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898, 902(4) (660 S.E.2d 765) (2008); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mixon, 118 Ga.App. 31, 33 (162 S.E.2d 830) (1968). The term ‘temporary residence’ provides fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what is required to comply with the statute.” In re: C.B., 286 Ga. 173, 686 S.E.2d 124 (November 9, 2009). OCGA § 16-12-4(b), defining cruelty to animals, is not unconstitutionally vague. “Pursuant to OCGA § 16-12-4(b), a person can be held criminally responsible for cruelty to animals if he “causes death or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering to any animal by an act.” However, according to OCGA § 16-12-4(f), a person is not prohibited from “[d]efending his or her person or property, or the person or property of another, from injury or damage being caused by an animal” or “[i]njuring or killing an animal reasonably believed to constitute a threat for injury or damage to any property” so long as “[t]he method used to injure or kill such animal shall be designed to be as humane as is possible under the circumstances.” C.B. argues that the statutory language set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) creates an ambiguity as to the conduct prohibited because different interpretations of the same facts can be used to either find an individual criminally responsible for cruelly injuring an animal or authorize the “humane” injuring of the animal. We disagree. … Reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that OCGA § 16-12-4(b) explains when a person is liable for cruelty to animals, while OCGA § 16-12-4(f)(1) explains some circumstances in which the killing or wounding of animal can be justified. OCGA § 16-12-4(f)(2) goes on to state that the killing or wounding of an animal will be justified only if the action is humane and occurs under the circumstances described in OCGA § 16-12-4(f)(1). [fn: We note that, in this case, the evidence did not show that C.B. was justified in shooting the dog. OCGA § 16-12-4(f)(1). ]” Harper v. State, 300 Ga.App. 757, 686 S.E.2d 375 (November 5, 2009). “There is no merit in Harper's challenge to the statute proscribing kidnapping with bodily injury OCGA § 16-5-40 on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term ‘bodily injury.’ Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 49(3) (572 S.E.2d 583) (2002) (‘bodily injury’ is a term that is ‘commonly understood’).” Smith v. State, 285 Ga. 725, 681 S.E.2d 161 (July 9, 2009). Vehicular homicide statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied: evidence supported defendant’s vehicular homicide conviction where officer struck and killed another motorist as defendant was fleeing and eluding. “There is nothing in the statute that would have prevented Smith, or any person of ordinary intelligence, from understanding that actions taken to elude police that result in the death of another person could lead to a prosecution and conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle.” McNair v. State, 285 Ga. 514, 678 S.E.2d 69 (June 8, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for violating “OCGA § 40-6- 120(a)(2), the traffic statute addressing left-hand turns,” reversed, and the code section declared void for vagueness. Unanimous Supreme Court rules that the language of the code section is subject to two possible meanings when it directs that “the left turn shall be made … so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.” Court finds that the word “leave” has two possible, diametrically-opposed meanings: “The first interpretation is that a driver who wants to make a left turn onto a roadway with multiple lanes must make the turn in a manner that leaves the intersection or other extreme left-hand lane location lawfully available, i.e., open or clear, to traffic moving in the same direction on the roadway the driver has just entered. [fn] This interpretation applies ‘leave’ in the context of its definition as ‘to permit to remain undisturbed ... to permit to remain unoccupied ... to let be without interference.’ Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed.), p. 1287.” “The second interpretation of OCGA § 40-6-120(a)(2) is that a driver who wants to make a left turn onto a roadway with multiple lanes must make the turn so that, when the driver departs from or ‘leaves’ the intersection or other location, the turning vehicle is itself located in the lane farthest to the left that is lawfully available to traffic moving in that same direction. The interpretation applies ‘leave’ in the context of its tertiary definition as ‘to go away or depart from.’ Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra.” Defendant here was accused of violating the code section by turning left onto a road with two lanes of traffic for east-bound traffic, and into the right lane. State contended that the code section required Defendant to choose the left lane. Raber v. State, 285 Ga. 251, 674 S.E.2d 884 (March 23, 2009). By a 4-3 majority, Supreme Court holds that OCGA § 16- 13-42(h), making it “unlawful for any practitioner to issue any prescription document signed in blank,” is not unconstitutionally vague for failure to define “issue.” Defendant doctor was accused of violating the code section by giving his nurse practitioner a pad of 33 pre-signed blank prescriptions. “[Defendant] argues that, because OCGA § 16- 13-41(h) does not define what a physician must do to ‘issue’ a prescription document, he did not have fair notice that providing a pre-signed blank prescription pad to a member of his medical staff in the course of her employment would subject him to prosecution for a felony offense. ” Majority disagrees, and disagrees with dissenters (Hunstein, and