☢ test - Í

Bobby v. Dixon, 10-1540, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (November 7, 2011). Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas petition following Dixon’s Ohio murder conviction. Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that “the Miranda decision itself clearly established that police could not speak to Dixon on November 9, because on November 4 Dixon had refused to speak to police without his lawyer. That is plainly wrong. It is undisputed that Dixon was not in custody during his chance encounter with police on November 4. And this Court has ‘never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than “custodial interrogation.”’ McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182, n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2090, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (‘If the defendant is not in custody then [ Miranda and its progeny] do not apply’).” Clark v. State, 309 Ga.App. 749, 711 S.E.2d 339 (June 2, 2011). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; defendant’s statement during custodial interview that he didn’t have anything else to say on a particular subject wasn’t tantamount to invocation of right to remain silent. Law v. State, 308 Ga.App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (February 24, 2011). Conviction for armed robbery affirmed. Defendant’s alleged invocation of right to silence was ambiguous at best, where he said he would talk, but checked wrong box on written waiver. “[T]he officer's attempt to clarify whether Law wished to speak with him was not improper.” Weaver v. State, 288 Ga. 540, 705 S.E.2d 627 (February 7, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant didn’t unequivocally invoke right to silence. “After being told that his wife was dead, Appellant appeared to become emotional and said, ‘I can't talk right now.’ … In context, ‘[t]he only reasonable interpretation of this statement is that his emotions had temporarily overcome his ability to speak.’ State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935(I) (Utah, 1998).” “Soon afterwards, Appellant stated, ‘I don't want to say nothing. There's just so much to say.’ … ‘Viewed in this context, the statement “I [don't want to] say[ ] nothing” is plainly not an attempt to cut off questioning....’ Reeves v. State, 241 Ga. 44, 47(1), 243 S.E.2d 24 (1978). See also United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7 th Cir., 2006). It was part of the ‘give and take’ of interrogation and may also be ‘reasonably understood to express [Appellant's] internal conflict and pain in being asked to recount [all that] had happened.’ State v. Lockhart, 830 A.2d 433, 443 (Me., 2003). Accordingly, the statement was no more than ‘an equivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, and thus the interrogating officer[ ] had no obligation to stop questioning him. [Cit.]’ Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 795(3), 700 S.E.2d 386 (2010). See also Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 425(2), 696 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Perez v. State, [283 Ga. 196, 201, 657 S.E.2d 846 (2008)].” Accord, Williams (January 23, 2012), above; Lucas (March 23, 2015), above. Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted custodial statement. “[D]efendant’s statement, ‘if you're not going to talk real talk, then we shouldn't talk’ was not an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. On the contrary, it was conditional and ambiguous, and lacked sufficient clarity to lead a reasonable police officer to understand that defendant was exercising his right to remain silent. Perez v. State, 283 Ga. 196, 199-200 (657 S.E.2d 846) (2008).” Accord, Turner v. State , 287 Ga. 793, 700 S.E.2d 386 (September 20, 2010) (“if y'all are going to try to do me like that, I don't want to talk no more,” was too ambiguous to invoke right to silence). Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (June 1, 2010). Reverses Sixth Circuit grant of habeas relief to Michigan murder defendant; Michigan courts properly determined that defendant’s silence for two hours, forty-five minutes did not require officers to terminate interrogation without an express invocation of defendant’s right to remain silent. Extends prior holding in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), requiring express invocation of right to counsel, to right to remain silent. Facts here: Miranda warning was read aloud, partly by police, partly by defendant, but defendant refused to sign waiver. After lengthy interrogation in which defendant was “largely silent,” “[Detective] Helgert asked Thompkins, ‘Do you believe in God?’ Thompkins made eye contact with Helgert and said ‘Yes,’ as his eyes ‘well[ed] up with tears.’ Helgert asked, ‘Do you pray to God?’ Thompkins said ‘Yes.’ Helgert asked, ‘Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?’ Thompkins answered ‘Yes’ and looked away. Thompkins refused to make a written confession, and the interrogation ended about 15 minutes later.” Defendant argues that his lengthy silence was itself an invocation of the right to remain silent, but Supreme Court disagrees, preferring a holding consistent with Davis ’s requirement that a request for counsel be unambiguous. “There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and ... provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. Davis, 512 U.S., at 458-459.” Cites North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), for