☢ test - Í

Taylor v. State, 320 Ga.App. 596, 740 S.E.2d 327 (March 21, 2013). Drug convictions affirmed; no error where trial judge greeted jurors prior to jury selection outside presence of defendant and counsel, and excused one who was a police officer pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-1(a)(1). “Like the Supreme Court of Georgia, ‘we do not condone [the] practice’ of conducting voir dire outside the presence of a defendant or counsel. See Robertson v. State, 268 Ga. 772, 774(4) (493 S.E.2d 697) (1997) (trial court met with prospective jury members prior to voir dire, in the absence of defendant and his lawyer, and asked whether they were citizens of the county, whether they had served on the grand jury, and whether they would suffer any hardship if chosen to serve). Given that Taylor has made no showing of any systematic and adverse impact on the representative nature of the jury lists as a result of this judge's conduct of voir dire in this or other cases, and that the trial court's engagement with these prospective jurors was limited to investigating valid statutory grounds for excusing them, the court did not err when it excused the prospective juror at issue as a law enforcement officer engaged in work necessary for public safety. See id.; former OCGA § 15–12–1(a)(1).” Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 740 S.E.2d 115 (March 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to be present. “In this case, the pre-trial discussion of legal motions was not a critical stage of trial requiring Campbell's presence to ensure a fair hearing. Prior to the selection of the jury, the trial court addressed the State's motion in limine to exclude cross examination of a witness about an issue of which Campbell's attorney was unaware, denied in part the State's motion in limine to exclude Campbell's attorney from mentioning that he was a former law enforcement officer, and began considering the defendant's motion to suppress his videotaped statement, which was subsequently played at trial. Since there was not a reasonably substantial relationship between Campbell's presence during the discussion of these legal matters and his opportunity to defend against the charges, we conclude that his right to be present during critical stages of his criminal trial was not violated. See Parks [ v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 325, 565 S.E.2d 447 (2002)] (defendant's right to be present not violated by his absence from bench conferences discussing legal matters where no witnesses discussed their testimony); Bethune v. State, 291 Ga.App. 674(1), 662 S.E.2d 774 (2008) (defendant's absence during brief colloquy between the trial court and counsel on legal matters at pre-trial motions hearing did not violate his right to a fair trial).” Accord, Tolbert v. State , 321 Ga.App. 637, 742 S.E.2d 152 (April 25, 2013); Leeks (February 16, 2015), above (defendant couldn’t have substantially contributed to bench conference with counsel regarding question from deliberating jury on lesser-included offenses). Fisher v. State, 317 Ga.App. 761, 732 S.E.2d 821 (October 3, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to trial court’s interaction with jury outside his presence. “The record shows that the trial judge was summoned to the jury room because the jurors' discussion was becoming hostile and tempers were flaring. The judge repeated that portion of the charge stating that each juror must decide the case for themselves after a thorough consideration of the evidence and deliberation with their fellow jurors. The court then reminded the jurors that any further communication must be in writing. The court called the lawyers and their clients back to the courtroom, described what happened, and offered to restate the instruction in open court. All of the lawyers stated that it was not necessary to recharge the jury, none of the lawyers requested a mistrial nor did anyone object or request further action of any kind.” “‘A colloquy between the trial judge and the jury is a part of the proceedings to which the defendant and counsel are entitled to be present.’ Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998). However, ‘[defendants] waived [their] right to appellate review of this issue by failing to voice an objection or seek a mistrial after being informed by the trial judge, prior to the return of the jury's verdicts, of his visit with the jury.’ Id at 807, 505 S.E.2d 731.” Zamora v. State, 291 Ga. 512, 731 S.E.2d 658 (September 10, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred by considering excusal of juror at bench conferences, in defendant’s presence but outside his hearing. Defendant waived objection and acquiesced in his counsel’s actions, however, by not raising the issue when first brought to his attention at motion for new trial hearing. “It is true that Appellant was in the courtroom during the bench conferences at which Juror Whitfield was discussed and dismissed. But Appellant did not ‘see and hear ’ those proceedings, Wade [ v. State, 12 Ga. 25, 29 (1852)] (emphasis added), and thus he was not ‘present’ in the sense our case law uses that word. The colloquies between the court, counsel, and the juror might as well have been in chambers, as occurred (improperly) in Sammons [ v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 387 (612 S.E.2d 785) (2005)], and Pennie [ v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 420-421 (520 S.E.2d 448) (1999).]” Accord, Heywood (March 28, 2013), above. Adams v. State, 316 Ga.App. 1, 728 S.E.2d 260 (May 2, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived objection to trial court’s ex parte excusal of witness by failing to object when advised of the action. “[T]he record shows that shortly after excusing the juror, the trial court explained its ex parte decision to both Adams and his counsel, and neither objected. Thus, at the very least, Adams acquiesced in his counsel's waiver of his right to be present at all critical proceedings.” Juror here was upset because tree fell on her house during storm.