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made no statement. Screws v. State, 245 Ga.App. 664, 538 S.E.2d 547 (August 24, 2000). Robbery and cocaine possession convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s custodial statement, as his statement that “he needed to ‘get his head clear,’” did not prohibit the officers from making a later request. “‘“The right to [remain silent] is not protected by a per se rule of ‘permanent immunity’ against further police-initiated interrogation.” [Cits.]’ Larry v. State, 266 Ga. 284, 286(2)(a), 466 S.E.2d 850 (1996) quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). ‘Police may legitimately inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them with or without an attorney. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, 251 Ga. 62, 63, 303 S.E.2d 7 (1983). ‘The facts in this case indicate “(t)his was not the persistent, repetitive interrogation against which courts have fashioned protection for an accused who might otherwise be coerced into incriminating himself.” [Cit.]’ Spratley v. State, 169 Ga.App. 922(1), 315 S.E.2d 474 (1984), quoting Johnson v. State, supra.” 3. RIGHT TO COUNSEL See EVIDENCE – STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT, below 4. RIGHT TO TESTIFY/ WAIVER Wilmott v. State, 326 Ga.App. 1, 755 S.E.2d 818 (March 5, 2014). Physical precedent only. Convictions for operating a chop shop and removing a vehicle identification number (VIN) affirmed; no error where trial court engaged in colloquy with defendant after State rested and required defendant to declare his intention to testify. Colloquy with defendant regarding right to testify is encouraged, State v. Nejad, 286 Ga. 695, 695–700(1), 690 S.E.2d 846 (2010), but Court of Appeals expresses doubt that trial court should require defendant to state his intention at that time, especially where, as here, “Wilmott's counsel indicated that Wilmott was not yet ready to do so. The trial court's actions undermined the relationship between Wilmott and his counsel and infringed upon Wilmott's ability to determine the manner in which he would present his case. Faced with the request to ‘hold off,’ the better practice would have been to postpone the colloquy until later in the trial.” No harm here, however, as counsel had already indicated “that there was a ‘pretty good chance’ the defense would call Wilmott as a witness.” Best practice: advise defendant that he personally can and must choose to either testify or remain silent; give opportunity to consult with counsel on the subject; but don’t require defendant to disclose his intentions at that time. Rudolph v. State, 313 Ga.App. 411, 721 S.E.2d 625 (December 19, 2011). 1. Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure “to advise [defendant] about his right to testify.” “Based on his common practice, trial counsel stated that he would have directed Rudolph not to testify, but would have made it clear that it was ultimately Rudolph's decision. See Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 162(1) (535 S.E.2d 760) (2000) (‘Certainly, evidence of a routine or standard practice or procedure can be used in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards.’ ) (citation omitted).” 2. “In any event, Rudolph has not shown that there is any likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had testified at trial. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Rudolph did not present any evidence as to what the content of his testimony would have been had he testified at trial, and therefore, he failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. See Brown v. State, 288 Ga.App. 671, 672(1)(a), (b) (655 S.E.2d 287) (2007).” Smith v. State, 306 Ga.App. 693, 703 S.E.2d 329 (November 3, 2010). Felony shoplifting conviction affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to testify where defendant raised the issue after closing arguments, when State’s witnesses had already been released . “[T]he question before us is ‘whether a defendant, who waived [his] right to testify during the presentation of the evidence, can reassert [his] right if [he] disagrees with [his] counsel's presentation of the closing arguments.’ U.S. v. Cummings, 2009 WL 2058845, 4 (E.D.Wash., 2009). Although the U.S. Supreme Court established in Rock v. Arkansas, [483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)], that ‘the right to testify on one's own behalf in defense of a criminal charge is a fundamental constitutional right,’ 483 U.S. at 53, n. 10, the Court also stated that a defendant's ‘right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation and must sometimes “bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”’ Id. at 55 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). Nevertheless, ‘restrictions of a defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ Rock at 55-56. Smith's request to address the trial court was couched as a complaint about his attorney and not as a request to testify. To the extent Smith's complaint reflected his intent to invoke his right to testify, however, we find that he asserted this right too late, regardless of his dissatisfaction with his counsel's performance. To permit Smith to reopen the evidence after closing arguments and after the State had released all of its witnesses would have detrimentally affected the fairness and legitimacy of the trial. A requirement that ‘a defendant ... exercise his right to testify prior to the close of evidence is not “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve.”’ Cummings, 2009 WL 2058845 at 4 citing Rock, 483 U.S. at