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plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citation omitted.)); von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 573(2) (748 S.E.2d 446) (2013) (‘[A] sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.’ (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.)); Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 487(2)(c) (746 S.E.2d 109) (2013) (‘Void convictions and illegal sentences have never been subject to general waiver rules.’).” 2. Attempt to limit parole violates separation of powers. “ By imposing such a sentence, a court intrudes upon the constitutional prerogative of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to extend clemency to persons under sentence. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II(a) (‘[T]he State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles....’),” citing “ Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 25(2) (663 S.E.2d 256) (2008). And whatever the prosecuting attorneys and defendant in a criminal case might agree to, they cannot simply by agreement confer upon the judicial branch an extraconstitutional power to limit the constitutional prerogatives of another branch of the government. See Perez v. State, 254 Ga.App. 872, 873(1) (564 S.E.2d 208) (2002) (‘The authority to grant parole or other relief from the sentence imposed by the trial court rests with the State Board of Pardons & Paroles, not the district attorney's office .’ (Citation omitted.)). To the extent that we held otherwise in Baker v. State, 284 Ga. 280, 281(2) (663 S.E.2d 261) (2008), we overrule that decision.” 3. Suggests, however, that defendant may be held to his bargain. “[Defendant] also promised that he would not seek parole for 25 years. No one should misunderstand our decision as holding that his promise not to seek parole is unenforceable. When a defendant promises the State that he will not ask for parole, his promise is a personal one. It does not require a court to do anything, and it does not purport to limit the constitutional power of the Board. If Humphrey breaks his promise and applies to the Board for parole before he has served 25 years, the State may ask the Board itself or a court to enforce the promise. We express no opinion today about the availability of a remedy for the State, but our decision does not foreclose the possibility of such a remedy.” Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 748 S.E.2d 426 (September 9, 2013). Convictions for violating Georgia’s mandatory education statute, OCGA § 20-2-690.1, affirmed; statute isn’t unconstitutional for any of the reasons argued by defendant. No improper delegation of powers. “[T]his Court recognizes that the General Assembly cannot be expected to ‘find all facts and make all applications of legislative policy,’ and consequently, delegation of legislative authority is permissible when it is accompanied by sufficient guidelines for the delegatee. Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 703(1) (398 S.E.2d 567) (1990). This is so because in such instance the delegatee is not performing a legislative function, that is, it is not making a purely legislative decision, but is acting in an administrative capacity by direction of the legislature. Id. As has been discussed, OCGA § 20–2–690.1, is to be considered in conjunction with OCGA § 20–2– 693, which does provide realistic guidance for enforcement of the penalty provisions of OCGA § 20–2–690.1. OCGA § 20–2–693 directs that the State Board of Education, in promulgating its general policies and regulations, take into consideration ‘sickness and other emergencies which may arise in any school community.’ By their very nature, such guidelines must be flexible in order to account for the varying exigent circumstances which might bear on school attendance. There is no violation of the Georgia separation-of-powers doctrine.” Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 663 S.E.2d 256 (June 30, 2008). Trial court erred in attempting to impose conditions of parole in sentence. “The Board of Pardons and Paroles has executive power regarding the terms and conditions of paroles. See OCGA §§ 42-9-40, 42-9-44. See also Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 647(2) (428 S.E.2d 661) (1993). Accordingly, the trial court’s attempt to control parole conditions violates the constitutional provision regarding the separation of powers, and this portion of the sentence must be vacated. Stephens, supra.” Brabham v. State, 240 Ga.App. 506, 524 S.E.2d 1 (October 21, 1999). Defendant’s armed robbery conviction affirmed; mandatory sentencing statute does not violate separation of powers. “‘The power to create crimes and to prescribe punishment therefor is legislative. The judge is a mere agent of the law. He has no discretion except as it is given him. The penalty is affixed by law. In the absence of legislation, the judiciary cannot exercise discretion in fixing the quantum of punishment to be inflicted upon criminals. Such power is not one which inheres in the judicial department. Thus it is within the power of the legislature to direct the punishment to be prescribed for second offenders and to leave no discretion to the trial judge.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 771, 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979). Accordingly, Brabham's Separation of Powers argument is without merit.” X. SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT See also EVIDENCE – STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT, below Seminal case: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 1. COMMENTARY ON DEFENDANT’S SILENCE