☢ test - Í

S.E.2d 447 (October 3, 2011); Jones v. State , 290 Ga. 576, 722 S.E.2d 853 (February 27, 2012); Turnbull v. State , 317 Ga.App. 719, 732 S.E.2d 786 (September 28, 2012). Mathis v. State, 265 Ga.App. 541, 594 S.E.2d 737 (February 11, 2004). “No error occurred in trial counsel’s failure to call defendant to testify. While a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to testify, ‘ the decision whether to testify lies solely with the defendant after full consultation with counsel,’ [cit.].” Trial court conducted excellent inquiry on record, insuring that defendant understood his rights relating to testimony at trial. 5. SELF INCRIMINATION/ NON-VERBAL Germany v. State, 315 Ga.App. 717, 727 S.E.2d 240 (April 12, 2012). Revocation of probation affirmed; no violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights in “revoking probation for [defendant’s] refusal to take a polygraph examination.” Defendant’s three sentences included the following special condition of probation: “Probationer shall submit to and cooperate with a lie detector test or Psychological Stress Evaluation, whenever so directed by the Probation Supervisor of any city, county or state law enforcement officer concerning any inquiry relative to compliance with the terms of his/her probation. Additionally, probationer shall submit to and cooperate with a lie detector test and/or Psychological Stress Evaluation inquiring into his/her knowledge of criminal activity as may be directed by the Probation Supervisor or by any city, county or state law enforcement officer.” “The evidence here showed that Germany declined to undergo a polygraph examination. As the trial court observed, this is a different situation than agreeing to undergo a polygraph examination and then refusing to answer incriminating questions, which would invoke Fifth Amendment rights. Germany was not forced to answer incriminating questions, and he was never threatened that his invocation of his right not to answer particular questions would result in revocation of his probation. The trial court did not err by concluding that the revocation of Germany's probation for failure to comply with the probation condition requiring him to undergo a polygraph examination did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights.” Based on Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427(II)(A) (104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409) (1984) (“the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert [the probationer's] otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones,” as long as the probationer was not “required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege.”); Mann v. State, 154 Ga.App. 677, 681(4) (269 S.E.2d 863) (1980) (a probation “condition requiring the probationer to submit to polygraph tests does not violate the [probationer's] Fifth Amendment rights.”). Different result if revocation based on assertion of privilege as to specific questions. Simpson v. State, 289 Ga. 685, 715 S.E.2d 142 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no compulsory self-incrimination where defendant surrendered “his [bloody] clothes to the police for inspection. Under the Federal Constitution, the protections of the right against self-incrimination are limited to being compelled to testify as ‘a witness against himself.’ Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution. This has been interpreted to apply only to ‘evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,’ and not a ‘comp[ulsion] by the State to produce “real or physical evidence.”’ Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761–762, n. 6, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). Our State Constitution, however, extends this protection further. We have held that the right not to produce evidence against oneself included the right not to be compelled in ‘the doing of an act against [one's] will to incriminate’ oneself. (Punctuation omitted .) Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 517(3), 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972). Thus, in Georgia, for example, a suspect cannot be required to place his foot into a footprint left at a crime scene so that police might match the footprint to a shoe. Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667(2) (1879). Here, appellant did not perform any act against his will to incriminate himself. On the contrary, he surrendered his clothes when asked to do so. Moreover, … the police were entitled to seize the clothes, which were in his immediate possession, because he had already been lawfully arrested. Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 602(2), 361 S.E.2d 821 (1987) (‘[o]nce the appellant was lawfully arrested and in custody, the effects in his possession could be lawfully searched and seized without a warrant’) (citing U.S. v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)). Thus, we find no merit in this claim.” Fortune v. State, 300 Ga.App. 550, 685 S.E.2d 466 (October 21, 2009). In defendant’s prosecution for burglary, kidnapping and aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence. Use of defendant’s DNA profile from State database, made from lawfully-obtained DNA sample, was properly used to identify him in a later prosecution although defendant was acquitted in the rape case which generated the original profile. Such use of defendant’s DNA did not violate defendant’s privilege against self- incrimination under either the federal or state constitutions. “The Georgia constitutional protection against self- incrimination is broader than the federal protection, because while the United States constitutional protection applies only to ‘testimony,’ the Georgia Constitution applies to both oral and real evidence. Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 516, 192