☢ test - Í

“critical” stage of the proceedings.’ Ferrell v. State, 261 Ga. 115, 122-123(12) (401 S.E.2d 741) (1991). No juror was present at the bench conference. Moreover, Bennett ‘could not have made a meaningful contribution’ to the bench conference. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Barrett v. State, 275 Ga. 669, 671-672(4) (571 S.E.2d 803) (2002). ‘[T]here was simply no error in proceeding with the limited inquiry outside the presence of the defendant.’ Coburn v. State, 252 Ga.App. 315, 318(2) (555 S.E.2d 750) (2001) (brief colloquy with alternate juror re alleged misconduct). Trial counsel’s failure to object to this brief conference therefore was not ineffective.” Bench conference here concerned potential juror’s possible familiarity with victim’s family; conference was brief, and further voir dire ensued. Crouch v. State, 279 Ga. 879, 622 S.E.2d 818 (November 21, 2005). “During jury voir dire, a potential juror indicated that he was acquainted with Crouch and was uncertain that he could be impartial. Further questioning of this potential juror was accomplished at the bench, to prevent other potential jurors from hearing his responses. Crouch complains that he was not present at the bench when this questioning took place. However, prior to the bench-side questioning, the court asked if defense counsel wished Crouch to be able to hear the questioning, and counsel responded negatively. Crouch did not object to the procedure himself, nor did he seek to have counsel object for him, and any objection to questioning the potential juror at the bench is waived. Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 506-507(2) (591 S.E.2d 782) (2004).” Womack v. State, 273 Ga.App. 300, 614 S.E.2d 909 (May 18, 2005). “During a pre-trial conference in the court’s chambers with the prosecutor and trial counsel for Womack and Robinson, the court discussed the State’s offer of immunity to Tollette in exchange for his testimony against Womack and Robinson. Womack’s counsel expressly waived Womack’s presence at the conference, and Womack never complained at trial about having been absent during the conference. Further, the transcript shows that Tollette never testified at trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia has previously found there was no error when the trial court conducted similar proceedings in the defendant’s absence, since the defendant had no legal basis upon which to object to the State’s request for an order to compel the witness to testify.” [Footnote omitted.] Accord, Johnson v. State , 283 Ga.App. 524, 642 S.E.2d 170 (February 9, 2007). Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 612 S.E.2d 785 (May 9, 2005). Defendant’s murder conviction reversed; trial court erred in “replac[ing] a juror following an ex parte meeting at which Sammons was not present, and to which she did not consent.” “Proceedings at which the jury composition is selected or changed are a critical stage at which the defendant is entitled to be present.” Coley v. State, 272 Ga.App. 446, 612 S.E.2d 608 (March 24, 2005). “Coley … alleges that the trial court erred by continuing the trial in his absence. The transcript shows that Coley refused to attend the trial other than during closing argument and another short period during trial. The record shows that Coley was repeatedly advised of his right to be present at trial, and he refused to attend. On the other hand, when he wanted to do so, Coley attended the trial. The trial court instructed the jury that they were not to consider Coley’s absence in their deliberations. We find no error. Coley was voluntarily absent from the trial, and thus he waived his right to be present. Yancey v. State, 219 Ga.App. 116 (464 S.E.2d 245) (1995).” Accord, Dawson v. State , 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (March 17, 2008) (defendant chose not to attend sentencing phase of his death penalty trial; doctor certified he was fit to attend). Wilkerson v. State, 269 Ga.App. 190, 603 S.E.2d 728 (August 20, 2004). “Wilkerson contends that the trial court committed error by sentencing him on the two misdemeanor counts during his absence. The transcript shows that Wilkerson was present when the court sentenced him for trafficking cocaine but that the court failed to sentence him on the other two counts at that time. The court apparently later entered sentences on those two counts of 12 months to serve concurrently with his 12 year (to serve) felony conviction. ‘A criminal defendant has the right to be present during all portions of his or her trial, and a defendant’s absence during a critical stage of those trial proceedings, absent a waiver of the defendant’s right to be present, is not subject to harmless error analysis. [Cit.]’ King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 264(15) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000). Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393) (1977); [other cites]. But here, Wilkerson was present for the entire sentencing hearing when the information relied upon by the court for its sentencing decision was presented. He had an opportunity to present evidence and did so, raised no objection at the completion of the hearing, and was made aware of the sentence before any appellate deadlines passed. We conclude that Wilkerson was present for sentencing sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.” Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 591 S.E.2d 782 (January 12, 2004). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “The trial judge went to the jury room and communicated with the jury on two occasions after the close of evidence, accompanied both times by the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, but without Fuller. The first visit to the jury