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“specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity,” Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), and must not impose vague requirements of identification such as “credible and reliable,” see Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Statute here, by contrast, only required disclosure of name, not any document. “The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined ‘by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.’ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its duration, [cit.], or its location, [cit.]. A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Nor does requiring disclosure of identity violate a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment ; while statements of identity may be “testimonial” for Fifth Amendment purposes, “[defendant’s] challenge must fail because in this case disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.” “Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555, 110 S.Ct. 900, 107 L.Ed.2d 992 (1990) …. Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.” Four justices dissent. OCGA § 16-10-24 does not specifically enumerate failure to identify oneself as obstruction. Case law seems to allow conviction for obstruction under circumstances similar to those found here, however. See Johnson, above, and cases cited therein. OCGA § 16-11-36(b), cited in Hiibel, allows officers to consider refusal to identify oneself as a circumstance indicating that one is loitering and prowling. Bell v. State, 278 Ga. 69, 597 S.E.2d 350 (May 24, 2004). “[R]equiring a defendant to permit photographs to be taken of him or to submit to fingerprinting does not violate a defendant’s right against self-incrimination.” Tuff v. State, 278 Ga. 91, 597 S.E.2d 328 (May 3, 2004). Swabbing of hands for gunshot residue “‘does not constitute an unconstitutional search or seizure,’” nor does it violate the right against self-incrimination. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 147 L.Ed.2d 24 (June 5, 2000). Prosecution of defendant based upon documents he was forced to produce pursuant to federal grand jury subpoena, backed up by federal court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) compelling the production and granting immunity “to the extent allowed by law,” violated defendant’s rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While “a person may be required to produce specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief because the creation of those documents was not ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the privilege” (emphasis added), in this case the government sought the discovery and production of broad categories of documents, the contents of which were the basis of subsequent prosecution. “[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence. That constitutional privilege has the same application to the testimonial aspect of a response to a subpoena seeking discovery of those sources.” That testimonial aspect lies in more than the physical production of the documents: “[t]he assembly of literally hundreds of pages of material in response to [the broadly- described subpoena] request for … is the functional equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery deposition. Entirely apart from the contents of the 13,120 pages of materials that respondent produced in this case, it is undeniable that providing a catalog of existing documents fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with a ‘lead to incriminating evidence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.’” Further prosecution of defendant is thus controlled by Kastigar v. United States , 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972): “a person who is prosecuted for matters related to testimony he gave under a grant of immunity does not have the burden of proving that his testimony was improperly used. Instead, we held that the statute imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution, not merely to show that its evidence is not tainted by the prior testimony, but ‘to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.’ Id., at 460, 92 S.Ct. 1653. Requiring the prosecution to shoulder this burden ensures that the grant of immunity has ‘le[ft] the witness and the Federal Government in