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from relying upon the privilege at sentencing.” “We reject the position that either petitioner's guilty plea or her statements at the plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing.” 2. Contrary to Third Circuit, incrimination isn’t complete at plea entry, but continues through sentencing. “It is true, as a general rule, that where there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege. We conclude that principle applies to cases in which the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final. See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249 (1960). If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared. Where the sentence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony.” Based on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), a death penalty case: “Any effort by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.” 451 U.S., at 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866. “The Fifth Amendment by its terms prevents a person from being ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. To maintain that sentencing proceedings are not part of ‘any criminal case’ is contrary to the law and to common sense.” 3. Sentencing court couldn’t draw negative inferences from defendant’s silence at sentencing. “The normal rule in a criminal case is that no negative inference from the defendant's failure to testify is permitted. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). We decline to adopt an exception for the sentencing phase of a criminal case with regard to factual determinations respecting the circumstances and details of the crime.” “The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in § 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it.” Scalia, writing for Roberts, O’Connor and Thomas, dissents. Y. STANDING Rehman v. Belisle, 294 Ga. 71, 751 S.E.2d 97 (November 4, 2013). Mandamus action properly dismissed; plaintiff who was not charged with violation of ordinance or otherwise threatened with its enforcement lacked standing to challenge its constitutionality. Plaintiff sued Mayor and Council of Senoia, seeking “a declaration that a city ordinance is ‘ill conceived, confusing, detrimental and unconstitutional’ and should be repealed. The ordinance states: ‘It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession less than one ounce of marijuana.’” Based on use of the pronoun “his,” “Plaintiff posits the ordinance can be read so as to make it lawful for men, but not women, to be in possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.” Citing Manlove (June 15, 2009), below. Manlove v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, 285 Ga. 637, 680 S.E.2d 405 (June 15, 2009). Challenge to local noise ordinance dismissed for lack of standing where petitioners had not been cited for violation. “[Petitioners] did not have standing because they failed to show any harm or injury resulting from appellee's noise ordinance. ‘As a general rule, a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law only if the law has an adverse impact on that litigant's own rights.’ Feminist Women's Health Center v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433 (651 S.E.2d 36(1) (2007). Whether proceeding under federal law or the law of this state, in order to challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance on First Amendment grounds, the party before the court must show an injury in fact. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782) (1988) (to challenge the constitutionality of a statute the plaintiff must ‘establish at an irreducible minimum an injury in fact’); Maverick Media Group, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, Fla., 528 F.3d 817, 822-823 (11 th Cir., 2008); Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Roswell, 283 Ga. 417(1) (658 S.E.2d 587) (2008). Here, it is undisputed that [petitioners] have never been subject to any fine or penalty as a result of violating appellee's noise ordinance, nor have they otherwise been harmed for running afoul of appellee's noise ordinance. [Petitioners] repeatedly assert that they intend to play their music ‘loudly’ in the future, however, even this assertion does not necessarily trigger a violation of the noise ordinance on its face or suggest an imminent threat of prosecution. See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488(II) (129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1) (2009) (threat of injury in fact for standing purposes must ‘be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1206-1208 (11 th Cir., 2006) (although arrested for protesting in the past, plaintiffs' assertions that they would engage in protests in the future was insufficient to establish an imminent and concrete threat of injury for standing purposes). A court cannot judge the constitutionality of a law based on speculation and conjecture of such an unspecified future harm as is alleged in the case at bar. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it dismissed [petitioners’] action for lack of standing.” Three (Sears, writing for Hunstein and Melton) dissent: “As then-Judge Carley succinctly put it when he was on the Court of Appeals, a plaintiff ‘is not required to violate a law about which there is an actual controversy concerning its enforceability and suffer a criminal prosecution, in order to test its validity.’ Total Vending Serv., Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 153 Ga.App. 109, 111 (264 S.E.2d 574) (1980).” See also Rehman ( November 4, 2013)