☢ test - Í

S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (June 10, 1999). Affirming in part and reversing in part Eleventh Circuit; harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applies to erroneous jury instruction that omits an element of the charged offense. Defendant here was charged with filing false federal income tax returns, bank fraud, and related offenses. The U.S. District Court determined that materiality was a question for the court, not the jury, and found that the evidence established materiality. Eleventh Circuit affirmed. U.S. Supreme Court reverses as to the holding that materiality is a question for the court, not the jury, but finds the error harmless because defendant didn’t contest at trial that the $5,000.000 understatement of defendant’s income on his tax returns was material. “‘[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.’ Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). … The error at issue here – a jury instruction that omits an element of the offense – differs markedly from the constitutional violations we have found to defy harmless-error review. Those cases, we have explained, contain a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ [ Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)]. Such errors ‘infect the entire trial process,’ Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and ‘necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair,’ Rose, 478 U.S., at 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101. Put another way, these errors deprive defendants of ‘basic protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’ Id., at 577-578, 106 S.Ct. 3101.” Omission of an element, by contrast, may still result in a fundamentally fair proceeding. Analogized to Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 469, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (no reversal of perjury conviction despite omission of “materiality” element from jury charge; in light of “overwhelming” and “uncontroverted” evidence of materiality, “the error did not ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”). Distinguishing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instruction required reversal “because it ‘vitiates all the jury’s findings,’ 508 U.S., at 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, and produces ‘consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,’ id., at 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078.”). “In this situation, where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. We think it beyond cavil here that the error ‘did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Chapman, supra, at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.” “We believe that where an omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence, this approach reaches an appropriate balance between ‘society's interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method by which decisions of guilt are to be made.’ Connecticut v. Johnson, [ Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 86, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983)] (plurality opinion).” Stevens disagrees with harmless error analysis, but concurs in judgment. Scalia, writing for Souter and Ginsburg, dissents on this point: “I believe that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have the jury determine his guilt of the crime charged – which necessarily means his commission of every element of the crime charged – can never be harmless.” AA. TAKINGS Mann v. Department of Corrections, 282 Ga. 754, 653 S.E.2d 740 (November 21, 2007). “OCGA § 42-1-15, which prohibits registered sex offenders from residing or loitering at a location that is within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school or area where minors congregate (the ‘residency restriction’),” is unconstitutional as applied to defendant’s residence here, but not his business: defendant owned his residence before a child care facility was built within 1,000 feet. Similarly, he co-owned and managed a restaurant in a leased shopping center space before another child care facility was located within 1,000 feet of the restaurant. Held, the code section constitutes an unconstitutional taking of defendant’s residence without just and adequate compensation, but no improper taking of the business. Residence: “As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 537 (125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876) (2005), ‘ government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster – and that such “regulatory takings” may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.’ Accord Mann [ v. State , 278 Ga. 442, 443(2), 603 S.E.2d 283 (2004). ‘Regulations that fall short of eliminating property’s beneficial economic use may still effect a taking, depending upon the regulation’s economic impact on the landowner, the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the interests promoted by the government action.’ (Footnotes omitted.) [ Lingle. ] This language reflects the ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City , 438 U.S. 104, 124 (98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631) (1978), which rejected any set formula and instead listed certain factors to be used to ‘identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, [the Penn Central test] focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that