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made statements to police, the prosecutor was free to explore any inconsistencies or omissions concerning those statements on cross-examination. Id. See also McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598(11)(a) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995) (prosecutor's questioning was not improper commentary on defendant's silence where the questions highlighted inconsistencies, namely that defendant made affirmative statements to police at the scene that he lost his memory and prosecutor asked why defendant did not tell police that he shot the victims in self-defense).” Accord, Johnson v. State , 292 Ga. 785, 741 S.E.2d 627 (April 15, 2013); Yancey v. State , 292 Ga. 812, 740 S.E.2d 628 (April 29, 2013) (where defendant voluntarily went to police to discuss wife’s murder, no error in admitting evidence that he suddenly stopped talking and left when asked to draw scene of crime); Carter v. State , 324 Ga.App. 118, 749 S.E.2d 404 (October 4, 2013) (not improper to cross-examine defendant about inconsistencies between her testimony and statement to police); Seabolt v. Norris , 298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (March 7, 2016) (proper to comment on inconsistencies between defendant’s testimony and her custodial statement to police). Fullwood v. State, 304 Ga.App. 341, 696 S.E.2d 367 (June 7, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction affirmed; where defendant testified on direct that he had acted in self-defense, but “had not gone to the police because he was scared,” prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine him on the subject, citing “ Mitchell v. State, 242 Ga.App. 177, 181(4)(a) (529 S.E.2d 169) (2000) (no ineffectiveness where defendant opened the door to prosecutor's cross-examination concerning his silence). See also Gaston v. State, 257 Ga.App. 480, 484(3) (571 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (rejecting claim of improper comment on silence where defense opened the door).” Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286 (February 1, 2010). At defendant’s murder trial, no improper comment on defendant’s silence: “five days after the crimes were committed, police officers sought out appellant and questioned him regarding the crimes. Appellant gave a statement in which he admitted he knew of and participated in the plan to commit the armed robbery of the victims but claimed he then hesitated because of his friendship with the victims and abandoned the enterprise by running away. … During the course of this statement, appellant specifically told the interrogating detective that he was ‘going to call you all next week’ to report what [co-defendants] Benbow and Worthy had done to the victims. In her closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated this comment appellant had made to the interrogating detective when she argued that appellant could have but did not call the police in the days following the crimes. We hold that appellant invited the prosecutor's comment about his pretrial silence by making the statement to the interrogating officer that he had intended to call the police ‘next week’ and thereby raised an issue regarding his failure to come forward before the interrogation that the prosecutor was legitimately authorized to address in her closing argument.” Mayberry v. State, 301 Ga.App. 503, 687 S.E.2d 893 (November 23, 2009). At defendant’s trial for kidnapping with injury, aggravated sodomy, and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where defense counsel didn’t object to prosecutor’s improper question commenting on defendant’s silence; “and when the police came to your house and arrested you, you didn't even ask them why they were there, did you, because you knew why they were there; isn't that right, Mr. Mayberry?” This “incidental” “passing reference” was not enough to change the outcome of the case; “Even if the question raised an inference regarding Mayberry's silence, the prosecution did not follow up on the question, nor did it capitalize on it in its closing argument to the jury.” Adams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 775, 686 S.E.2d 390 (November 5, 2009). Officer’s comment on defendant’s pre-arrest silence was error, but harmless where trial court sustained objection, but denied motion for mistrial, and defendant declined any curative instruction. Prosecutor asked patrol officer, “‘When you approached Mr. Adams, what did you say to him?’ The officer answered, ‘I asked him what did he throw in the bushes. He never would say when I asked what he throwed in the bushes.’” Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. 842, 684 S.E.2d 590 (October 5, 2009). “It was not improper for the prosecutor to cross- examine Stringer regarding his failure to mention the alibi to officers or others when he made his statement or at any other time before trial. McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 606(11)(a) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995); Munn v. State, 263 Ga.App. 821, 826(8) (589 S.E.2d 596) (2003). ‘The record reveals that [Stringer] did not avail himself of the right to remain silent immediately upon his arrest.... Under those circumstances, the State's question[ing] “was not an impermissible comment on [his] right to remain silent, because the evidence showed that [he] did not remain silent [.] ... If [Stringer] has recently manufactured self-serving and exculpatory evidence, the jury surely was entitled to know of that possibility and weigh it in their deliberations. (Cits.)” [Cits.]’ Milline v. State, 172 Ga.App. 468(1) (323 S.E.2d 678) (1984). See also Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 355 (219 S.E.2d 430) (1975). Because Stringer ‘did speak to the officers and others ... about the shooting[ ], the [State's] questions were proper inquiries into the inconsistency between [his]