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affirmative statements [subsequent to the crimes] and his testimony at trial. [Cit.]’ McMichen v. State, supra. See also Sheppard v. State, 285 Ga. 36, 37(2) (673 S.E.2d 852) (2009). Compare Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70 (673 S.E.2d 854) (2009) (following ‘the rule of Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 630(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991), that the prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's pre-arrest silence’).” Accord, Kendrick v. State , 287 Ga. 676, 699 S.E.2d 302 (July 5, 2010); Brinson v. State , 288 Ga. 435, 704 S.E.2d 756 (January 10, 2011); Johnson v. State , 292 Ga. 785, 741 S.E.2d 627 (April 15, 2013). Jones v. State, 300 Ga.App. 287, 684 S.E.2d 411 (October 2, 2009). Mistrial not required where detective gave non- responsive comment on stand that 17-year old defendant’s mother wouldn’t allow detective to interview defendant. “[W]hile the remark may be viewed as evidence that Jones's mother had thwarted the detective's attempt to interview her teenaged son, it fell short of implying further that Jones had elected to remain silent.” Overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011). Hardy v. State, 301 Ga.App. 115, 686 S.E.2d 789 (September 8, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to officer’s brief reference to defendant’s silence: “The fact that a defendant exercised his right to remain silent may not be used against him at trial. Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 327(3) (297 S.E.2d 237) (1982). ‘However, if the testimony concerning remaining silent is made during a narrative on the part of the authorities of a course of events and apparently was not intended to, nor did it have the effect of, being probative on the guilt or innocence of the defendant it is not prejudicial. In fact, to reverse a conviction, the evidence of the defendant's election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of the defendant's defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 561(2)(d) (532 S.E.2d 395) (2000). In this case, the testimony was not given to prove Hardy's guilt or innocence. It could ‘be characterized as a narrative recitation of the events surrounding [Hardy's] arrest by the authorities, and it appears that it was not intended to reflect on his guilt and it was not probative on that issue. Thus, the remark was not so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 95(4) (646 S.E.2d 219) (2007), citing Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 419, 420(3) (577 S.E.2d 782) (2003).” Accord , Dyer v. State , 287 Ga. 137, 695 S.E.2d 15 (May 3, 2010); DeLong v. State , 310 Ga.App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (July 6, 2011); Gooden v. State , 316 Ga.App. 12, 728 S.E.2d 693 (May 18, 2012); Griffin v. State , 331 Ga.App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (February 12, 2015); Matabarahona (November 20, 2015), above. Boivin v. State, 298 Ga.App. 411, 680 S.E.2d 415 (May 18, 2009). “A defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent cannot be used as evidence against him. Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417, 419(2) (271 S.E.2d 817) (1980). ‘It is fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process of law ... to permit cross-examination of a defendant as to post-arrest silence where the defendant has been informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) (1966) or to permit comment thereon.’ Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393(1) (435 S.E.2d 202) (1993) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the state impermissibly inquired into whether Boivin told law enforcement about information relating to his defense after invoking his right to remain silent. Such inquiry should not be made on retrial.” Accord, Grissom v. State , 300 Ga.App. 593, 685 S.E.2d 492 (October 26, 2009) (State’s cross- examination of defendant and closing argument, both challenging defendant’s pre-arrest silence and failure to reveal then the substance of his trial testimony, required reversal of his drug convictions.). Distinguished, Willis (April 26, 2011), above. Gipson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 413, 677 S.E.2d 431 (April 9, 2009). “‘Every comment directed toward a defendant's silence will not be cause for automatic reversal.’ Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814, 815(1) (262 S.E.2d 116) (1979).” Investigator’s comment here, that defendant invoked “his Miranda rights and did not want to speak without his attorney,” “by its own terms, did not sound in evidence of Gipson’s guilt.” “‘To reverse a conviction the evidence of a defendant's election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of defendant's defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury.’ Smith [ v. State, 244 Ga. 814, 816(1) (262 S.E.2d 116) (1979)].” Accord, Raymond v. State , 298 Ga.App. 549, 680 S.E.2d 598 (June 25, 2009). Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Reversing 290 Ga.App. 44, 658 S.E.2d 815 (2008); prosecutor’s comment in closing argument, on defendant’s pre-arrest silence, was improper. “[D]uring closing argument [at defendant’s trial for aggravated battery], the prosecutor stated, ‘I want you to consider that Mr. Reynolds had the opportunity to stay ... that night and call the police or wait for police to respond to give his version of the facts.’” Court of Appeals held, based on Morrison v. State , 251 Ga.App. 161, 164(3) (554 S.E.2d 190) (2001), that this was not improper comment because “the rule prohibiting comments regarding prearrest silence is properly limited to a defendant's silence in the face of questions by an agent of the State or his failure to come forward when he knew that he