☢ test - Í

[co-defendant] Allen's pointing the gun at [a female occupant of same vehicle] caused Calmes to feel threatened, the threat occurred while they were in the van, driving to the scene of the robbery and assault, not during the crimes themselves. And before the victims were robbed and assaulted, Allen walked off for a period of time; Calmes remained in the van and did not leave, even though he had the opportunity. Because any threat of violence to Calmes did not coincide with the robbery and assault, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a charge on coercion.” Hines v. State, 308 Ga.App. 299, 707 S.E.2d 534 (March 8, 2011). DUI conviction affirmed; evidence didn’t support a defense of coercion. “Under OCGA § 16-3-26, a person cannot be guilty of any crime, except murder, ‘if the act upon which the supposed criminal liability is based is performed under such coercion that the person reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to prevent his imminent death or great bodily injury.’ But ‘[t]he danger must not be one of future violence but of present and immediate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act.’ (Footnote omitted.) Thomas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 290, 292(1), 645 S.E.2d 713 (2007). Accord Slater v. State, 185 Ga.App. 889, 890(2), 366 S.E.2d 240 (1988). Coercion is an affirmative defense, see OCGA § 16-3-28, but it is a defense ‘only if the person coerced has no reasonable way, other than committing the crime, to escape the threat of harm.’ (Citation omitted.) Stitt v. State, 190 Ga.App. 58, 59, 378 S.E.2d 168 (1989). Accord Rodriguez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 169, 170(1), 702 S.E.2d 10 (2010). The state has the burden to disprove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt. Aleman v. State, 227 Ga.App. 607, 608(1), 489 S.E.2d 867 (1997). Accord Bentley v. State, 261 Ga. 229, 230(2), 404 S.E.2d 101 (1991). On cross- examination, Hines admitted that he was not coerced into driving the car away from the restaurant. Hines testified that an employee of the restaurant asked him to leave; that he drove away to avoid a fight; that he had three or four beers before driving the truck; that he had a cell phone in his possession but he did not attempt to call 911, nor did he ask the Buffalo's employees to call a cab for him; and that the person who was trying to fight him was in the parking lot but was not armed .” Rodriguez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 169, 702 S.E.2d 10 (September 22, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for statutory rape affirmed; defendant failed to present a coercion defense. “According to Rodriguez, the victim told him that if he did not have sex with her she would tell her father they were having sex, in which case her father ‘was going to do something bad to [Rodriguez].’ Fearing that the victim's father would kill him, Rodriguez had sex with the victim.” “Here, assuming Rodriguez's testimony to be true, the victim's threat contemplated future violence-she would tell her daddy and then bad things would happen. Rodriguez was not forced to have sex with the victim under a threat of present and immediate harm, notwithstanding the presence of the father elsewhere in the apartment. … Furthermore, ‘[c]oercion is no defense if the person has any reasonable way, other than committing the crime, to escape the threat of harm.’ (Citation omitted.) Gordon v. State, 234 Ga.App. 551, 552 (507 S.E.2d 269) (1998). The victim, a 12-year-old child, could not have stopped Rodriguez from simply leaving.” Clausell v. State, 302 Ga.App. 472, 691 S.E.2d 312 (February 23, 2010). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault and armed robbery, trial court wasn’t required to sua sponte charge jury on coercion; evidence didn’t support such a charge. Only evidence raising the issue victim’s testimony “Clausell claimed in a letter that he was forced to participate because a gun was being pointed at him[; but] this testimony was ‘the self-serving statement of a defendant and was inadmissible hearsay without probative value; thus, a jury charge based on such statement was not warranted.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adame v. State, 244 Ga.App. 257, 262(4)(a) (534 S.E.2d 817) (2000).” Thomas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 290, 645 S.E.2d 713 (May 8, 2007). Evidence did not support defendant’s request for jury charge on coercion where defendant testified that co-defendant threatened to leave him at an unfamiliar shopping mall if he didn’t participate in shoplifting. “[I]n order to apply the defense of coercion, there must be ‘evidence of a threat of immediate violence at the time of the commission of the [crime], not simply a threat of violence or danger in the future.’ (Footnote omitted.) Maxey v. State, 272 Ga.App. 800, 802(1) (613 S.E.2d 236) (2005). See also Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424(2) (589 S.E.2d 108) (2003); OCGA § 16-3-26. In this case, there was no immediate or future threat of violence. There was no evidence that Thomas feared Horn or that Horn threatened him with violence. Nonetheless, Thomas maintains that he was entitled to the coercion charge because Horn told him that he had to participate in the crime if he wanted to go home. The affirmative defense of coercion does not apply under these circumstances. Compare Jones v. State, 226 Ga.App. 619, 621(1) (487 S.E.2d 371) (1997) (defendant’s testimony that his co-defendant forced his participation by pointing a gun at him, giving him orders, and causing him to fear for his life entitled him to a charge on coercion, even absent a request).” Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356 (October 3, 2005). Defendant, convicted of murder, contended that her boyfriend/co-defendant actually shot the victim, then forced her to help dispose of the body. “[Defendant] … takes issue