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methods for waiving his right to be present at the trial judge’s discussions with the two jurors .” Distinguished, Dennis v. Paxton , 284 Ga. 430, 668 S.E.2d 258 (October 6, 2008) (defendant’s waiver of right to be present does not give him “authority to disobey court orders” by missing required court appearances). Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 646 S.E.2d 67 (June 4, 2007). Malice murder conviction affirmed. Defendant “argues the trial court erred when it failed to disclose to [defendant] and his counsel the contents of the jury communication reporting their deadlocked status prior to the trial court responding to the communication by giving the Allen charge. By a written note, the jury foreman informed the trial court, ‘We have a couple of people that says no way to change mind. What do we do?’ The trial court notified counsel of receipt of a communication from the jury, but not the contents, and summoned counsel to the courtroom,” where it responded to the inquiry. Defendant contends that his right to be present and his right to counsel were violated by the trial court’s failure to disclose the contents of the jury’s communication, and its failure to consult with counsel before formulating a response. Supreme Court unanimously finds that defendant’s right to be present was not violated, based on Barrett v. State , 275 Ga. 669(4), 571 S.E.2d 803 (2002). Does not rule on whether defendant’s right to counsel was violated, but finds any such violation harmless, as the charge given did not constitute reversible error. “In an exercise of this Court’s inherent power to maintain a court system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an orderly and efficient manner ( Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 532 (408 S.E.2d 97) (1991)), we take this opportunity to require trial courts to have jurors’ communications submitted to the court in writing; to mark the written communication as a court exhibit in the presence of counsel; to afford counsel a full opportunity to suggest an appropriate response; and to make counsel aware of the substance of the trial court’s intended response in order that counsel may seek whatever modifications counsel deems appropriate before the jury is exposed to the instruction.” Accord, Coleman v. State , 317 Ga.App. 409, 731 S.E.2d 94 (August 10, 2012) (no violation of defendant’s right to be present where court responded to jury’s note after consulting with counsel, but outside defendant’s presence. Defendant was advised of the communications before the jury returned its verdict, and voiced no objection.); Leeks (February 16, 2015), above ( citing Lowery , no violation of right to be present where defendant couldn’t have contributed meaningfully to bench conference with counsel regarding question from deliberating jury). Guyton v. State, 281 Ga. 789, 642 S.E.2d 67 (February 26, 2007). Record supported trial court’s finding that defendants affirmatively waived their right to be present when trial court interviewed prospective jurors. “The record shows that before waiving his right to be present, [co-defendant] Preston conferred with counsel for at least 14 minutes, during which time counsel fully explained Preston’s right to be present and the nature of the proceedings which were about to take place in Preston’s absence. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, counsel testified that when they conferred, Preston asked intelligent questions and appeared to understand that he was waiving his right to be in the courtroom during the preliminary selection process.” Vaughn v. State, 281 Ga.App. 475, 636 S.E.2d 163 (September 6, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for burglary reversed, based on trial court’s colloquy with the jury, held with counsel present but defendant excluded. After close of evidence, jurors asked permission to speak to “a detective.” Judge excluded everyone from the courtroom, including defendant, but allowing the attorneys and court personnel to remain. The jury was then brought in; four of them reported receiving hang-up phone calls. Judge directed them to disregard the phone calls, and asked if any of them could not do so; none responded. Especially given the implication that the calls were somehow connected with the case, “[u]nder these circumstances, Vaughn had a right to be present during voir dire regarding the telephone calls so that he could assist his trial attorney in ‘effectively examining’ the jurors regarding their abilities to be fair and impartial. [Cit.] Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Pennie v. State, [271 Ga. 419 (520 S.E.2d 448) (1999),] we necessarily conclude that Vaughn’s involuntary absence during the colloquy between the trial court and the jurors was prejudicial and that the trial court erred in denying Vaughn’s motion for new trial on this basis.” Compare Engles (March 21, 2008), above. Grimes v. State, 280 Ga.App. 65, 633 S.E.2d 401 (June 21, 2006). Motor vehicle hijacking and related convictions affirmed; violation of defendant’s right to be present was harmless. Judge entered jury room to answer a question about the law. Defense counsel consented to this procedure, but defendant was not present when this consent was given. Upon entering the jury room, the jury immediately said they had a verdict, but weren’t sure it was correct. Judge advised them to return their verdict in the courtroom, then placed the conversation on the record. Held, the court’s communication with the jury had no effect on the verdict, which had already been reached, and was harmless as a matter of law. Bennett v. State, 279 Ga.App. 371, 631 S.E.2d 402 (May 12, 2006). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to be present. “‘[A] conference ‘of limited scope’ involving only the trial court and counsel is not ‘a