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was the target of a criminal investigation .” Supreme Court rejects this holding of Morrison , finding it to be inconsistent with Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 630(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991) (overruled on other grounds, Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 154-156(4) (510 S.E.2d 802) (1998)). Mallory held that “a comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward is far more prejudicial than probative,” and is not limited to the circumstances described in Morrison . Overrules Morrison and its progeny. Accord, Scott v. State , 305 Ga.App. 710, 700 S.E.2d 694 (August 27, 2010). Failure to object to such argument prior to Reynolds is not per se ineffective assistance, Patterson v. State , 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (June 29, 2009). Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 647, 670 S.E.2d 421 (November 17, 2008). “Georgia law prohibits prosecutors from impeaching defendants based on their pre-arrest silence. Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991) (overruled on other grounds by Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151(4), 510 S.E.2d 802 (1998)). Therefore, [defendant] is correct that the prosecutor's questions and comments concerning [defendant]'s failure to contact the police and tell them he shot someone accidentally were impermissible. Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345(12) (496 S.E.2d 674) (1998); Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813(5c) (596 S.E.2d 582) (2004) (‘a prosecutor may not comment on an accused's pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward voluntarily, even if he chooses to testify at trial’). The trial court, however, was not required, absent a timely objection, to prohibit the prosecutor's questions and comments. Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479(4) (299 S.E.2d 531) (1983) (trial court need not interpose itself to stop prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor in the absence of a timely objection). Since [defendant] concedes there was no timely objection made to the prosecutor's questions and comments regarding his pre-arrest silence, he may not pursue the matter on appeal. Id.; Landers v. State, 270 Ga. 189, 190-91(2) (508 S.E.2d 637) (1998); Marable v. State, 247 Ga. 509, 510 (277 S.E.2d 52) (1981).” Dinkins v. State, 295 Ga.App. 289, 671 S.E.2d 299 (November 13, 2008). No error in allowing cross-examination of defendant on his failure to explain his actions to police where “only a relatively small part of the State's questioning referred to Dinkins's post-arrest silence, a silence which was almost immediately broken.” Dinkins testified at trial that he didn’t participate in armed robbery perpetrated by his companion at convenience store. “On cross-examination, the State asked Dinkins a series of questions attacking his contention that he was an unwitting bystander to the robbery. … Only after this series of questions did the prosecutor ask Dinkins why, when police stopped the car, he did not ‘hop out of the car screaming “I didn't know anything about this, I'm not in on it, I didn't do it”? Why?’ Dinkins responded that ‘they didn't give me a chance’ and ‘[t]hey wouldn't let me say anything.’ The prosecutor asked how the police could force Dinkins not to say anything, and only then did Dinkins respond, ‘Because they told me I had the right to remain silent.’ The prosecutor continued, ‘But you also had the right to speak to them didn't you?’ and added, ‘Didn't say anything at all? You didn't say my buddy just robbed Circle K and held a gun to my head and made me get in this car?’ to which Dinkins responded, ‘No, because they read me my rights.’ He elaborated, ‘That can be used against me in a court of law.’” Defendant then testified that he did give an oral statement to police at the station. “‘[A] prosecutor does not impermissibly comment on prearrest silence merely by showing that the accused's demeanor and conduct during and after the crime (but before an agent of the State questions him and before he knows he is being investigated) were inconsistent with a defense such as coercion or justification. In our view, defining ‘prearrest silence’ to include the failure of an accused under the circumstances described here to report a crime or to seek police protection would unduly expand the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination at the expense of the duty of the State to enforce the laws and the function of the courts to seek the truth.’ (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Morrison v. State, 251 Ga.App. 161, 164-165(3) (554 S.E.2d 190) (2001). Here, “[t]he majority of the prosecutor's questions concentrated on the inconsistencies between Dinkins's testimony at trial and his conduct during and after the robbery, not his silence at the time of his arrest. It was Dinkins, not the prosecutor, who first raised the issue of his right to remain silent. Under these circumstances, nearly all the questions addressed to Dinkins clearly fall within the exception established in Morrison. ” Seems to directly contradict Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Cooper v State, 287 Ga.App. 901, 652 S.E.2d 909 (October 23, 2007). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, defendant took the stand and answered questions from his attorney about why he didn’t go to the police to tell them his side of the story, and why he hired an attorney. Prosecutor cross-examined defendant on these subjects, and made closing argument based on the subject. Held, trial court properly allowed the cross-examination and closing argument after defendant introduced the subject. “Cooper’s attorney first introduced this line of questioning, and having done so, Cooper cannot now argue that the State improperly followed up on the same line of questioning. See Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818, 822(3) (546 S.E.2d 509) (2001) (‘defendant first opened the door to this line of questioning, he cannot now complain’) (punctuation omitted); Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 181, 182(1) (366 S.E.2d 763) (1988) ; Cobb v. State, 251 Ga.App. 697, 698 (555 S.E.2d 79) (2001) . Therefore, we discern no reversible error.”