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above (defendant not charged with violation or threatened with prosecution lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of ordinance). Z. STRUCTURAL ERROR Seminal case: Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed, but case remanded to complete record on defendant’s contention that he was denied the right to represent himself despite his express assertion of the right. At various times during the multi-year pendency of his case, defendant was either appointed counsel or allowed to represent himself, but the record here omits transcripts of some pretrial proceedings and does not make clear when and why counsel changed or appeared in some instances. “Once given pro se status, the defendant ‘must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.’ McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174(II)(B) (104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122) (1984). Deprivation of the right to self-representation is structural error, i.e., errors that require automatic reversal. Id. at 177(III), n. 8 (‘Since the right of self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to “harmless error” analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.’); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8(II)(A) (119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35) (1999).” Mitchell v. State, 293 Ga. 1, 742 S.E.2d 454 (April 29, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no “structural error occurred at trial when the judge left the courtroom during deliberations while the jury was rehearing appellant's recorded statements.” “The trial judge's absence occurred during deliberations while the jury was rehearing previously received recorded evidence.” No evidence that judge’s absence caused any delay, obstruction or prejudice, and no basis for defendant’s argument “that jurors might have inferred from the judge's absence that she considered appellant's statements incredible. … Absent any indication that the judge's absence affected either the fairness or the outcome of the proceedings, we find the error was harmless. In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold that a judge's absence from the courtroom during trial may never amount to structural error. Some absences may be so inherently prejudicial that relief is required, and in such cases, this Court will not hesitate to reverse a criminal conviction. See United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240, 241 (3 rd Cir., 1998) (‘[W]e cannot ... anticipate every circumstance under which the judge's absence may destroy the structure’). This is not such a case. Courts are reminded, however, that a trial by jury in the presence of an impartial judge is the foundation of our criminal justice system. As a general rule, when a judge finds it necessary to be absent from the courtroom, the judge should adjourn the proceedings during his or her absence.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (May 24, 2010). “The Second Circuit has said that it must recognize a ‘plain error’ if there is ‘ any possibility, ’ however remote, that a jury convicted a defendant exclusively on the basis of actions taken before enactment of the statute that made those actions criminal. [Cit.] In our view, the Second Circuit's standard is inconsistent with this Court's ‘plain error’ cases.” Circuit Court’s reversal of defendant’s convictions for forced labor and sex trafficking therefore reversed and remanded. “A federal grand jury indicted respondent Glenn Marcus on charges that he engaged in unlawful forced labor and sex trafficking between January 1999 and October 2001. At trial, the Government presented evidence of his conduct during that entire period. And a jury found him guilty of both charges. On appeal, Marcus pointed out for the first time that the statutes he violated were enacted as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), which did not become law until October 28, 2000. Marcus noted that the indictment and the evidence presented at trial permitted a jury to convict him exclusively upon the basis of actions that he took before October 28, 2000. And for that reason, Marcus argued that his conviction violated the Constitution – in Marcus' view, the Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Marcus conceded that he had not objected on these grounds in the District Court. But, he said, the constitutional error is ‘plain,’ and his conviction therefore must be set aside.” (Internal cites and quotes omitted.) 1. Not structural error. “[W]hile the rights at issue in this case are important, they do not differ significantly in importance from the constitutional rights at issue in other cases where we have insisted upon a showing of individual prejudice. See [ Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-307, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)] (collecting cases). Indeed, we have said that ‘ if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred’ are not ‘structural errors.’ Rose [ v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)]. No one here denies that defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator.” 2. Test for plain error. “[A]n appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the