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possible juror misconduct.” The trial court then supplemented the record with an order reciting the contents of the note pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41(d), but plaintiffs disputed the exact wording of the note based on the recollections of the two jurors. 1. Presence. “[A] jury communication regarding its inability to reach a verdict has been deemed a substantive matter for the purpose of a defendant's right to be present. [ Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 74(4)(b)(I), 646 S.E.2d 67 (2007)]; accord Wells v. State, 297 Ga.App. 153, 159–160(2), 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009). … [T]he right to be present in regard to the jury communication was totally denied in this case, and that although the duration of the exclusion was briefer than in Kesterson, the present violation was ‘more absolute’ in that, unlike in Kesterson, where the plaintiff had her attorneys present and representing her during trial, these Plaintiffs were wholly without any representation or input during the trial court's communication with the jury.” Harm. “It is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether the criminal precedents regarding the presumption of prejudice should be extended into the civil arena in a case such as this because … under the unique circumstances of this case, the error was harmful. ‘[A] critical difference exists between many of the cases in which our appellate courts have deemed a right to be present violation harmless or waived and the case at hand, which is that those communications were in fact disclosed to the defendant and/or his attorney prior to the time the jury returned its verdict. Depending on the time of this disclosure, this afforded the defendant or his counsel the opportunity to have input concerning the court's response, request that the court query the jury about the potential deadlock, object, move for a mistrial, or at a minimum, and importantly here, preserve a record of the communication. And if the defendant or his attorney was told of the communication prior to the return of the verdict and they failed to act, a waiver of the right to be present violation would occur,’” quoting Court of Appeals at 693-694(1). “In sum, the unique circumstances of this case, which include the untimely and serendipitous disclosure of the communication to Plaintiffs or their counsel; Plaintiffs' inability to make the actual note or response a part of the record; the differing recollections about the nature and timing of the communication; the failure to resolve the perceived conflicts; and the inability to make a determination that a verdict for Defendants was demanded, regardless of any effect of the communication on the jury, support Plaintiffs' entitlement to a new trial.” Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 773 S.E.2d 263 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; violation of defendant’s right to be present at trial wasn’t shown by mere absence from bench conference, absent some showing of the substance of the conference. “Asked at the motion for new trial if she could recall what was discussed at the bench conference, trial counsel could only speculate. Speculation as to what may have been discussed at the conference cannot serve as the basis for the grant of a new trial. See Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 112 (549 S.E.2d 370) (2001).” Estrada v. State, 332 Ga.App. 359, 772 S.E.2d 810 (May 14, 2015). Robbery conviction affirmed; defendant waived objection to his absence during conference between court, counsel, and jury in jury room. Judge and counsel entered jury room to answer jury’s questions about “the verdict being unanimous and how to deal with the question of the lesser- included offense.” Court then made record of the interaction in defendant’s presence; defendant failed to object. “‘.... [Estrada] had opportunities to discuss [the jury room] visit[ ] with counsel after the fact and assert any objections he had, but the record is silent in that regard. We conclude, therefore, ... that any objection to the communication with the jury ... was waived.’ Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 506–507(2), 591 S.E.2d 782 (2004). Consequently, Estrada has not shown that he is entitled to reversal and we affirm his conviction.” Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed, but remanded on other grounds; no violation of right to be present where proceedings complained of weren’t ‘critical stages of the proceedings.’ 1. “ Thomas asserts that the court held a hearing on April 5, 2010, that the bailiff told him the State announced ready for trial outside of his presence, and that the court granted a continuance that day; Thomas later objected to the continuance. Thomas asked for a transcript of this hearing, and on appeal, he has raised the failure of the court to provide the transcript as error. But Thomas has not shown that any of his ‘rights [were] lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or [that] the outcome of the case [was] substantially affected in some other way’ at this hearing. Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 111(2) (549 S.E.2d 370) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). He has not claimed that any order issued or any matter was decided that affected his case other than the continuance, for which his objection was preserved. Thus he has not shown that whatever occurred on April 5 was a critical stage of the proceedings. We therefore find no error.” 2. “The record shows that on April 26, 2010, Thomas was absent because he had to be taken to the hospital and that backup counsel was present on his behalf. Although during Thomas's absence the trial court ordered that Thomas receive a psychological and medical evaluation there is no indication that Thomas was ever evaluated as a result. On April 26, the trial court also revoked the February 3, 2010 ruling allowing Thomas to proceed pro se, but Thomas was allowed to revisit the matter on September 14, 2010. Although Thomas's absence on April 26, 2010 may be relevant to his right to self representation [discussed elsewhere in the opinion], Thomas has not shown that his absence on April 26, standing alone, substantially affected the outcome