☢ test - Í

complaint of a partial violation of OCGA § 17-8-54.” Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 651 S.E.2d 1 (July 13, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the removal of two jurors during deliberations in a hearing closed to spectators. “‘(A) violation of one’s right to a public trial is structural error. (Cits.) Structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” (Cit.) As such, structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis. (Cit.)’ [Cit.] Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 570-571(1) (602 S.E.2d 312) (2004).” “‘The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.... To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals believing public questioning will prove damaging because of embarrassment, may properly request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel present and on the record .’ Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 511-512(III) (104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629) (1984). In this case, the issue arose after deliberations had begun, rather than during the initial selection process, and the request for closure was initiated by the juror himself, rather than prompted by the trial court’s inquiry as to whether there was a need for privacy. Despite these factual differences, however, Berry does not suggest any reason why the legal principle established in Press-Enterprise Co. is not equally applicable here. ‘By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of unnecessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the [trial] court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service.’ Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, supra at 512(III).” Closure here was without objection from defense. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (June 26, 2006). “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” Thus, Supreme Court of Washington erred in failing to consider whether the error in this case was harmless error. Here, jury was charged on “assault” and “assault with a deadly weapon,” but not “assault with a firearm” – but the evidence was uncontroverted that the only weapon used was a handgun. Under Washington law, “assault with a firearm” carries a higher sentence enhancement than “assault with a deadly weapon.” Jury specifically found that defendant used a deadly weapon. Supreme Court remands for consideration of whether the failure to specify “firearm” in the verdict form, although the indictment specified “a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun,” was harmless error. “ We have repeatedly recognized that the commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal. Instead, ‘“most constitutional errors can be harmless.”’ Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). ‘ “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” ’ 527 U.S., at 8 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). Only in rare cases has this Court held that an error is structural, and thus requires automatic reversal. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), in turn citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (complete denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (biased trial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (denial of self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (denial of public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (defective reasonable-doubt instruction)).” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (June 26, 2006). Wrongful denial of right to retained counsel of choice is “structural error,” requiring reversal without harmless error analysis. Structural errors “‘defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards’ because they ‘affec[t] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and are not ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ Id., at 309-310. [fn] See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Such errors include the denial of counsel , see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), the denial of the right of self-representation , see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-178, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), the denial of the right to public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), and the denial of the right to trial by jury by the giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction , see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113