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of the case such that it could be considered a critical stage of the proceedings. See Ballard [ v. Smith, 225 Ga. 416, 418(2) (169 S.E.2d 329 (1969)].” Davis v. State, 331 Ga.App. 585, 771 S.E.2d 232 (March 26, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no denial of right to be present where defendant and counsel voluntarily absented themselves from part of trial. With court’s consent, three co-defendants and their counsel left the courtroom while the State presented similar transaction evidence against the fourth defendant. Davis was present when counsel asked permission to leave, and voluntarily left when the court consented. “‘The right is waived if the defendant personally waives it in court; if counsel waives it at the defendant's express direction; if counsel waives it in open court while the defendant is present; or if counsel waives it and the defendant subsequently acquiesces in the waiver.’ Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 492(2)(a) (651 S.E.2d 698) (2007).” Hower v. State, 331 Ga.App. 567, 769 S.E.2d 402 (March 6, 2015). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to child molestation. Defendant’s right to be present at critical stages of his prosecution wasn’t denied by his absence “from the courtroom when defense counsel, the assistant district attorney, and the court discussed a potential sentence should Hower plead guilty. The trial court had Hower brought back into the courtroom and expressly advised him of the content of the discussion. The right to be present attaches ‘at any stage of [a] criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if [the defendant's] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745(III), 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (defendant's rights were not violated when he was absent from a hearing to determine the competency of two child witnesses against him). ‘[Our Supreme] Court has determined that a critical stage in a criminal prosecution is one in which a defendant's rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or one in which the outcome of the case is substantially affected in some other way.’ Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 111(2), 549 S.E.2d 370 (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted) (holding that charge conference is not a proceeding at which a defendant has an unequivocal right to be present). See also Lyde v. State, 311 Ga.App. 512, 515–516(1), 716 S.E.2d 572 (2011) (discussion of legal argument outside presence of defendant is not stage of proceeding at which defendant's rights to fair trial are at risk).” Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 769 S.E.2d 296 (February 16, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. No violation of defendant’s right to be present where trial judge discussed question from deliberating jury with counsel at the bench; defendant was present in the courtroom but not participating in the bench conference. “‘A defendant has the constitutional right to be present at any stage of a criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if [his or her] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ Barrett v. State, 275 Ga. 669, 671, (4) (571 S.E.2d 803) (2002) (punctuation omitted). ‘Under this standard, a defendant's right to be present is not violated ... by his involuntary absence from the conference held by a trial court with defense and prosecuting counsel to discuss a response to a deliberating jury's substantive inquiry.’ Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 74(4)(b)(i) (646 S.E.2d 67) (2007). [Trial] Judge Glanville answered the jury's question in the presence of, and with the acquiesce of, all counsel, and he merely referred the jury to the charges already provided. We do not find that Appellant could have made a meaningful contribution to the manner in which Judge Glanville formulated his response or that Appellant's presence could have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. See Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766(4) (740 S.E.2d 115) (2013) (the right to be present is not violated when the defendant is absent during conferences addressing legal matters to which the defendant cannot make a meaningful contribution).” Jury’s question and court’s response: “On charges 2+3 (Felony Murder) are there lesser charges, such as manslaughter .... Answer: You will have to rely upon the [ ] charge of the court.” Bagwell v. State, 329 Ga.App. 122, 764 S.E.2d 149 (September 24, 2014). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to be present shown, relating to bench conferences. Based on Heywood (March 28, 2013), below. 1. No violation of right to be present based on conferences which “dealt with taking breaks.” 2. No violation of right to be present during conferences on “legal argument concerning whether to hold a Jackson–Denno hearing and whether certain other evidence was admissible. Because these bench conferences involved questions of law and consisted of essentially legal argument about which Bagwell presumably had no knowledge, his right to be present was not violated,” citing Heywood and other cases . 3. Where subject of bench conference was unknown, defendant “has not shown that his right to be present was violated. See Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 111–112(2), 549 S.E.2d 370 (2001) (reasoning that ‘mere speculation’ about what was discussed during a bench conference shows no harm and thus could not serve as a basis for the grant of a new trial); Lopez v. State, 326 Ga.App. 770, 776(6), 757 S.E.2d 436 (2014) (‘[Appellant] has not shown what subjects were discussed at the bench conferences that occurred outside of his presence; therefore, he has not shown any meaningful relationship between his presence or absence at the conferences and his opportunity to defend against the charges against him.’); Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga.App. 92, 96(2), 522 S.E.2d 684