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“although the accused has a right to be present at every stage of the proceedings, this right is waived when he is free on bail and voluntarily absents himself from the trial. ... and voluntary absence of the accused waives his right to be present when sentence is imposed.” Likewise, the defendant waives the right of confrontation by his voluntary absence. CAVEAT: The court in this case failed to consider the fact that jeopardy never attached; see Riley (December 5, 2001) and Stacey (March 26, 2002), above. Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 549 S.E.2d 370 (July 16, 2001). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant’s involuntary absence from a charge conference in chambers did not violate his constitutional right to be present at trial because a charge conference involves essentially legal argument about which Defendant presumably has no knowledge and would not make a meaningful contribution or gain anything from being present; therefore, a charge conference is not one of those proceedings at which a defendant has an unequivocal right to be present. Accord, Stroud v. State , 284 Ga.App. 604, 644 S.E.2d 467 (March 28, 2007) (judge answered yes or no question from jury, in writing, outside defendant’s presence); Small v. State , 285 Ga.App. 445, 646 S.E.2d 292 (April 30, 2007) (defendant absent during discussion between court and counsel about “whether a mandatory sentencing provision would be applicable if Small was found guilty.”); Milligan v. State , 307 Ga.App. 1, 703 S.E.2d 1 (September 10, 2010); Lyde (August 23, 2011), above. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant had no right to be present in hearing granting immunity to, and compelling testimony of, witness. “King contends that the trial court acted improperly by conducting a brief hearing outside his presence concerning the State’s request for an order compelling Walter Smith to testify in King’s trial and confirming the use and derivative use immunity that would apply to that compelled testimony. See OCGA § 24-9-28. … The hearing in question, however, appears not to have been a part of the proceedings against King. While King might have preferred that a key witness not be ordered to testify truthfully in his trial, there is nothing in Georgia law that would have permitted him to object to the State’s request for the order or that would suggest that King’s rights were the subject matter under consideration. See Williams v. State, 234 Ga.App. 191, 193- 194(2) (b), 506 S.E.2d 237 (1998). On the contrary, the trial court was obliged to consider whether the testimony was ‘necessary to the public interest,’ a matter which King had no standing to address. OCGA § 24-9- 28(a). King was placed on sufficient notice that Smith had been ordered to testify and that his testimony could not later be used against him. Any alleged bias on the witness’s part was the proper subject of cross-examination, not grounds for denying the State’s request for the order. [Cit.]” Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 520 S.E.2d 448 (September 13, 1999). Defendant’s murder conviction reversed; trial court erred by holding conference with juror in presence of counsel, but outside presence of defendant. “At the conclusion of the evidence, a juror apparently notified the court that a spectator in the courtroom had attempted to speak to that juror in the hallway. The juror was brought into chambers and was questioned by the court in the presence of both counsel, but in the absence of the defendant. The juror explained that this spectator made eye contact with him and greeted him as he walked by. He added, ‘I thought I recognized him, and he might have recognized me from somewhere.’ The juror also stated that he resides in the area where the crime took place and that he also may have recognized the victim from photographs introduced in evidence. When asked by the court if the incident in the hallway would influence his decision in the case, the juror expressed concerns that he may later see the man in his neighborhood and possibly suffer repercussions as a result of his verdict. He was then asked whether he could put these factors aside and decide the case based on the evidence, to which he replied, ‘I think I can, I'm pretty sure I can.’ The prosecutor, who had not posed any questions to the juror, declined the court's offer to participate in the inquiry. The juror was then returned to the jury room for deliberations. At that point, defense counsel announced that he waived Pennie's presence at the conference.” Based on Hanifa v. State , 269 Ga. 797, 807(6), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998): “‘[w]ithin the Georgia constitutional right to the courts [Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII] is a criminal defendant's ‘right to be present and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had against him on the trial before the Court.’ [Cits.] A colloquy between the trial judge and the jury is a part of the proceedings to which the defendant and counsel are entitled to be present.’ Accord Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 74, 90 S.E.2d 557 (1955) (‘[t]his principle has been recognized since the establishment of this Court’). Thus, where the accused is involuntarily absent from the proceedings, the trial judge should have no communications with a juror about the case, except as to matters relating to the comfort and convenience of the jury. Hanifa, supra at 807, 505 S.E.2d 731.” “Since the attempted waiver by counsel was made without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, it was not a valid waiver of her right to be present at all stages of the trial proceedings, guaranteed under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII of the Georgia Constitution.” “ Where the juror revealed a possible connection to the victim and expressed concern that his verdict may pose a danger to him in the future, Pennie had an absolute right to be present at the meeting to assist trial counsel in effectively examining the juror.” Distinguishing Hanifa : “While we found a waiver of appellate review in Hanifa, we did so because the defendant ‘fail[ed] to voice an objection or seek a mistrial after being informed by the