☢ test - Í

Animals, Inc. v. New North Rockdale County Homeowners Assoc., 253 Ga. 551, 553(5) (322 S.E.2d 239) (1984). Thus, we reject Wilbros's assertion that the ordinance gives unfettered discretion to a health official to determine what constitutes a violation. In light of the facts to be decided, we interpret the ordinance to require the opinion of a health officer that the prohibited pollution is sufficient to be disagreeable or discomforting to a person of ordinary sensibilities or detrimental to health or well-being. We do not find this provision to be unconstitutionally vague or to grant unfettered official discretion.” Kennedy v. Carlton, 294 Ga. 576, 757 S.E.2d 46 (February 24, 2014). Habeas court erred by granting relief; OCGA § 16- 10-23 isn’t unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Defendant pretended to be a DFCS employee, calling neighbors to ask questions about the foster mother of his three children. 1. Statute not vague. Habeas court found that code section “failed to adequately hold itself out as applicable to public employees as opposed to public officers .” Supreme Court disagrees: “OCGA § 16–10–23, which is captioned ‘Impersonating a public officer or employee,’ consists of a single sentence: ‘A person who falsely holds himself out as a peace officer or other public officer or employee with intent to mislead another into believing that he is actually such officer commits the offense of impersonating an officer and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute forthrightly and plainly states that it applies to public employees, as well as peace and other public officers. ” 2. Issue wasn’t waived by defendant’s Alford plea. “Carlton made the challenge prior to the entry of his pleas, and expressly attempted to reserve it following his pleas. Compare Kolokouris v. State, 271 Ga. 597 (523 S.E.2d 311) (1999). Moreover, the gravamen of Carlton's challenge is that inasmuch as OCGA § 16–10–23 failed to adequately give notice that his conduct was criminal, the statute is fatally flawed, and the counts in his indictment, to which he pled, failed to charge him with any crime. A plea of guilty does not waive the defense that an indictment charges no crime. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 56(3) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995).” Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 748 S.E.2d 426 (September 9, 2013). Convictions for violating Georgia’s mandatory education statute, OCGA § 20-2-690.1, affirmed; statute isn’t so vague as to violate due process. Considered “in pari material with other legislation and regulations,” the statute gives fair notice of what constitutes an “excused” or “unexcused” absence from school. “OCGA § 20–2–693 expressly provides that the classification of school absences as excused or not is to be further refined by policies and regulations promulgated by the State Board of Education. Indeed, the trial court specifically noted Department of Education Regulation 160–5–1–.10 which lists various circumstances in which an absence may be excused. Again, the requirement of due process is that the law give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of the conduct which is forbidden or mandated, and it is clear that OCGA § 20–2–690.1 punishes the legally unjustified failure to send a child for whom one is responsible to school. And, the trial court noted in Pitts's case that ultimately she was to be prosecuted for only those counts in the accusation for which she ‘wholly failed to provide any attempt whatsoever’ to excuse her son's absences from school; consequently, as that court found, ‘no person of ordinary intelligence could reasonably believe that the wholesale failure to provide ANY attempt to excuse a child's absence could qualify as an “excused” absence under any conceivable definition of the word.’ Pitts's due process challenge fails.” Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (June 17, 2013). Interim appeal in prosecution for Medicaid fraud; trial court properly found that Medicaid fraud statute wasn’t unconstitutionally vague. “The trial court found that although the statute did not explicitly state all the manners in which one could violate OCGA § 49–4–146.1(b)(2), the procedures for which one would not be entitled to payment through the program were listed in the Medicaid manual; thus, the statute in conjunction with the manual provided appellant with appropriate notice as required by law. The court also concluded that when the facts in the indictment were combined with the statute there was no vagueness. Finally, the court rejected appellant's claim that the statute was susceptible to subjective application by law enforcement—noting that either there was enough evidence to meet the statute's elements or not. We agree with the trial court.” Youmans v. State, 291 Ga. 754, 732 S.E.2d 441 (October 15, 2012). Conviction for failure to register as a sexual offender under OCGA § 42-1-12(c)(4) affirmed; statute isn’t unconstitutionally vague for failing to define “sexually violent offense” requiring registration. “It is clear from appellant's own statements that he did not find the statute vague in the absence of a definition of the term ‘sexually violent offense.’ He testified at his probation revocation hearing that he knew he was convicted of a ‘sexually violent offense’ in 2004 and was required in 2009 to inform authorities of his change of address, as he had done previously. He did not register his change of address on this occasion, he admitted, because he was busy and just ‘didn't go and register at the county.’ See Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 241, 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009) (defendant who reported change of address at least four times did not find term ‘temporary residence’ vague despite absence of statutory definition).” Defendant was previously convicted of aggravated sexual battery.