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trial judge, prior to the return of the jury's verdicts, of [the irregularity].’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 807, 505 S.E.2d 731. Unlike Hanifa, Pennie's lack of knowledge prevented her from raising the issue during trial. And she ‘repudiated the waiver of counsel ... at the first opportunity,’ in her motion for new trial.” Carley dissents, would find defendant’s absence harmless in light of the meager contact between juror and spectator: “only the juror spoke, saying, ‘hey, how you doing.’” Accord, Ramage (March 8, 2012), supra (judge’s conferences with deliberating jury violated defendant’s right to be present, regardless of counsel’s consent, unless defendant personally consented). Brumelow v. State, 239 Ga.App. 119, 520 S.E.2d 776 (July 14, 1999). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed. No violation of defendant’s right to be present: “The discussion Baxter complains of took place more than a month before trial during a hearing on co-defendant Smith's motion to sever his trial from that of Baxter and Brumelow. Baxter's attorney was present in the courtroom simply to observe, not participate in, the hearing. The judge, who is not the same judge who presided over the actual trial, asked the attorney whom he represented. The attorney said he represented Baxter and Brumelow. The judge then asked if there was a conflict between them, and the attorney stated there was no conflict and even if there was, they had waived it. The court then made no further comment to the attorney on the matter and proceeded with the hearing on the motion to sever. The discussion in question was not a critical stage of Baxter's trial at which he had an absolute right to be present, but was merely an extremely brief and informal colloquy, which took place over a month before trial at a hearing on a co-defendant's motion, and which invoked no ruling by the court. See Smith v. State, 209 Ga.App. 699, 700(1), 434 S.E.2d 528 (1993); Stone v. State, 177 Ga.App. 750, 751(1), 341 S.E.2d 280 (1986). We find no error requiring a reversal of Baxter's convictions based solely on his absence from that colloquy. See generally Bowden v. State, 202 Ga.App. 802, 803(1), 415 S.E.2d 527 (1992) (physical precedent) (see also Beasley, J., concurring specially); Bishop v. State, 179 Ga.App. 606, 609(2), 347 S.E.2d 350 (1986).” Estep v. State, 238 Ga.App. 170, 518 S.E.2d 176 (May 19, 1999). Cruelty to children conviction affirmed. Trial court did not abuse discretion by continuing trial in defendant’s absence where she failed to show up for the second and third days of trial, despite calls claiming she was on her way. “‘The burden of determining the cause of the defendant's absence was on [her] counsel, not on the trial judge.’ Smith v. State, 139 Ga.App. 515, 517, 228 S.E.2d 705 (1976). ‘[Estep] voluntarily absented [herself] from the court since [she] was free on bail and clearly knew the proceedings had begun, but had not made sufficient arrangements to attend.’ Winfield v. State, 210 Ga.App. 849, 851(1), 437 S.E.2d 849 (1993). Gee v. State, 212 Ga.App. 422, 423(1), 442 S.E.2d 290 (1994); see also Yancey v. State, 219 Ga.App. 116, 464 S.E.2d 245 (1995); Brown v. State, 199 Ga.App. 856, 857(2), 406 S.E.2d 516 (1991). Moreover, contrary to Estep's contention otherwise, the court was authorized to sentence Estep in her absence. ‘[V]oluntary absence of the accused waives his right to be present when sentence is imposed.’ Byrd, 233 Ga. at 780, 213 S.E.2d 610. See also Croy v. State, 168 Ga.App. 241(1), 308 S.E.2d 568 (1983).” Accord, Hill v. State , 290 Ga. 493, 722 S.E.2d 708 (February 6, 2012) (identical facts; quoting Estep ). Distinguished, Cesari (November 17, 2015), above (defendant waived his presence by voluntarily absenting himself, but regained that right by returning; trial court erred by excluding him after his return, absent evidence that he was disruptive). Russell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 512 S.E.2d 913 (February 24, 1999). Defendants’ armed robbery convictions reversed; defendants were denied right to be present during critical stage of prosecution when some “voir dire was conducted, a McCollum challenge to the jury’s composition was made, and the jury was re-struck” outside their presence. Record did not support trial court’s finding that defendants “implicitly” waived their right to be present. In prior appearance of this case, Russell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 546, 497 S.E.2d 36 (1998), “we directed the trial court to ‘consider and balance all relevant factors in arriving at its determination regarding the issue of acquiescence and make relevant findings of fact’ on at least six issues: ‘(1) whether [defendant] knew of his right to be present during jury selection; (2) whether [defendant’s] counsel waived [defendant’s] right to be present in the presence of [defendant]; (3) whether [defendant] posed any form of timely objection to conducting voir dire outside his presence; (4) whether [defendant] was absent voluntarily or whether he was in confinement or custody of the State; (5) whether the trial court announced in the [defendant’s] presence that counsel would meet with him in chambers to continue the voir dire; and (6) if the trial court so announced the chambers conference in [defendant’s] presence, whether a fair risk existed that such announcement would have misled [defendant] as to his right to be present during voir dire.’ Id. at 550(6), 497 S.E.2d 36.” “ It is well established that even though counsel is present at the critical stage and makes no objection to his client’s absence, no waiver of the defendant’s right occurs unless the client thereafter knowingly acquiesces in his counsel’s choice to proceed without him. Id.; see also Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga.App. 378, 380(1), 480 S.E.2d 378 (1997).” No evidence here that defendants knew of their right to be present or ever knowingly acquiesced in counsel’s choice to proceed in their absence. Accord, Brooks v. State , 271 Ga. 456, 519 S.E.2d 907 (September 13, 1999) (murder conviction reversed where jury selection, including strikes for cause and Batson challenges, conducted in chambers without waiver of defendant’s right to be present).