☢ test - Í

See Mobley v. State, 264 Ga. 854, 856(2) (452 S.E.2d 500) (1995).” Accord, Owens v. State , S16A0058, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 611, 2016 WL 856826 (March 7, 2016). In re: Long, 276 Ga.App. 306, 623 S.E.2d 181 (November 9, 2005). Trial court erred in finding witness in contempt for refusing to testify; alleged grant of immunity (made by another court) was improperly made without written application from state, or hearing to determine that witness’s testimony was “necessary to the public interest” pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28. While it’s unclear in the statute whether witness himself has right to be present at this hearing, Court of Appeals suggests that such a right is implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 264-265(15), 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000), and in In re: S.U. , 269 Ga.App. 306, 603 S.E.2d 790 (2004). Blue v. State, 275 Ga.App. 671, 621 S.E.2d 616 (September 29, 2005). “Trial counsel, and not the trial court, is primarily responsible for advising a defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to testify in his own behalf. Brock v. State, 270 Ga.App. 250, 251(1) (605 S.E.2d 907) (2004).” Accord, Price v. State , 280 Ga. 193, 625 S.E.2d 397 (January 17, 2006); Feaster v. State , 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). Debaeke v. State, 270 Ga.App. 169, 605 S.E.2d 882 (October 22, 2004). “Although it would have been preferable for the trial court to make a record of Debaeke being advised of his right to testify, it is not reversible error to fail to do so since the record shows that Debaeke was aware of his right and decided not to testify. See Stokes v. State, 258 Ga.App. 840, 841(1), 575 S.E.2d 651 (2002).” In re: S.U., 269 Ga.App. 306, 603 S.E.2d 790 (August 27, 2004). “S.U. and a co-defendant were charged with criminal attempt to commit burglary, cruelty to animals, criminal damage to property, loitering and prowling, and curfew violation. S.U.’s co-defendant’s trial was held first, and S.U. was subpoenaed to testify at the trial. On the morning of the trial, the State moved for a grant of testimonial immunity for S.U., which the trial court granted. When he was called to testify, however, S.U. asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and refused to testify. The trial court instructed him to testify, or that he would be held in contempt of court. S.U. refused to do so, and the trial court found him in contempt.” Held, 1. trial court was not required to conduct evidentiary hearing before granting State’s motion; defendant had prior notice and was adequately represented on oral argument before the trial court on the motion. 2. “The purpose of use immunity is to overcome a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination by granting that defendant immunity from any criminal misconduct disclosed by compelled testimony. Hayes v. State, 168 Ga.App. 94(2), 308 S.E.2d 227 (1983). ‘[T]he trial court’s grant of an order of immunity pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28(a) removed any right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted) Willard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 469, 470- 471(1)(a), 535 S.E.2d 820 (2000). ‘[T]o hold otherwise would render the immunity statute meaningless, because any witness would be able to continue to assert the privilege against self-incrimination regardless of a grant of immunity.’ Id. at 471, 535 S.E.2d 820.” See also Kastigar v. United States , 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Curry v. State, 269 Ga.App. 170, 603 S.E.2d 530 (August 18, 2004). “Defendant was not denied his right to testify where his decision to remain silent was based in part on defense counsel’s warning “that ‘if he did take the stand, I would have to bring [ ] some concerns of mine to the attention of the judge prior to doing that, based on some concerns that I had of what he might say.’ … [T]his comment does not suggest a threat of any kind. Rather, it suggests that Curry may have presented his counsel with an ethical dilemma, in response to which Curry was advising his client of his ethical responsibilities. See Ward v. State 242 Ga.App. 246, 249, 529 S.E.2d 378 (2000) (trial counsel properly informed judge of concern about defendant’s testimony).” Bishop v. State, 266 Ga.App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (March 5, 2004). “There is no ‘Georgia authority placing an affirmative duty on the trial court to advise the defendant of his right to testify in his own behalf. While it may be the better practice to apprise [defendants] of their rights in this regard, and under some circumstances it must be done, “under ordinary circumstances, where no statute requires it, and where the [defendant] possesses ordinary intelligence and is under no duress, the judge need not inform the [defendant] of his constitutional privilege.”’ (Citations and punctuation omitted) Coonce v. State, 171 Ga.App. 20, 21 (318 S.E.2d 763) (1984); May v. State, 179 Ga.App. 736, 738 (348 S.E.2d 61) (1986).” Accord, Debaeke, above; Brock v. State , 270 Ga.App. 250, 605 S.E.2d 907 (October 29, 2004); Newby v. State , 272 Ga.App. 507, 612 S.E.2d 837 (March 25, 2005); Moss v. State , 278 Ga.App. 362, 629 S.E.2d 5 (January 19, 2006); State v. Nejad , 286 Ga. 695, 690 S.E.2d 846 (March 15, 2010) (conviction upheld despite defense counsel’s testimony that he refused to allow defendant to testify, thanks to trial court’s practice of personally informing the defendant of his right); Sanford v. State , 287 Ga. 351, 695 S.E.2d 579 (May 17, 2010); Gibson v. State , 290 Ga. 6, 717