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time protect legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals believing public questioning will prove damaging because of embarrassment, may properly request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel present and on the record .’ Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 511-512(III) (104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629) (1984). In this case, the issue arose after deliberations had begun, rather than during the initial selection process, and the request for closure was initiated by the juror himself, rather than prompted by the trial court’s inquiry as to whether there was a need for privacy. Despite these factual differences, however, Berry does not suggest any reason why the legal principle established in Press-Enterprise Co. is not equally applicable here. ‘By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of unnecessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the [trial] court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service.’ Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, supra at 512(III).” Closure here was without objection from defense. Moore v. State, 279 Ga. 45, 609 S.E.2d 340 (February 21, 2005). “Generally, the constitutional right to a public trial is not violated where the court exercises its inherent power ‘“... to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom ..., and generally to further the administration of justice.” [Cit.]’ Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 127(4), 303 S.E.2d 437 (1983).” (Defendant here complained of court’s locking the doors while charge to jury was read, but failed to object at time, so issue not directly decided here.) Accord, Presley (February 22, 2008), above. Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated when trial judge excluded certain persons from the courtroom during testimony of child molestation victims. “In Waller [ v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31) (1984)] , the Court held that the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights had been violated when the trial court granted the state’s motion to close the hearing on the defendants’ motion to suppress and barred spectators. ‘The Court then articulated the steps that must be taken if a courtroom is to be completely cleared of spectators: “The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” [Cit.]’” quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 (11 th Cir., 2001). Complete closure of the proceedings is a “structural error,” not subject to harmless error analysis. “There is, however, ‘a distinction between total closures of proceedings, as in Waller, and situations where the courtroom is only partially closed to spectators. [Cit.] When access to the courtroom is retained by some spectators (such as representatives of the press or the defendant’s family members), we have found that the impact of the closure is not as great, and not as deserving of such a rigorous level of constitutional scrutiny. [Cit.]’ Id. at 1315.” “OCGA § 17-8-54 provides for only a partial closure of a criminal trial based upon a legislative determination that there is a compelling state interest in protecting children while they are testifying concerning a sex offense. [Cit.] This distinguishes Waller . [Cit.]” Although trial court excluded all spectators here, defense counsel did not object and give court “an opportunity either to allow Hunt’s immediate family and any press members to remain in the courtroom or to engage in the four-part Waller inquiry.” Thus, affirmed. Accord, Tolbert v. State , 321 Ga.App. 637, 742 S.E.2d 152 (April 25, 2013). V. SELF-INCRIMINATION See subheading SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT; and EVIDENCE – STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT, below W. SEPARATION OF POWERS Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349, 773 S.E.2d 760 (June 15, 2015). Following negotiated plea and sentence of guilty but mentally ill to murder, trial court erred by denying motion to vacate void sentence. 1. When defendant was by law eligible for parole after 14 years, superior court had no power to prohibit parole sooner than 25 years, even with defendant’s consent. “It is true that Humphrey consented to his sentence, including the provision that he would be ineligible for parole for the first 25 years of that sentence. But when a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void. See Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611(1) (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991) (‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ (Citation omitted.)). And as we have indicated in a number of cases, the consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 706(1) (749 S.E.2d 660) (2013) (‘[A] defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement and accepts the benefit of that bargain does not waive or ‘bargain away’ the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citations omitted.)); Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8(2) (749 S.E.2d 672) (2013) (‘A defendant who knowingly enters into a