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S.E.2d 350 (1972). For example, it was error to force a defendant to place his foot into a print left near a burglary scene and use that evidence against him at trial. Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879). On the other hand, ‘[t]he removal of a substance from the body through a minor intrusion does not cause the person to be a witness against himself within the meaning of Fifth Amendment protection and similar provisions of Georgia law.’ Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519, 202 S.E.2d 428 (1973). Thus, the results of a blood test using blood taken from the defendant without his consent while he was unconscious were admissible. Id. ‘OCGA § 24-4-60 does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed.’ Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386(4), 651 S.E.2d 32 (2007). In this case, the State did not force Fortune to incriminate himself by maintaining in its database a DNA profile generated from a seminal fluid stain at the scene of an alleged rape, which included the GBI case number that led to Fortune being identified as the defendant in that case. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying Fortune's motion to suppress.” Strong overruled by Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (March 27, 2015) to the extent Strong holds that dissipating blood alcohol is always an exigent circumstance justifying nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases. Thompson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 363, 670 S.E.2d 152 (November 4, 2008). Corporate representative could not invoke Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to justify refusing to produce corporate document in response to subpoena. “It is well-established that corporations and other collective entities are treated differently than individuals regarding the right against self-incrimination in that corporations have no right or privilege against self- incrimination. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-109 (108 S.Ct. 2284, 101 L.Ed.2d 98) (1988); Classic Art Corp. v. State, 245 Ga. 448, 448 (265 S.E.2d 577) (1980); Jacobs v. State, 157 Ga.App. 466, 468 (278 S.E.2d 21) (1981). … ‘[W]ithout regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as custodian, a corporate custodian such as petitioner may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.’ Braswell, 487 U.S. at 109. Thompson argues that because she is the only officer of the corporation and the State is seeking to use the document against her personally in a criminal trial, she may rely on her personal right against self-incrimination. Thompson cites no authority for that proposition. Further, it is inconsistent with existing case law. ‘It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.’ Braswell, 487 U.S. at 108.” Butler v. State, 277 Ga.App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (December 6, 2005). Having defendant stand before jury and turn in profile, at juror’s request, did not violate defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution . “ Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515-518(3) (192 S.E.2d 350) (1972), reiterated that the Georgia Constitution accords broader rights than the United States Constitution in that the Georgia constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination ‘protects one from being compelled to furnish evidence against himself, either in the form of oral confessions or incriminating admissions of an involuntary character, or of doing an act against his will which is incriminating in its nature.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 516-517(3). Creamer distinguished acts in which the defendant is forced to submit his body for the purpose of having evidence removed or having his body displayed (which acts are constitutional) from acts in which the defendant is forced to remove or produce the evidence himself (which acts are unconstitutional). Id. at 517-518(3). Compare Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 634(7) (323 S.E.2d 801) (1984) (requiring defendant to strip to his waist and be photographed to show tattoos on his body did not violate Georgia Constitution) and Scott v. State, 274 Ga. 476, 478(2)(b) (554 S.E.2d 488) (2001) (requiring defendant to display scar for photographing did not violate Georgia Constitution) with Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668(2) (1879) (forcing defendant to place foot into tracks near crime scene was unconstitutional) and Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 133-134 (137 S.E.2d 463) (1964) (requiring defendant to drive truck upon scales was unconstitutional). Creamer summarized that the State may legally require the defendant ‘to submit so that evidence may be produced from him, but he is only required to be present and the evidence is adduced by those fingerprinting, photographing or identifying him.’ Creamer, supra at 517(3). Based on a similar analysis, Meriwether, supra at 671(2), concluded that under the Georgia Constitution, ‘[d]irecting defendant to stand up for identification is not compelling him to be a witness against himself.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Compare Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 78-79(1) (1881) (requiring defendant to show amputated leg so that witness, who could not remember how much of the perpetrator’s leg was cut off, could fill in the gap and testify that perpetrator’s leg was cut off below the knee, was unconstitutional). Accordingly, Butler’s rights under the Georgia Constitution were not violated by having him stand before the jury for identification purposes.” Affirmed on different issue, Butler v. State , 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006). Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (June 21, 2004). Defendant’s conviction for obstruction, based on refusing to identify himself to a police officer under Nevada law, did not violate his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. To be valid, initial stop must be based on