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substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a grant of immunity.’ Id., at 458- 459, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).” Justices Thomas and Scalia suggest in concurrence that they would hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause “protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence.” Patterson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 131, 528 S.E.2d 884 (January 31, 2000). Trial court properly dismissed declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-14, prohibiting radio and other noise “plainly audible at a distance of 100 feet or more from the motor vehicle”; as “Patterson lacked standing to pursue these issues because there was no ‘actual controversy’ between the parties, as required by OCGA § 9-4-2(a).” “Here, Patterson acknowledged that he had not been charged with violation of the statute nor had there been any showing of intent by authorities to take any action pursuant to the statute.” Distinguishing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) and Total Vending Svc. v. Gwinnett County, 153 Ga.App. 109, 264 S.E.2d 574 (1980), where petitioners had been threatened with prosecution. Patterson has received no such threat; “the challenge here is merely anticipatory. Compare State v. Café Erotica, 269 Ga. 486, 487, n. 1, 500 S.E.2d 574 (1998) with American Booksellers Assn. v. Webb, 254 Ga. 399, 401(2), 329 S.E.2d 495 (1985).” 6. WHEN APPLICABLE Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to allow defendants to call co-indictee Richardson to the stand “to introduce evidence of Richardson's prior acts of violence in support of their justification defense.” Brown and McKinney contended that they were merely defending themselves from Richardson in the gun battle which killed a child bystander; Richardson faced his own trial in the incident the following month. Richardson’s attorney announced his intention to “invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to any questions about those prior acts.” “When a witness expresses his intention to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court must consider the questions that the witness would be asked and ‘decide whether there is a real and appreciable danger that the answer[s] could incriminate the witness. If so, then the decision to answer must be left to the witness. If the trial court determines that the answers could not incriminate the witness, the witness is required to answer or face the court's sanctions.’ Cody v. State, 278 Ga. 779, 780 (609 S.E.2d 320) (2004) (emphasis in original). After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court here reasonably concluded that any questions as to Richardson's past violent acts could incriminate him and affect his pending trial. Accordingly, the court precluded Appellants from calling Richardson as a witness.” Distinguishing Spivey v. State, 200 Ga.App. 284 (407 S.E.2d 425) (1991), “where the limited questioning proposed by the defendant appeared calculated ‘to elicit only potentially relevant testimony exculpatory of [the defendant], rather than incriminatory of [the witness].’ See id. at 285.” Kansas v. Cheever, 12-609, ___ U.S. ____, 134 S.Ct. 596, 187 L.Ed.2d 519 (December 11, 2013). Reversing Kansas Supreme Court’s reversal of Cheever’s murder conviction. Following Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423–424, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987). Under Buchanan , “a State may introduce the results of a court-ordered mental examination for the limited purpose of rebutting a mental-status defense” without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Cheever presented expert testimony in support of a voluntary intoxication defense ; trial court properly allowed State to present, in rebuttal, evidence of defendant’s court-ordered evaluation. 1. “ The rule of Buchanan, which we reaffirm today, is that where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. [Cit.] Any other rule would undermine the adversarial process, allowing a defendant to provide the jury, through an expert operating as proxy, with a one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state at the time of the alleged crime.” 2. “[W]hile as Cheever notes, the mental evaluation in Buchanan was requested jointly by the defense and the government, our holding was not limited to that circumstance. Moreover, contrary to Cheever's suggestion, the case did not turn on whether state law referred to extreme emotional disturbance as an ‘affirmative defense.’ Buchanan, 483 U.S., at 408, 422, 107 S.Ct. 2906 (holding that the prosecution's use of rebuttal expert testimony is permissible where a defendant ‘presents psychiatric evidence’).” 3. “Mental-status defenses include those based on psychological expert evidence as to a defendant's mens rea, mental capacity to commit the crime, or ability to premeditate.” Thus, Kansas Supreme Court’s holding that Buchanan didn’t apply because voluntary intoxication isn’t a “mental disease or defect” (as defined in state law) is incorrect, as is its suggestion that Buchanan wouldn’t apply to a “temporary” condition. Buchanan applied the rule to extreme emotional disturbance. Wilson v. State, 286 Ga. 141, 686 S.E.2d 104 (November 9, 2009). Defendant can’t complain that trial court ignored State’s witness’s effort to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. “[A] criminal ‘defendant lacks