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government imposes upon private property rights. . . . [T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.’ Lingle , supra at 539-540.” Finds defendant’s property interest in the home he shares with his wife to be significant, as is the burden of moving out of it. Rejects State’s argument that he can sell it or rent it, and thus either be forced to incur closing costs or take on the “unwelcomed and unanticipated role” of lessors. “See also Duffield v. DeKalb County , 242 Ga. 432, 433-434 (2) (249 S.E.2d 235) (1978) (property is taken under Georgia Constitution when owner’s right to ‘possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it’ impaired). Unlike the situation in the typical regulatory takings case, the effect of OCGA § 42-1-15 is to mandate [defendant’s] immediate physical removal from his … residence. It is ‘functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly . . . ousts the owner from his domain.’ Lingle, supra , 544 U.S. at 539.” Further, defendant faces the prospect of repeatedly being forced to move of other third-parties decide to locate one of the prohibited uses near any future residence. “ Looking to the magnitude and character of the burden OCGA § 42-1-15 imposes on the property rights of registered sex offenders and how that burden is distributed among property owners, Lingle , supra, 544 U.S. at 542; see also Mann , supra , we conclude that, under the circumstances present here, justice requires that the burden of safeguarding minors from encounters with registered sexual offenders must be ‘spread among taxpayers through the payment of compensation.’ Lingle, supra at 543. We therefore find that OCGA § 42-1-15(a) is unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the regulatory taking of appellant’s property without just and adequate compensation.” Business: “Appellant’s property interest in the business in which he owns a half-interest is considerable. However, nothing in OCGA § 42-1- 15(b)(1) compels appellant to divest himself of that ownership interest in the business or to relocate the business in order to maintain his interest in it. Although the statute’s work restriction does directly deprive appellant of his right to work at the physical location of the business, there was no showing that appellant’s property interest in the business depends on his physical presence; that the tasks he performs on site at the restaurant cannot be performed economically by others; and that other tasks he performs cannot be handled with comparable economic efficiency at a site outside any buffer zone.” Implicitly holds that ownership of business is not covered by code section’s prohibition on “employment.” BB. VAGUENESS Whatley v. State, 297 Ga. 399, 774 S.E.2d 687 (June 29, 2015). Interlocutory appeal. Trial court properly denied constitutional challenge to OCGA § 16-13-43 (which “deals with the distribution of controlled substances by prescription and provides that it is unlawful to ‘withhold information from a practitioner that such person has obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.’”). Contrary to defendant’s argument, the statute isn’t void for vagueness. “It is well-settled that the ‘void for vagueness doctrine of the due process clause requires that a challenged statute or ordinance give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that specific conduct is forbidden or mandated and provide sufficient specificity so as not to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Vagueness challenges ... that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case to be decided. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Parker v. City of Glennville, 288 Ga. 34, 35(1), 701 S.E.2d 182 (2010). … ‘[W]hen a statute or ordinance does not implicate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, a facial vagueness challenge will be upheld only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [ Catoosa County v. R.N. Talley Properties, 282 Ga. 373, 374, 651 S.E.2d 7 (2007)].” Statute here doesn’t implicate defendant’s First Amendment freedoms, and “[t]here is no indication anywhere in the record that Whatley raised an argument with regard to the facts of her specific case, much less the application of OCGA § 16–13–43(a)(6) to her specific facts. Only a facial challenge to the statute was raised, and, as a facial challenge was not warranted, the trial court should have denied Whatley's general demurrer for this reason.” Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (February 24, 2014). Trial court properly denied LLC’s various constitutional challenges to prosecution under county nuisance ordinance. Defendant here operated a landfill in Stephens County, and was charged with violations of both county ordinance and State EPD regulations for solid waste disposal violations. Local ordinance wasn’t unconstitutionally vague. “Wilbros is charged with violation of subsection (3) of the ordinance, which declares as a nuisance ‘[p]ollution of the air by gases, vapors, fumes, mists, dusts, or smoke in quantities sufficient to be disagreeable, discomforting, or detrimental to health or well-being in relation to the conditions of the surrounding area, as determined by the health officer.’ It is also charged with violation of subsection (4), which declares as a nuisance ‘[t]rash, garbage, refuse, or any foul, decaying or putrescent material kept in such quantities or used in such a manner or place as to become offensive, objectionable, or detrimental to health or well-being.’ A nuisance ordinance ‘is not vague if it uses terms which have well established common law meanings or which are significantly explained in the context of the ordinance as a whole.... [T]he term “offensive” does not render a nuisance standard unconstitutionally vague.’ Stanfield v. Glynn County, 280 Ga. 785, 789(4) (631 S.E.2d 374) (2006). The test of whether an act is a nuisance is whether it would be offensive to persons of ordinary feelings and sensibilities. Life for God's Stray