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spectators. Defense counsel requested that the defendant be informed of the matter, so trial court called defendant into the courtroom and advised him of the substance of the conference. The judge then proposed to ask the jurors individually whether they had seen or heard anything that affected their ability to serve; defense counsel approved, in defendant’s presence. Held, “Under these circumstances, Hernandez’s attorney waived any right Hernandez may have had to be present during the earlier portion of the hearing, and Hernandez subsequently acquiesced in the waiver. [Cits.]” Spragg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (June 18, 2008). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Where defendant failed to appear for the second day of his trial on armed robbery and related charges, no error in “the failure of the court to give, sua sponte, a charge that the jury should draw no adverse inferences from Spragg’s absence.” Payne v. State, 290 Ga.App. 589, 660 S.E.2d 405 (March 26, 2008). Right to presence not violated where judge addressed the venire panel at the beginning of their jury service, or when a juror approached the judge and asked to be excused from service on criminal cases generally because of bias arising from his years as a police officer. “[T]he right to be present does not extend to any and all communications between the trial courts and potential jurors. Hanifa v. State, [ v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807(6), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998)], illustrates that the scope of the right protected is a criminal defendant’s ‘right to be present and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had against him on the trial before the Court.’ The out-of-court conversation downstairs of which Payne complains was simply not part of the proceedings against him, and the record plainly shows that Adams was excused as a juror for Payne’s trial at a bench conference in court, based upon the challenge of Payne’s counsel with Payne present in the courtroom. We find no error.” Affirmed on different issue, 290 Ga.App. 589, 660 S.E.2d 405 (March 26, 2008). Engle v. State, 290 Ga.App. 396, 659 S.E.2d 795 (March 21, 2008). Trial court’s response to deliberating jury’s questions, in chambers in the presence of counsel, did not violate defendant’s right to be present during critical stages of prosecution. “The record shows that during its deliberations the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking two questions. The first question asked if the crime of sexual battery was a misdemeanor or a felony, to which the court responded: ‘This is not a matter for the jury’s consideration.’ The second question asked if, based on the testimony, there would be leniency considerations, to which the court replied: ‘You are not to concern yourselves with punishment.’ The record further reflects that the trial court ‘shared’ the jury’s note with counsel in chambers.” “[W]e fail to see how Engle could have made a meaningful contribution to the manner in which the judge formulated his response, which was done in the presence of his trial counsel.” Overruled on other grounds, Watson v. State , 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). See also Mims (December 4, 2009), above. Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 651 S.E.2d 698 (October 9, 2007). Defendant waived his right to be present while the trial court interviewed individual jurors. “The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a criminal defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against him is a fundamental right and a foundational aspect of due process of law. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (‘The Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment ... both guarantee to a criminal defendant ... the “right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.”’) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)); see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed.2d 674 (1934). This Court’s interpretation of the analogous provisions of the Georgia Constitution has always been in accord. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 74, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955) (‘It is the legal right of a person accused of crime in this State to be present at all stages of his trial, such right being derived from our Constitution. This principle has been recognized since the establishment of this court.’) (citation omitted); Wade v. State, 12 Ga. 25, 29, 1852 WL 1379 (1852) (‘The defendant has not only the right to be confronted with his witnesses, but he has also the right to be present, and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had against him on the trial before the Court.’). However, the right to be present belongs to the defendant, and he is free to relinquish it if he so chooses. Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, 291 U.S. at 106 (“No doubt the privilege may be lost by consent....’); Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 421, 520 S.E.2d 448 (1999) (‘It is true that a defendant may personally waive his right to be present at a stage in the trial, or counsel may waive this right for the defendant.’). The right is waived if the defendant personally waives it in court; if counsel waives it at the defendant’s express direction; if counsel waives it in open court while the defendant is present; or if counsel waives it and the defendant subsequently acquiesces in the waiver. Pennie v. State, supra, 271 Ga. at 421, 520 S.E.2d 448; Wilson v. State, supra, 212 Ga. at 77-78, 90 S.E.2d 557. The record shows clearly that Hampton personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present at the two juror interviews and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present. In addition, Hampton waived his right to be present through the representations of his trial counsel made in open court while he was present. Moreover, Hampton subsequently acquiesced in the waiver by counsel. In other words, Hampton utilized all four available