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standing to assert [another's] privilege against self-incrimination. [Cit.]’ Lawton v. State, 259 Ga. 855, 856(2) (388 S.E.2d 691) (1990). Indeed, ‘[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is that of the person under examination as a witness and is intended for his protection only.... [Cits.]’ Lively v. State, 237 Ga. 35, 36 (226 S.E.2d 581) (1976).” Accord, Romer v. State , 293 Ga. 339, 745 S.E.2d 637 (July 1, 2013) (Defendant couldn’t object to evidence that his brother, who was not a co-defendant, refused to speak to police). Williams v. State, 295 Ga.App. 249, 671 S.E.2d 268 (November 25, 2008). Trial court followed proper procedure in determining witness’s right to invoke privilege against self-incrimination. “In a hearing conducted outside the jury's presence, the witness, who was facing robbery charges in another county, informed the trial court that he did not want to testify. ‘ The appropriate course where, as here, a witness invokes his right to remain silent is as follows: First, the trial court must determine if the answers could incriminate the witness. If so, then the decision whether it might must be left to the [witness]. On the other hand, where the trial court determines the answers could not incriminate the witness, he must testify (or be subject to the court's sanction). It is for the court to decide if the danger of incrimination is “real and appreciable.”’ Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. 423, 424(3) n. 3 (360 S.E.2d 716) (1987) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). The trial court here followed this procedure. First, outside the jury's presence, the witness testified that Williams was not involved in the Fisher or Barnes robberies because he and Williams had seen someone else driving the stolen Honda. The prosecutor then described a letter the witness had written to Williams, parts of which could be interpreted as incriminatory toward the witness with respect to his charges in the other county. The prosecutor informed the court that she intended to use the letter for impeachment if the witness testified before the jury. After the trial court informed the witness that he could testify at Williams' trial, but that he did not have to do so and that anything revealed at trial could be used against him later, the witness elected not to testify. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court resolved this issue correctly. See In re: Victorine, 230 Ga.App. 209, 211(1) (495 S.E.2d 864) (1998).” Mercer v. State, 289 Ga.App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (February 14, 2008). Trial court properly declined to strike witness’s testimony when he invoked the Fifth Amendment on certain questions on cross relating to his possession of a firearm. “‘[W]hen a witness declines to answer on cross-examination certain pertinent questions relevant to a matter testified about by the witness on direct examination, all of the witness’ testimony on the same subject matter should be stricken.... In determining whether the testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 331, 333(7) (168 S.E.2d 587) (1969). Accord Cody v. State, 278 Ga. 779, 780- 781(2) (609 S.E.2d 320) (2004).” Billings v. State, 278 Ga. 833, 607 S.E.2d 595 (January 10, 2005). Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to call a witness in the presence of the jury where that witness had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination as to all questions. “‘If it appears that a witness intends to claim the privilege [against self-incrimination] as to essentially all questions, the court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow him to take the stand. Neither side has the right to benefit from any inferences the jury may draw simply from the witness’ assertion of the privilege either alone or in conjunction with questions that have been put to him.’ [Cit.] ... [O]ne reason for this rule is that reliable inferences do not ordinarily follow from a witness’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment.’ Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 604(7) (340 S.E.2d 869) (1986).” Davis v. State, 264 Ga.App. 128, 589 S.E.2d 700 (November 14, 2003). “[T]he court did not err in allowing the State to question the witness even after she invoked the Fifth Amendment. See Bowen v. State, 194 Ga.App. 80, 81 (389 S.E.2d 516) (1989) (State allowed to ask questions of witness after he invoked Fifth Amendment because witness only invoked Fifth Amendment with respect to certain questions). ” Whitaker v. State, 256 Ga.App. 436, 568 S.E.2d 594 (July 9, 2002). Conviction at bench trial (for public indecency, not stated in opinion) affirmed; in post-trial hearing to determine whether jury trial waiver was voluntarily made by defendant personally, no violation of defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination by requiring him to testify on that limited subject. “Whitaker's privilege against self-incrimination was not affected by inquiry into matters not relevant to his guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Cummings v. State, 242 Ga.App. 657–658(1), 530 S.E.2d 782 (2000) (questioning not relevant to