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everything else I said?” “[Agent] responded that the sentence did not mean that Norton was refuting anything else he had said. The officer also told Norton that if he did not feel comfortable discussing any of the agent's questions, he should just refuse to answer rather than lie to law enforcement. Norton executed the waiver form and the interview proceeded. … Norton contends that this question shows that he had previously spoken with an officer and had indicated that he did not want to speak with police. By questioning him a second time, therefore, police violated his Miranda rights and the trial court erred in admitting the evidence obtained during that interview. We find no such error.” Held, Norton’s question wasn’t an unequivocal (or even an equivocal) assertion of the right to remain silent. No other evidence indicated that Norton had previously invoked the right. Ridley v. State, 290 Ga. 798, 725 S.E.2d 223 (March 5, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting defendant’s custodial statement, as he didn’t unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent. “As detectives prepared to take Ridley to jail in 1994, the following colloquy took place: Ridley: I'm upset because I'm getting locked up. You take me on to jail. Detective: No, just listen to me. Ridley: I don't want to—no—no nothing. Take me on to jail. Detective: We have a certain way we had to do it, okay? Do you mind if I just go ahead and do my job? Ridley: Yeah. Detective: Why? Ridley: Because you can take me on to jail. Detective: Well, we will. Ridley: And let me try to doggone try to talk to somebody about this – all this mess I'm in.” Further conversation ensued in which defendant made incriminating statements. “Here, at no point did Ridley unequivocally state that he wanted to remain silent or wanted to speak with an attorney before speaking further with police. Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted the statement in question.” Accord, Cheley (May 23, 2016), above (“Although Cheley made several comments about wanting to ‘rest’ and go back to the jail, he also said that he was being treated fairly, that he was planning to continue talking to the investigators later, and that he wanted to ‘tell [them] everything.’”). Hill v. State, 290 Ga. 493, 722 S.E.2d 708 (February 6, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant didn’t invoke right to silence “where, as here, the accused waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and made an oral statement. Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 330(6), 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983). See also Moore v. State, 207 Ga.App. 802–803, 430 S.E.2d 115 (1993) (refusal to sign a waiver form or a confession does not constitute invocation of the right to remain silent).” Rather, defendant agreed to speak to officers, he just refused to put it in writing or make a recorded statement. Williams v. State, 290 Ga. 418, 721 S.E.2d 883 (January 23, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; defendant’s custodial statement was properly admitted despite his contention that he invoked his right to remain silent. “Viewed in context, we agree with the trial court that appellant's statement ‘I can't go on answering these questions’ was not an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent,” citing Weaver (February 7, 2011), below. Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 721 S.E.2d 864 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting testimony that defendant refused to answer certain questions while otherwise waiving right to remain silent. Counsel “argued that admission of Appellant's statement that he did not want to answer the same question with respect to [whether he had sex with State’s witness] would constitute an improper comment on Appellant's right to remain silent. … Appellant's refusal to answer a particular question during the custodial interview in Mississippi was admissible. … Many cases have held ‘in such a situation that a defendant's failure to respond to some questions during questioning—while responding to others—may be the subject of testimony at defendant's trial, at least where the defendant's silence cannot be construed as an attempt to reassert his rights and cut off questioning altogether. [Cits.]’ (Emphasis in original.) People v. Hart, [828 N.E.2d 260, 273 (Ill.2005)]. See also United States v. Burns, 276 F3d 439, 441–442(I) (8 th Cir., 2002); Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614, 621–622(4) (Mass., 2001); Thomas v. State, [726 So.2d 357, 358 (Fla.App., 1999)]. In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197) (1979), ‘[t]he Supreme Court of the United States ... recognized that a defendant's refusal to answer certain questions is not the equivalent of a request to end the interrogation.’ United States v. Reynolds, 743 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1090(II)(A) (D.S.D., 2010). As the Eleventh Circuit has indicated, it is also consistent with Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994), which we extended in Perez [ v. State, 283 Ga. 196, 200 (657 S.E.2d 846) (2008)] to the right to remain silent, to hold that ‘a suspect's refusal to answer certain questions is not tantamount to the invocation, either equivocal or unequivocal, of the constitutional right to remain silent and that questioning may continue until the suspect articulates in some manner that he wishes the questioning to cease.’ United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 477(III)(B) (11 th Cir., 1996). ‘“[T]he refusal of a defendant to answer a particular question during a custodial interrogation is not an invocation of the right to remain silent” [Cits.]’ State v. Fluker, 1 A.3d 1216, 1223(I) (Conn.App., 2010).” Accord, Yancey v. State , 292 Ga. 812, 740 S.E.2d 628 (April 29, 2013) (defendant voluntarily went to police to discuss wife’s murder; no error to admit evidence that he stopped talking and left when asked to draw scene of crime).