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guilt not interrogation requiring Miranda warnings).” Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 121 S. Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (March 19, 2001). Reversing Ohio Supreme Court, which erroneously “held that a witness who denies all culpability does not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Because our precedents dictate that the privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty, and that the facts here are sufficient to sustain a claim of privilege, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.” Ohio reversed Reiner’s involuntary manslaughter conviction because trial court granted witness Batt transactional immunity when she asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege. Reiner was charged with killing his infant son; he cast blame on the babysitter, Batt. “The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. As the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged, this privilege not only extends ‘to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.’ Hoffman [ v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)]. ‘[I]t need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’ Id., at 486-487, 71 S.Ct. 814. We have held that the privilege's protection extends only to witnesses who have ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ Id., at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814. That inquiry is for the court; the witness' assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination. Ibid. A danger of ‘imaginary and unsubstantial character’ will not suffice. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 366, 37 S.Ct. 621, 61 L.Ed. 1198 (1917). But we have never held, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did, that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary, we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's ‘basic functions ... is to protect innocent men ... “who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (quoting Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 U.S. 551, 557-558, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956)) (emphasis in original). In Grunewald, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth. 353 U.S., at 421-422, 77 S.Ct. 963.” Braswell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 602, 538 S.E.2d 492 (August 18, 2000). Aggravated assault, theft and related convictions affirmed; no prosecutorial misconduct where “the prosecutor continued to question him about burning the victim's car after Braswell invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. … A defendant in a criminal case who voluntarily testifies in his own behalf waives his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. Carter v. State, 161 Ga.App. 734, 736(3), 288 S.E.2d 749 (1982). ‘Furthermore, when a defendant voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf and testifies as to his guilt or innocence as to a particular offense, his waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing. His voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts because of the necessary connection between all.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Hubbard v. State, 173 Ga.App. 127, 129(7), 325 S.E.2d 799 (1984).” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (April 5, 1999). Reversing Third Circuit; district court erred in holding that a) self-incrimination privilege didn’t apply in sentencing hearing, and b) court could draw negative inferences from defendant’s silence. Defendant pled guilty to drug charges, reserving the right to contest the amount of the drugs – an important factor in sentencing. Defendant declined to testify or present evidence at sentencing, and Government’s evidence was equivocal at best, but the district court made a finding adverse to defendant, expressly stating that its finding was based in part of defendant’s silence at sentencing. Held: 1. defendant’s guilty plea wasn’t “a waiver of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to all the crimes comprehended in the plea.” Contrary to Government’s argument, participation in plea colloquy didn’t amount to waiver. “The purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or involuntary plea. The Government would turn this constitutional shield into a prosecutorial sword by having the defendant relinquish all rights against compelled self- incrimination upon entry of a guilty plea, including the right to remain silent at sentencing.” “Nor does Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs pleas, contemplate the broad waiver the Government envisions. … Of course, a court may discharge its duty of ensuring a factual basis for a plea by ‘question[ing] the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded.’ Rule 11(c)(5). We do not question the authority of a district court to make whatever inquiry it deems necessary in its sound discretion to assure itself the defendant is not being pressured to offer a plea for which there is no factual basis. A defendant who withholds information by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination at a plea colloquy runs the risk the district court will find the factual basis inadequate. At least once the plea has been accepted, statements or admissions made during the preceding plea colloquy are later admissible against the defendant, as is the plea itself. A statement admissible against a defendant, however, is not necessarily a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Rule 11 does not prevent the defendant