☢ test - Í

State, 183 Ga.App. 373, 375(2) (358 S.E.2d 914) (1987) (court's explanation to the jury of why the defendant was not in the courtroom was not impermissible comment under OCGA § 17-8-57).” Taylor v. State, 295 Ga.App. 689, 673 S.E.2d 7 (January 6, 2009). Following convictions for involuntary manslaughter and related offenses, trial court erred in sentencing defendant in her absence. “‘[S]entencing is a critical stage at which a defendant is generally entitled to be present’ under the Georgia Constitution. (Footnote omitted.) Small v. State, 285 Ga.App. 445, 446 (646 S.E.2d 292) (2007). See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII; see also Williams v. Ricketts, 234 Ga. 716, 716-717 (217 S.E.2d 292) (1975) (unless there is only one possible sentence that the court could enter or the defendant has waived his or her right to be present for sentencing, the defendant has a constitutional right to be present in the trial court for sentencing).” Here, “the court held a sentencing hearing and a restitution hearing, then issued a written sentencing order three days after the restitution hearing. The court never pronounced sentence while Taylor was present in open court. Instead, Taylor subsequently received a copy of the sentencing order while she was incarcerated.” Affirmed on another issue, Taylor v State , 286 Ga. 328, 687 S.E.2d 409 (November 2, 2009). Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599, 669 S.E.2d 98 (November 3, 2008). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No violation of right to be present under state or federal constitutions where prospective juror was excused during defendant’s voluntary absence from courtroom. “[T]here is a critical difference between the right to be present protected by the Georgia Constitution and the corresponding federal constitutional right. Under governing Supreme Court precedent, denial of the federal constitutional right to be present is subject to harmless error review on direct appeal.” Federal right : any error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, and no abuse of discretion in excusing juror. State right : no harmless error analysis, but right may be waived. Waiver found here based on evidence, as found by trial court, that defendant was faking illness to delay proceedings, and trial court announced intention to proceed, but allowed defendant to excuse himself if he so chose. “A defendant who voluntarily absents himself from the proceedings has waived his right to be present. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 322, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008); Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 17-20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973).” Hood v. State, 292 Ga.App. 584, 666 S.E.2d 674 (July 9, 2008). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. “Hood contends that his defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to Hood's absence when the statutory oath and venire oath were given to the jury. The trial court found that Hood's defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object because the administration of these oaths was not a stage of the trial or a critical stage of the proceedings requiring Hood's presence, and therefore counsel's performance was not deficient. We agree. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 824(3) (279 S.E.2d 650) (1981); Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga.App. 378, 380(1) (480 S.E.2d 378) (1997).” Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 663 S.E.2d 164 (June 30, 2008). Malice murder conviction affirmed. “The United States and Georgia Constitutions both secure the fundamental right of criminal defendants to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against them. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106 (54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674) (1934); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807 (505 S.E.2d 731) (1998). However, there is a critical difference between the right protected by the Georgia Constitution and the corresponding federal constitutional right. Under governing United States Supreme Court precedent, denial of the federal constitutional right to be present is subject to harmless error review on appeal. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460) (1986); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117- 120 (104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267) (1983). By contrast, under our case law, a denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 264 (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000); Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 860-861 (524 S.E.2d 473) (1999). A violation of the Georgia Constitution’s right to be present is presumed to be prejudicial. Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 387 (612 S.E.2d 785) (2005); Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 422 (520 S.E.2d 448) (1999). Thus, absent a valid waiver by the defendant, a violation of the right to be present enshrined in the Georgia Constitution triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal. Sammons, supra, 279 Ga. at 387; Carter v. State, 273 Ga. 428, 430 (541 S.E.2d 366) (2001).” Where issue is ineffective assistance of counsel, however, defendant must show prejudice. No prejudice here, where trial counsel did not insist on defendant’s right to be present during discussion of juror’s brief chance encounter with a State’s witness which did not require that the juror be excused. Hernandez v. State, 292 Ga.App. 129, 663 S.E.2d 802 (June 20, 2008). Gang activity and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to conference held outside his presence. On the fourth day of defendant’s eight-day trial for criminal gang activity, “[a] bailiff reported to the trial judge that several jurors had expressed security concerns” about trial spectators staring at them during lunch. The jurors “were requesting escorts to their cars at the end of each court day.” The trial court conferred with counsel about this information, outside the presence of defendant, the jurors, and