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which had existed prior to the conduct in issue ; but here, abolition of the year-and-a-day rule was not unexpected and indefensible. Rather, the rule only ever had a tenuous foothold in Tennessee law; had been legislatively or judicially repealed in a number of other jurisdictions; and had long been rendered obsolete by advances in medical and related science. Based on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), which ruled that a retroactive South Carolina Supreme Court decision violated due process by applying the state’s criminal trespass statute to behavior previously not covered. “Reviewing decisions in which we had held criminal statutes ‘void for vagueness’ under the Due Process Clause, we noted [in Bouie ] that this Court has often recognized the ‘basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.’ Id., at 350, 84 S.Ct. 1697 … Deprivation of the right to fair warning, we continued, can result both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S., at 352, 84 S.Ct. 1697. For that reason, we concluded that ‘[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,” [the construction] must not be given retroactive effect.’ Id., at 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (quoting J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 61 (2d ed., 1960)). We found that the South Carolina court's construction of the statute violated this principle because it was so clearly at odds with the statute's plain language and had no support in prior South Carolina decisions. 378 U.S., at 356, 84 S.Ct. 1697.” The due process protection against unreasonable retroactive application of judicial decisions, however, is not as broad as the protections afforded by the Ex Post Facto Clause, especially when considering applications of common law. “In the context of common law doctrines (such as the year and a day rule), there often arises a need to clarify or even to reevaluate prior opinions as new circumstances and fact patterns present themselves. Strict application of ex post facto principles in that context would unduly impair the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law system. The common law, in short, presupposes a measure of evolution that is incompatible with stringent application of ex post facto principles. It was on account of concerns such as these that Bouie restricted due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’ Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S., at 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (internal quotation marks omitted).” 3. Abolition of the year-and-a-day rule here wasn’t “unexpected and indefensible.” The rule arose because “13th century medical science was incapable of establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt when a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the victim and his death”; modern science more often can establish causation. As a result, a number of other jurisdictions had already abolished the rule when defendant stabbed victim here. And the rule was not firmly grounded in Tennessee – “while the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that the rule persisted at common law, it also pointedly observed that the rule had never once served as a ground of decision in any prosecution for murder in the State. Indeed, in all the reported Tennessee cases, the rule has been mentioned only three times, and each time in dicta.” Stevens, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer dissent, noting that the Tennessee decision expressly claimed to be changing the law, not simply interpreting the law that existed at the time of the crime, and pointing out that other states have abolished the rule only prospectively. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555, 544 S.E.2d 153 (March 19, 2001). County ordinance limiting the number of dogs and/or cats on a residential lot of less than five acres was unconstitutionally vague; ordinance allowed owners to apply for a permit to exceed the limit, but gave no criteria for approval or denial of the permit. “‘Due process requires that any licensing scheme enacted pursuant to the police power ‘provide sufficient objective criteria to control the discretion of the governing authority and adequate notice to applicants of the criteria for issuance of a license.’ [Cit.]” Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 693(6), 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997). ‘Constitutional standards of due process do require that a governing body issuing licenses establish “ascertainable standards ... by which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify ... [.]” [Cit.]’ Levendis v. Cobb County, 242 Ga. 592, 594(1), 250 S.E.2d 460 (1978). Thus, to overcome a vagueness challenge, the Ordinance must be ‘“drawn with sufficient specificity to apprise an applicant of common intelligence of the standards which he should anticipate the governing body will consider.” [Cits.]’ Dinsmore Dev. Co. v. Cherokee County, 260 Ga. 727, 729(1), 398 S.E.2d 539 (1990). See also FSL Corp. v. Harrington, 262 Ga. 725, 726, 425 S.E.2d 276 (1993). Construing the absence of any criteria in the Ordinance most strongly against the State, a reasonable person would assume, as Foster apparently did, that an applicant need not meet any ascertainable standards and that the licensing requirement was solely for the administrative purpose of establishing a registry of who in the county was keeping more than four dogs. … Foster applied for the permit, which was denied for no reason specified in the statutory provision he is charged with violating. Under these circumstances, the State is constitutionally barred from seeking to prosecute Foster on the ground that he violated the Ordinance. ‘ The absence of ascertainable standards leaves the granting or denying of permits to the uncontrolled discretion of the [Office], which is incompatible with the requirements of due process. [Cit.]’ Pel Asso., Inc. v. Joseph, 262 Ga. 904, 909(4), 427 S.E.2d 264 (1993).”