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defendants of the presumption of innocence. Defendant argues that literal meaning makes any accused guilty: “any person who is charged with possession of marijuana, which possession is of one ounce or less, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor…” “‘[T]he literal meaning of the statute prevails unless such a construction would produce unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, [267 Ga. 77, 78 (475 S.E.2d 595) (1996)]. The literal construction of OCGA § 16-13-2(b) proposed by D.H. would result in the absurd consequences that any person charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not be presumed innocent and the State would not have any burden of proof. Instead, the accused would automatically be deemed guilty of the offense merely by virtue of the accusation. Such absurd consequences obviously were not contemplated by the legislature, and we will not construe the words of the statute in such an unreasonable way.” T. PRIVACY See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE – EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, below Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (October 17, 2011). Murder and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no constitutional privacy violation in seizure of defendant’s hospital medical records by search warrant. First, because “he invited two law enforcement officers into the room where he was being treated. Bowling cannot claim an expectation of privacy in the medical records to the extent that they contain information he disclosed to medical personnel or they disclosed to him in those two officers' presence.” Second, “‘the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant ... will issue.... [T]he Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment and strike a new balance.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) King v. State, 276 Ga. 126, 128–129(2) (577 S.E.2d 764) (2003) (‘ King II ’).” Finally, contrary to defendant’s argument, HIPAA (“the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996”) and the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR §§ 160, 164) don’t create a “contemporary standard of privacy” prohibiting release of medical information in this context; rather, “the Privacy Rule authorizes disclosure of protected health information without notice, consent, or opportunity to object ‘[i]n compliance with and as limited by the relevant requirements of: (A) A ... court-ordered warrant.’ 45 CFR § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A).” Engle v. State, 290 Ga.App. 396, 659 S.E.2d 795 (March 21, 2008). “Citing In re: J.M., 276 Ga. 88 (575 S.E.2d 441) (2003), Engle … contends that his conviction ‘for a consensual touching of [the victim], within the context of their relationship (albeit brief) as boyfriend and girlfriend, violated [his constitutional] right to privacy.’ But In re: J.M. is not applicable here. In that case our Supreme Court reversed an adjudication of delinquency for an alleged violation of the fornication statute, OCGA § 16-6-18, because the statute infringed on the juvenile’s state constitutional right of privacy. As we have since noted however, ‘[c]ritical to the Court’s decision was the fact that the juvenile and his girlfriend were both 16 years old at the time they had sexual intercourse, [and thus were both at] the age at which they could legally consent to sexual intercourse.’ In re: L.A.N., 276 Ga.App. 477, 478(1) (623 S.E.2d 682) (2005). Since we have rejected Engle’s contention that the 13-year-old victim in this case was at the age where she could legally consent to sexual conduct, this enumeration is also without merit. See id.” Overruled on other grounds, Watson v. State , 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (June 25, 2007). Trial court properly admitted recordings of defendant’s telephone conversations from jail with his mother where defendant was aware calls might be recorded. 1. Miranda didn’t apply because no interrogation was involved. 2. No violation of right to privacy. “To invoke the privacy protection of the Fourth Amendment, Preston must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576) (1967). While there appears to be no Georgia authority directly on point, federal courts and appellate courts of other states have decided this issue adversely to the position asserted by Preston. [Cits.] Persuaded by the rationale of the cited cases, we hold Preston had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls he placed to his mother from jail.” Dingler v. State, 281 Ga.App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (October 3, 2006). Requirement that certain convicted felons contribute DNA samples to state DNA databank is not unconstitutional violation of right to privacy. “As a person who was convicted of a felony prior to July 1, 2000 and who on that date was incarcerated on such offense, Dingler was properly subject to compulsory blood sampling to establish his DNA profile for storage in the State’s DNA data bank. OCGA § 24-4-60(b). ‘[O]nce a person is convicted of one of the felonies included as predicate offenses under the DNA Act, his identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from blood sampling.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837(III)(B)(1) (9th Cir.Cal., 2004), cert. denied 544 U.S. 924, (125 S.Ct. 924; 161 L.Ed.2d 483) (2005). It is not otherwise under OCGA § 24-4-60. See Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1345(III)(E) (N.D.Ga., 2003) (DNA