention to speak privately in chambers with the witness, they raised no objection. When the judge and witness left the courtroom to go to chambers, Scudder and his counsel raised no objection. And again, when the judge and witness returned from chambers, Scudder and his counsel failed to object. Moreover, Scudder and his counsel failed to ask the court reporter, who had accompanied the judge and witness into chambers, to reveal what had been said in private. In these circumstances, we conclude that counsel waived the right to be present for the meeting in chambers in the presence of Scudder, who acquiesced in the waiver.” Cesari v. State, 334 Ga.App. 605, 780 S.E.2d 56 (November 17, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by excluding defendant from courtroom after he voluntarily absented himself in the middle of trial, but then attempted to return to the courtroom. Cesari, who was free on bond, was late returning from a break at trial, for unknown reasons. After more than a 90-minute delay, during which Cesari couldn’t be located, trial proceeded with co-defendant Boccia’s testimony. Cesari walked in as the State began cross of Boccia. The trial court refused Cesari’s counsel’s request for a recess “to see if he’s intoxicated,” but granted counsel’s request to exclude Cesari from the courtroom. “Some time later” Cesari was allowed to return to the courtroom; he later testified he was unable to hear the proceedings while he was excluded, and “[t]here is no evidence whether his lawyer told him what had transpired in his absence.” Held, although Cesari relinquished his right to be present by voluntarily absenting himself, he “regained his right to be present” by returning. “Cesari returned and asked to be let in, and there is no evidence—despite his counsel’s stated fears that Cesari might be intoxicated—that he was in fact disruptive in any way that would necessitate his being barred from the courtroom. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 252 Ga. 498, 499–500, 314 S.E.2d 888 (1984). Nor is there any evidence that he either authorized or subsequently acquiesced in what could be viewed as his counsel’s attempt to waive his presence. See Allen v. State, [199 Ga.App. 365, 367–368(6), 405 S.E.2d 94 (1991)]. Further, given that disruptive defendants may, under certain circumstances, reclaim their right to be present, Fletcher, supra at 501, 314 S.E.2d 888, we cannot say that a nondisruptive defendant who voluntarily absents himself for a time may never regain his right to be present. See Fletcher, supra at 499–500, 314 S.E.2d 888 (‘Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cesari, upon returning to court and seeking admission to his own trial, should have been allowed to enter. Because he was absent from a critical part of his trial and did not acquiesce in any waiver by counsel once he made known that he was attempting to return to court, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.” Distinguishing cases where defendant left and never returned: Hunter v. State, 263 Ga.App. 747, 747–748(1), 589 S.E.2d 306 (2003), Estep v. State, 238 Ga.App. 170, 170–172(1), 518 S.E.2d 176 (1999), and Miller v. State, 122 Ga.App. 869, 869(1), 179 S.E.2d 265 (1970). Goulding v. State, 334 Ga.App. 349, 780 S.E.2d 1 (November 10, 2015). Child cruelty, aggravated assault, and related