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operation of any public school’ contains words of ordinary meaning that give fair notice as to the statute’s application,” citing Fielden (April 25, 2006), below. Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 642 S.E.2d 51 (February 25, 2007). OCGA § 16-10-20, prohibiting making false statements “within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state government,” etc., is not unconstitutionally vague. “The statute gave Banta ample notice that the conduct of which he was accused was prohibited. Stating that [child abuse victim] was walking at a time when medical evidence showed she would not be able to was a material fact in the matter within the Sheriff’s jurisdiction. … The statute also provides sufficient objective standards to those who are charged with enforcing it. Davis v. State , 272 Ga. 818, 820-821(2), 537 S.E.2d 327 (2000). This is not a case in which the prosecutor’s decision to consider Banta’s act to be criminal and to be a proper subject of prosecution is made only because of the act’s consequence. See Hall v. State , 268 Ga. 89, 94-95(2), 485 S.E.2d 755 (1997). Rather, Banta’s act was criminal when he made his false statement, without regard to the result of that act. Of course, the prosecutor must decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the defendant knowingly and willfully made a false statement as to a material fact, but ‘the fact that application of the statute’s standards sometimes requires an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the statute is violated does not render it unconstitutional. See State v. Miller , 260 Ga. 669, 674 (2), 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).’ Boyer v. State , 270 Ga. 701, 703(1), 512 S.E.2d 605 (1999). See also State v. Wooten , 273 Ga. 529, 531 (2), 543 S.E.2d 721 (2001).” Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 638 S.E.2d 292 (November 29, 2006). “OCGA § 16-8-60(b), which criminalizes the possession and distribution of sounds or images in violation of copyright protection,” is neither “(1) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or (2) preempted by federal copyright law.” As to vagueness: “the phrase ‘transferor of the sounds or visual images,’ found in OCGA § 16-8-60(b),” is not vague, although not defined in the statute. “A ‘transferor’ is one who conveys title or property to another. Black’s Law Dictionary (6 th ed., 1990). In the context of the statute, a ‘transferor of the sounds’ is the individual who conveyed the sounds by transferring them to the article in question. Thus, the statute plainly prohibits the sale, or possession for the purposes of sale, of an article that does not prominently display the name and address of the individual (or entity) who transferred the sounds to the article. The ‘prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness for “in most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” ... All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden,’” quoting Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. 772, 773 (596 S.E.2d 140) (2004). State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 629 S.E.2d 252 (April 25, 2006). Trial court erred in holding statute (OCGA §16-11-34(a), prohibiting conduct which might disrupt a lawful meeting) unconstitutionally void for vagueness. “A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it describes conduct in a manner so unclear that it leaves intelligent people uncertain as to the limits of its application. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322) (1926); Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590(1) (449 S.E.2d 94) (1994). The trial court held that OCGA § 16-11-34(a) is unconstitutionally vague because certain phrases are not defined in the Code or lack clarity. [fn] However, reading the statute according to the natural and obvious import of its language, see generally Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555(1) (544 S.E.2d 153) (2001), we conclude that OCGA § 16-11-34 provides a sufficiently definite warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct, namely, the reckless or knowing commission of any act which may reasonably be expected to disrupt or prevent a lawful meeting, gathering or process, and further that it is not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56(III) (119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67) (1999). Thus, we disagree with that part of the trial court’s ruling and hold that the language in OCGA § 16-11-34(a) is not vague: it is clear and unambiguous.” Statute struck down as overly broad, however. Accord, In re: D.H. (June 2, 2008), above (statute prohibiting disrupting or interfering with public school not unconstitutionally vague). Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 620 S.E.2d 792 (October 3, 2005). “Georgia’s false imprisonment statute, OCGA § 16- 5-41(a),” not unconstitutionally vague for failing to define the word “confine,” which “has a commonly understood meaning which would place a person of common intelligence on notice of the prohibited acts.” Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (May 14, 2001). Affirming Tennessee Supreme Court, and defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder. No ex post facto or due process violation where Tennessee Supreme Court retroactively abolished, in defendant’s murder prosecution, the common law “year-and-a-day” rule. Defendant stabbed victim, who died 15 months later from medical complications arising from defendant’s attack. 1. Ex Post Facto Clause , by its express terms, applies only to legislative enactments, not judicial decisions. 2. A retroactive judicial decision may violate due process if it is “unexpected and indefensible” by reference to the law