☢ test - Í

56. See also Manning v. State, 259 Ga.App. 794, 797(3), 578 S.E.2d 494 (2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to reopen evidence prior to closing argument to allow defendant to testify); U.S. v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1287-1288(II) (11 th Cir., 2005) (no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's request to testify made before closing arguments, but after State's witnesses had been released).” Accord, Danenberg v. State , 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (June 25, 2012) (court not required to re-open evidence to allow defendant to testify). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (June 16, 2009). Trial court made pro se defendant aware of his right to remain silent by advising him on the record, prior to his opening statement: “This is your chance to make an opening statement to me as to what you think the evidence will be. You have the right to remain silent. You have the right to give up that and to testify if you decide to.” Does not decide that court had any duty to advise defendant of his right to remain silent or testify. Williams v. State, 298 Ga.App. 151, 679 S.E.2d 377 (June 1, 2009). Conviction for voluntary manslaughter reversed; trial court erred in ruling that defendant could only present evidence of victim’s violent acts toward third parties if defendant first testified himself, where other evidence supported inference that victim was aggressor here. “Williams was thus presented with the constitutionally impermissible Hobson's choice of foregoing either (a) his right not to take the stand and become subject to cross-examination or (b) his entitlement to present evidence in support of his defense of justification.” Error was not harmless because “[b]y having Williams take the stand, the defense gave the prosecution an opportunity to elicit testimony from him on cross-examination showing, among other things, that his proficiency in self-defense as a result of his military training had enabled him to disarm Searcy when she had attempted to attack him with weapons on prior occasions. The state was thus able to undermine Williams's defense of self-defense in a way that would not have been possible if he had not testified.” Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). “ Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense, whether to so testify is a tactical decision to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with his trial counsel. Barron v. State, 264 Ga. 865(2) (452 S.E.2d 504) (1995).” Here, as trial counsel had reviewed with defendant his right to testify, his waiver of that right was valid. Trial court has no obligation to discuss the issue with defendant, although doing so on the record would be the better practice. Accord, Finch v. State , 287 Ga.App. 319, 651 S.E.2d 478 (August 22, 2007); Gibson v. State , 283 Ga. 377, 659 S.E.2d 372 (March 31, 2008) (defendant said he told trial court he didn’t want to testify “only to be polite,” and that if judge had inquired further she would have found that “he actually wanted to testify.”); Spencer v. State , 287 Ga. 434, 696 S.E.2d 617 (June 28, 2010) (“Requiring trial courts to inject themselves into the discussions between non-testifying defendants and their counsel about whether or not to take the stand would be inappropriate.”). Paige v. State, 277 Ga.App. 687, 627 S.E.2d 370 (February 1, 2006). “‘While a review of the authorities ... does not persuade us that we should mandate the trial court to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with a defendant to inquire of the non-testifying defendant whether he desires to waive his right to testify, we acknowledge that the better practice would be for the trial court to include this inquiry as a matter of routine in order to avoid a post-conviction attack of the nature raised in this appeal.’ Barron v. State, 264 Ga. 865, 866(2), n. 2 (452 S.E.2d 504) (1995).” Accord, Feaster v. State , 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007); Gaston v. State , 303 Ga.App. 502, 693 S.E.2d 841 (March 16, 2010). Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 625 S.E.2d 397 (January 17, 2006). No ineffective assistance where counsel ‘talked defendant out of testifying.’ “Certainly, after being informed, it is the defendant and not the attorney that is to make the ultimate decision about whether the defendant will testify in his own behalf. Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624, 626(2) (523 S.E.2d 26) (1999). The attorney is to counsel the defendant about any advantage or peril in testifying, so that the defendant can make an informed decision, and that is exactly what happened in this case. … What Price characterizes as ‘talking [him] out of testifying’ was merely his own election to follow the reasonable tactical advice of his lawyer, and there is no basis for complaint. Doctor v. State, 275 Ga. 612, 615(4)(d) (571 S.E.2d 347) (2002).” Crouch v. State, 279 Ga. 879, 622 S.E.2d 818 (November 21, 2005). Defendant was not harmed by trial court’s instruction to him about the dangers of testifying, including the concern that he might incriminate himself, even though court mistakenly gave a definition of “impeachment” when explaining the concept of incrimination. As defendant had given three contradictory statements to trial counsel in advance, so impeachment was, in fact, a real concern. “This Court has previously noted that there is no general requirement that the trial court interject itself into the defendant’s decision-making process concerning whether to testify , which should be undertaken after consultation with counsel.