☢ test - Í

West v. State, 271 Ga.App. 522, 610 S.E.2d 159 (February 7, 2005). Conviction for criminal damage to property affirmed. Court did not err in excluding defendant from courtroom where he disrupted proceedings and expressed intent to continue doing so. “Furthermore, contrary to West’s argument, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to have him returned to the courtroom for identification by one of the state’s witnesses. [Witness] testified that he saw West scale a fence and then jump onto the hood of a red truck parked in lot at the airport. [Witness] identified West by testifying that the man who had been sitting at the defense table earlier that morning during jury selection was the individual he saw committing the act in question.” “‘There are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-344 (90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353) (1970).’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sanders v. State, 242 Ga.App. 487, 488(1)(a) (530 S.E.2d 203) (2000), citing Williams v. State, 183 Ga.App. 373, 375(2) (358 S.E.2d 914) (1987).” Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga.App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (August 12, 2003). Burglary conviction affirmed. Trial court did not err in having defendant forcibly removed from the courtroom in front of prospective jury panel where he insisted on disrupting proceedings with verbal outbursts. “‘[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concepts of courts and judicial proceedings,’” quoting Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Sanders v. State, 242 Ga.App. 487, 530 S.E.2d 203 (February 22, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in removing defendant from the courtroom. “The judge gave the defendant every possible opportunity to remain in the courtroom. On each occasion the defendant continued to argue with the judge and stated specifically that he would not remain quiet. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in removing the defendant from the courtroom. See Smith v. State, 161 Ga.App. 512, 288 S.E.2d 754 (1982). The trial court's admonition to the jury pool to disregard the defendant's removal from the courtroom, which was repeated during the charge to the jury, sufficiently mitigated the effect of his absence on the jury. Williams v. State, [183 Ga.App. 373, 358 S.E.2d 914 (1987)].” 3. INTERPRETER Ling v. State, 288 Ga. 299, 702 S.E.2d 881 (November 22, 2010). Reversing 300 Ga.App. 726 (686 S.E.2d 356) (2009). In child cruelty prosecution, trial court’s ruling on motion for new trial vacated and remanded for written findings regarding defendant’s need for an interpreter. “[W]e hold that one who cannot communicate effectively in English may be effectively incompetent to proceed in a criminal matter and rendered effectively absent at trial if no interpreter is provided. We also now hold that trial courts must state and explain their findings when an issue concerning the need for an interpreter that implicates foundational due process rights is raised and decided at the motion for new trial stage.” Defendant here primarily spoke Mandarin Chinese; trial counsel testified that he was able to communicate with her effectively, but that in any event he didn’t ask for interpreter in part so as not to bias the jury against her, “given the media attention on immigration laws at the time. It is not professionally reasonable to decide to forego obtaining an interpreter for an otherwise incompetent criminal defendant based on speculative fears of juror bias, especially where, as here, there is no evidence that the defendant participated in or consented to the decision.” Carley, Thompson and Hines dissent, would find that the trial court’s implicit finding that no interpreter was needed was adequately supported by the record, without need for express findings on the record. Pineda v. State, 297 Ga.App. 888, 678 S.E.2d 587 (May 15, 2009). No violation of right to presence where defendant was present, but interpreter failed to interpret the first two-thirds of voir dire. “It is undisputed that Pineda was present during voir dire. The fact that Pineda may have ‘missed’ some portion of the colloquy between counsel and 24 potential jurors does not compromise his right to be present on a constitutional scale. ‘The use of an interpreter, and the extent to which he may be used [in the examination of a witness], must necessarily lie within the sound discretion of the trial judge.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hersi v. State, 257 Ga.App. 63, 64(1) (570 S.E.2d 365) (2002). Once the trial court noticed that the interpreter was not translating the proceedings, he quickly advised the interpreter to commence translating. Thus, Pineda's assertion is without merit.” S. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE In re: D.H., 285 Ga. 51, 673 S.E.2d 191 (January 26, 2009). OCGA § 16-13-2(b) does not unconstitutionally deprive