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(1999) (concluding that appellant waived issue concerning substance of bench conference, where bench conference was not transcribed for the record).” 4. Doesn’t decide whether right was violated by bench conferences regarding “procedural and logistical matters relating to striking a jury,” but any objection waived by defendant’s presence in courtroom during conferences and apparent acquiescence. “Bagwell's trial lawyer testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he typically did not invite defendants to bench conferences, routinely opting to inform his clients about the discussions upon returning to the defense table.” Wedel v. State, 328 Ga.App. 28, 761 S.E.2d 454 (July 8, 2014). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to be present where the court discussed counsel’s motion to withdraw in chambers, but presented the matter in full in open court, in defendant’s presence, and gave defendant an opportunity to be heard before ruling on the motion. “Here, evidence was presented at the hearing on the motion for new trial that supported the court's conclusion that the trial court did not rule on Reynolds's withdrawal motion until after court had been convened and Wedel was present. The record also shows that the judge went to great lengths to get all of the information about what had transpired at the in-chambers meeting on the record in Wedel's presence; that the judge repeatedly asked Wedel if he had a problem with the fact that a discussion about the situation occurred without Wedel being present; and that neither Wedel nor Berry objected. Under these circumstances, Wedel waived the right to claim that his absence was error. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 274 Ga. 637, 639(3), 555 S.E.2d 725 (2001) (defendant acquiesced in the proceedings when, following an in-chambers conference held in defendant's absence at which the court ruled on a motion in limine, when the motion and the court's ruling wwere subsequently discussed at length by all parties in defendant's presence without objection by defense counsel and without comment by defendant); Brown [ v. State, 310 Ga.App. 285, 290(6)(e)(ii), 712 S.E.2d 521 (2011)].” Lopez v. State, 326 Ga.App. 770, 757 S.E.2d 436 (April 2, 2014). Conviction for using a computer internet service to seduce or entice another person believed by him to be a child for the purpose of committing child molestation and aggravated child molestation, and related offenses, affirmed. Defendant’s right to be present wasn’t violated by bench conferences he chose not to attend. “The judge who presided over Lopez's trial found … that he had advised Lopez of his right to participate in any bench conference. A defendant is not entitled to a new trial if he acquiesced in limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence. See Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 517–520(7), 731 S.E.2d 658 (2012) (A criminal defendant is entitled to be present, and see and hear, all critical stages of the proceedings against him or her, and a discussion about dismissing a juror was such a critical stage. A new trial was not warranted on this basis, however, where the defendant acquiesced in the limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence.).” Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 641, 748 S.E.2d 896 (September 23, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no violation of right to be present where trial court discussed note from jury with counsel, outside defendant’s presence. Note asked “about the charge on manslaughter.” “The trial court responded simply to the note by stating: ‘You have received all of your instructions which include all of the allowable forms of the verdict.’” Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771, 743 S.E.2d 12 (March 28, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no reversal based on exclusion of defendant from bench conferences. 1. “Of the 13 bench conferences Appellant mentions, all but one involved only legal arguments regarding objections and proper trial procedure or logistical matters such as the order in which witnesses would be called and when to take breaks in the trial proceedings. Appellant's absence from these discussions did not violate his constitutional right to be present. See Parks [ v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 325, 565 S.E.2d 447 (2002)]; Huff [ v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 111, 549 S.E.2d 370 (2001)].” 2. Defendant was entitled to be present during conference about potential exclusion of jurors after prejudicial comment during voir dire, however, “the trial judge advised those in the courtroom, including Appellant, about the topic of this bench conference at the time. Appellant's failure to voice any objection to his absence from this bench conference, either directly or through counsel, constituted acquiescence in his counsel's waiver of his right to be present. See Zamora [ v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 520, 731 S.E.2d 658 (2012)]; Jackson v. State, 278 Ga. 235, 237, 599 S.E.2d 129 (2004) (holding that the defendants ‘acquiesced in the proceedings [occurring in their absence] when their counsel made no objection and [they] thereafter remained silent after the subject was brought to their attention’); Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 397, 554 S.E.2d 178 (2001) (holding that the defendant acquiesced where ‘all of the bench conferences in question took place while [the defendant] was in the courtroom, and she voiced no objection to them’).” Accord, Young v. State , 327 Ga.App. 852, 761 S.E.2d 801 (July 7, 2014) (defendant waived right to be present during voir dire bench conferences when “Young's counsel would tell Young what was happening, and both Young and his counsel were present in the courtroom during the entire process, yet neither objected.”); Bagwell (September 24, 2014), above; Estrada (May 14, 2015), above.