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convictions affirmed; no violation of right to presence where trial court conferred with juror about “the direction she had received from her doctor if a pregnancy test she was going to take the next morning turned out to be positive. This conversation plainly involved the juror’s ‘comfort and convenience,’ and was not a critical stage of trial.” “The actual decision to excuse the juror took place in open court with Goulding present on the morning of the fourth day of trial.” LaGon v. State, 334 Ga.App. 14, 778 S.E.2d 32 (September 28, 2015). Statutory rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly conducted trial in defendant’s absence where defendant refused to attend. 1. Deputies reported that defendant refused to leave his cell and threatened to fight with them if they attempted to force him. The court had both the deputies and defense counsel advise defendant of his right to attend and gave him multiple opportunities. Court properly found that defendant waived his right to be present. “‘The record shows that [LaGon] was repeatedly advised of his right to be present at trial, and he refused to attend. On the other hand, when he wanted to do so, [LaGon] attended the trial. The trial court instructed the jury that they were not to consider [LaGon’s] absence in their deliberations. We find no error [in the trial court’s decision to conduct the first three days of the proceedings in LaGon’s absence].’ Coley [ v. State, 272 Ga.App. 446, 449(3), 612 S.E.2d 608 (2005)]; see Anderson [ v. State, 238 Ga.App. 866, 873(3), 519 S.E.2d 463 (1999)].” 2. Court could begin trial in defendant’s absence in these circumstances. “This is not a case where a defendant out on bond or his own recognizance failed to appear at the trial proceedings when they commenced and then was tried and convicted in absentia. Rather, LaGon was in state custody and made a conscious choice to attend some but not all of his trial, threatening to violently resist if the sheriff’s deputies attempted to compel his attendance in the courtroom and thereby disrupt the court proceedings. Other courts have held that a defendant’s right to be present at trial is not violated in the circumstance where the defendant is in custody and makes clear to the trial court that he will not attend the start of trial without causing a disruption. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 235–237 (11th Cir.2013) (district court committed no error in finding that the defendant had waived his presence at trial under federal procedural rules, where the defendant, while in interview room before trial commenced, made clear that he would have to be forcibly brought into the courtroom). … We similarly conclude that where a criminal defendant who is in state custody—after being made aware of his right to be present and that the trial will proceed forward in his absence— refuses to attend the start of his trial without causing a disruption, the trial court has the discretion to conclude that the defendant has waived his right to be present for the proceedings and begin the trial in his absence. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ‘trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.’ [ Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)]. See Weaver [ v. State, 288 Ga. 540, 542–543(3), 705 S.E.2d 627 (2011)]. And we do not believe that in this context, a trial court should be required to have a resistant defendant forcibly transported into the courtroom in front of shocked jurors so that he can quickly waive his right to be present and then be removed, simply so that it can be said that the defendant was ‘present’ at the start of trial.” Allen v. State, 297 Ga. 702, 777 S.E.2d 680 (September 14, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to be present where court spoke to a juror about “a juror’s request to make a call to check on the status of a sick loved one.” The communication was allowed as “related to the ‘comfort and convenience of the jury.’” Further, defense counsel expressly waived defendant’s presence at bench conferences at the beginning of trial. Gillespie v. State, 333 Ga.App. 565, 774 S.E.2d 255 (July 16, 2015). Physical precedent only. Conviction for armed robbery and related offenses reversed; record didn’t support trial court’s finding that defendant waived right to be present during bench conferences regarding jury selection and discretionary strikes. In one bench conference, “[t]he trial court made the discretionary decision to excuse [a prospective juror] from service for hardship reasons. … [W]e cannot say that [co-defendant] Collins would have been unable to offer his counsel a meaningful opinion as to whether Juror Solomon should be excused.” Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (June 29, 2015). Affirming in relevant part 328 Ga.App. 686, 760 S.E.2d 235 (2014); in civil medical malpractice action, judgment for defendants reversed and remanded for new trial based on trial court’s response to deliberating jury’s question without notice to parties or counsel. Based on Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012) (affirming “that a party could not be excluded from the party's own trial simply because the party's physical and mental condition might evoke sympathy”) and Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 806– 808(6), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998) (affirming “the right of the criminal defendant to be present during the trial judge's communications with the jury,” except communications through the bailiff dealing exclusively with “the comfort and convenience of the jury.”). Here, jury sent a note during deliberations regarding the possibility of a hung jury; the trial court responded in writing directing the jury to continue deliberating, without consulting or notifying counsel. The note wasn’t preserved for the record, but came to counsel’s attention when “two jurors contacted Plaintiffs' counsel regarding