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909 (2009), trial court erred in excluding the public from courtroom during voir dire in defendant’s cocaine trafficking trial without finding overriding interest in doing so and considering reasonable alternatives, even where none were advanced by defendant. Trial court excluded defendant’s uncle from the courtroom and the entire floor of the courthouse during voir dire, citing the inability of the courtroom to accommodate 42 potential jurors plus spectators, and the concern that the uncle or others would “intermingle members of the jury panel” who would be “all out in the hallway.” Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that one who objects to closing a courtroom is “‘obliged to present the court with any alternatives that he wished the court to consider.’ Id., at 273, 674 S.E.2d, at 911, 912. When no alternatives are offered, it concluded, ‘there is no abuse of discretion in the court's failure to sua sponte advance its own alternatives.’ Id., at 274, 674 S.E.2d, at 912.” U.S. Supreme Court disagrees, quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984): “‘[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.’ Id., at 48.” “The conclusion that trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties is clear not only from this Court's precedents but also from the premise that ‘[t]he process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system,’” quoting Press- Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 505, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). “The public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right.” “Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials. Nothing in the record shows that the trial court could not have accommodated the public at Presley's trial. Without knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with audience members. … The generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudicial remarks, unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are present during the selection of jurors. If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course.” “[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had an overriding interest in closing voir dire, it was still incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure. It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide.” Compare Johnson (September 23, 2013), above (ok to conduct “sensitive” voir dire in chambers, with defendant and counsel present). Mullis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 218, 664 S.E.2d 271 (June 25, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court cleared courtroom of spectators during testimony of child abuse victim, even though victim was age 17 at time of trial. “[T]he state presented evidence during the trial of the profound emotional and psychological impact that Mullis’s abuse had on the victim, to the extent that, at one point, he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He had also failed out of school and been held back at least one grade before his outcry. Once the abuse was discovered and ceased, the behavioral problems that had led to the diagnosis of schizophrenia subsided and the victim became an A and B student. The state advocated the closing of the courtroom to nonessential personnel during the victim’s testimony because of the obvious severe psychological impact that the events had on the victim and out of fear that requiring him to recall the trauma that he suffered in front of numerous people, including strangers, would cause him unnecessary harm. The state further expressed concern that the victim would not be as open with the jury if he was required to recount the events in front of a full courtroom. The trial court expressly considered the Waller factors and exercised its discretion to close the courtroom. In so doing, it adopted the state’s concern that, in light of the victim’s fragile emotional and psychological history, the victim might be subjected to unnecessary harm – beyond mere shame – if required to testify in front of a full courtroom. The trial court further limited its ruling to the victim’s testimony and the courtroom was immediately reopened after the victim testified. Under these circumstances, the temporary and limited closure of the courtroom was authorized. See, e.g., Sears v. State, 182 Ga.App. 480, 483(8) (356 S.E.2d 72) (1987) ( trial court did not abuse its discretion when it cleared the courtroom during the testimony of a victim of child molestation who was over 16 at the time of trial ). See also OCGA §§ 17-8-53, OCGA § 17-8-54 (authorizing the trial court to close the courtroom under certain circumstances).” Accord, Pate v. State , 315 Ga.App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (March 27, 2012) (Physical precedent only). Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 651 S.E.2d 1 (July 13, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the removal of two jurors during deliberations in a hearing closed to spectators. “‘(A) violation of one’s right to a public trial is structural error. (Cits.) Structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” (Cit.) As such, structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis. (Cit.)’ [Cit.] Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 570-571(1) (602 S.E.2d 312) (2004).” “‘The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.... To preserve fairness and at the same