☢ test - Í

Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (November 8, 2010). Sex offender registration statute isn’t unconstitutionally vague for failure to define what offenses are covered, or terms such as “in the nature of” and “sexual offense.” “ ‘When the phrase challenged as vague has a commonly understood meaning, then it is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements.’ Dunn v. State , 286 Ga. 238(1), 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009). ‘Where, as here, the challenged statute does not involve First Amendment freedoms, it is examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. [Cits.]’ Baker v. State , [280 Ga. 822, 823, 633 S.E.2d 541 (2006).] It is commonly understood by persons of ‘common intelligence’ that criminal conduct which is a sexual offense is, at a minimum, criminal conduct which involves genitalia. Inasmuch as the offense of cruelty to children for which appellant was convicted is found in Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia and appellant’s conduct that led to his conviction – requiring his victim to touch his penis and requiring her to permit him to touch her breast – is a sexual offense, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.” Parker v. City of Glennville, 288 Ga. 34, 701 S.E.2d 182 (October 18, 2010). Superior Court properly denied injunction against enforcement of city ordinance, which prohibits weeds and grass over ten inches within the city, despite defendant’s claim of selective enforcement. “By its terms, … [ordinance] § 30-8 as written leaves no room for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Parker's allegation that the ordinance is not being enforced to its full limits does not render the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. Due process requires only that an ordinance define the offense in terms that advise people of ordinary intelligence of the conduct sought to be prohibited and provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Bell v. State, 252 Ga. 267, 270-271 (313 S.E.2d 678) (1984). Because § 30-8 satisfies both of these criteria, we affirm the trial court's decision upholding the constitutionality of § 30-8 on vagueness grounds.” Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650, 690 S.E.2d 835 (March 15, 2010). “OCGA §§ 16-6-1(b) and 17-10-6.1, the sentencing statutes for the crime of rape” are not “so vague that they fail to apprise [defendant] with sufficient clarity of the maximum sentence that may be imposed should he be convicted of violating OCGA § 16-6-1(a).” Defendant accurately points out that “OCGA § 16-6-1(b) sets forth four sentencing options as punishment available for a person convicted of the offense of rape: death; imprisonment for life without parole; imprisonment for life; or ‘a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment.’” While death and life without parole are not actually available (see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407(II) (128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525) (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584(III) (97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982) (1977), and State v. Velazquez, 283 Ga. 206 (657 S.E.2d 838) (2008)) the latter two options remain. “As Merritt correctly observes, when the language in OCGA § 16-6-1(b) and subsection (c)(4) of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 are construed together, the result is that trial courts are authorized to impose what may constitute a ‘de facto’ sentence of life without parole by sentencing a defendant to a term of years that, while ‘not exceeding life imprisonment’ as provided by OCGA § 16-6-1(b), may nevertheless equal a defendant's probable life span, which the defendant would then be required by OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(4) to serve in its entirety without any possibility of parole.” Supreme Court finds no conflict between this result and the holding in Velazquez . “We hold that a defendant never before convicted of rape who is contemplating a plea of guilty to a rape charge would reasonably understand that he faces either a life sentence, for which he would be eligible for consideration for parole after 30 years, or a term of years during which no parole was possible, with the term ranging from a minimum of 25 years to a number that would encompass the rest of his natural life. These statutes enable a defendant to readily ascertain the relevant law governing the sentences available for a first conviction for rape such that a defendant can be apprised of and fully understand the possible consequences when weighing whether to enter a guilty plea to the charge.” Defendant doesn’t challenge the punishment as cruel and unusual. Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010 ). OCGA § 17-10-10, which allows for consecutive sentences on separate offenses, is not void for vagueness (or otherwise unconstitutional for any of the numerous reasons advanced by defendant). Code section provides “[w]here at one term of court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, or on more than one count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein.” “‘ Courts have generally recognized that statutes which afford discretion to a sentencing court to impose consecutive sentences do not violate due process. [Cits.]’ State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 699(IV) (Iowa 2001).” Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 686 S.E.2d 772 (November 23, 2009). OCGA § 42-1-12 is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to define “temporary residence.” Defendant’s probation was revoked for failing to report his temporary change of residence to the sheriff within 72 hours. Using the Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “temporary” and “residence,” Supreme Court concludes that “a ‘temporary residence’ is where one lives for a limited time, which is in keeping with the long recognized concept that a person may have more than one residence. See Daniel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 Ga.App.